

National
Farmers
Federation

ACCC Supermarkets
Inquiry 2024-25
Discussion Paper

April 2024



NFF Members



The National Farmers' Federation (NFF) is the voice of Australian farmers.

The NFF was established in 1979 as the national peak body representing farmers and more broadly, agriculture across Australia. The NFF's membership comprises all of Australia's major agricultural commodities across the breadth and the length of the supply chain.

Operating under a federated structure, individual farmers join their respective state farm organisation and/or national commodity council. These organisations form the NFF.

The NFF represents Australian agriculture on national and foreign policy issues including workplace relations, trade and natural resource management. Our members complement this work through the delivery of direct 'grass roots' member services as well as state-based policy and commodity-specific interests.

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Covering letter

9 April 2024

Mr. Mick Keogh
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
Supermarkets inquiry 2024-25
GPO Box 3131
Canberra ACT 2601

Dear Mr. Keogh,

Subject: NFF submission to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission's Supermarkets inquiry 2024-25

The National Farmers' Federation (NFF) welcomes the opportunity to provide a submission to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission's (ACCC) Supermarkets Inquiry 2024-25 (Inquiry).

This Inquiry is occurring alongside a number of reviews and investigation into agricultural supply chains, and in particular those involving supermarkets. This NFF has stated consistently to these various reviews that the Australian agricultural supply chain is characterised by an uneven distribution of market concentration. Food and fibre production has one of the lowest rates of market concentration in the Australian economy. At the same time, supermarkets are one of the most concentrated sectors in Australia.

In 2022–23 Coles and Woolworths held a combined 65 per cent share of Australia's food and grocery market, significantly more than the two following largest firms, Aldi (10 per cent) and Metcash (7 per cent). Coles, Woolworths and Aldi account for more than 75 per cent of industry revenue. Combined, the four largest firms hold approximately 82 per cent of the market in the food and grocery sector. This market share of the top four firms is significantly higher in the food and grocery sector than most other sectors in Australia's economy.

Because of this significant market share, supermarkets are one of the largest supply channels of perishable products to end customers in Australia. This market concentration impacts on the competitive nature of the food supply chain. This is because the discrepancy in market concentration along the supply chain is open to abuse by firms that hold significant market power, often to the detriment of smaller businesses.

It is the NFF's view that supermarkets and retailers do use this market power to the detriment of farmers through lower prices, unfair risk burden and longer-term uncertainty, which can place significant pressure on individual farm businesses.

As it currently stands, Australia's competition law has been ineffective at preventing the misuse or abuse of market concentration. Instead, the existing structures and tools in place have allowed the development of a concerning level of market concentration and the misuse of market power to the detriment of Australian farmers and farm businesses.

The ACCC Inquiry offers an opportunity to build a contemporary evidence base on the Australian supermarket sector, which the NFF believes will demonstrate the impacts on competition within the agricultural supply chain.

The NFF looks forward to continuing to engage with the Inquiry over the course of 2024-25. Should you seek any further information please do not hesitate to contact Mr. Christopher Young, General Manager – Trade and Economics at

[REDACTED]

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]

Tony Mahar

Chief Executive Officer

The effect of market concentration and the misuse of market power

Australian agriculture is a successful, dynamic industry. Farmers across the country have continually taken advantage of new opportunities to become more efficient, productive, sustainable, and internationally competitive.¹

However, increasing concentration in Australia's agricultural supply chain may dampen the long-term ability of farmers to continually increase their efficiency and productivity.^{2,3} While the direct impacts differ between agricultural commodities, decreased competition in the agricultural supply chain risks reducing or delaying the long-term investment in productivity enhancing infrastructure, expansion of farm businesses, and implementation of new practices.

Agriculture relies upon open and transparent marketplaces that promote competition within agricultural supply chains, enabling farmers to access requisite inputs and sell their produce at a competitive price. The Australian agricultural supply chain has an uneven distribution of market concentration which threatens the economic conditions essential for dynamic, productive and profitable farms. While food and fibre production is one of the least concentrated sectors in Australia, supermarkets are one of the most concentrated.^{4,5,6}

Currently, Australia's supermarkets and retail sector is characterised by significant market concentration. This has significant impacts on the competitive nature of the food supply chain. In 2022–23 Coles and Woolworths held a combined 65 per cent share of Australia's food and grocery market.⁷ This is significantly larger than the two next largest firms, Aldi (10 per cent) and Metcash (7 per cent).⁸ Coles, Woolworths and Aldi account for more than 75 per cent of industry revenue.⁹ Combined, the four largest firms hold approximately 82 per cent of the market in the food and grocery sector.¹⁰ This market share of the top four firms is

¹ Berger-Thomas L., Breusch J. & Lilley L., 2018, Australia's experience with economic reform. Treasury working paper, The Treasury, Australian Government, Canberra, Australia.

² Australian Farm Institute 2020, How the relative bargaining power of Australian agricultural value chain actors affects trading practices – and this the efficient operation of these markets.

³ Sorrentino, A., Russo, C. & Cacchiarelli, L. 2018. "Market Power and Bargaining Power in the EU Food Supply Chain: The Role of Producer Organizations." *New Medit: Mediterranean Journal of Economics, Agriculture and Environment* 17(4):21–31.

⁴ Leigh, A. & Triggs, T. 2016, Markets, Monopolies and Moguls: The Relationship between Inequality and Competition, *The Australian Economic Review*, vol. 49, no.4, pp. 389–412.

⁵ Leptos, C. 2023, 'Food and Grocery Code Independent Reviewer – Annual Report 2022–23', The Treasury, Australian Government, Canberra, Australia.

⁶ Leigh A & Triggs T 2016, Markets, Monopolies and Moguls: The Relationship between Inequality and Competition, *The Australian Economic Review*, vol. 49, no.4, pp. 389–412.

⁷ Leptos, C. 2023, 'Food and Grocery Code Independent Reviewer – Annual Report 2022–23', The Treasury, Australian Government, Canberra, Australia.

⁸ *ibid.*

⁹ IBISWorld, An Industry (ANZSIC) Report G4111—Supermarkets and Grocery Stores in Australia, November 2020, pp. 35, 37 and 39.

¹⁰ Leptos, C. 2023, 'Food and Grocery Code Independent Reviewer – Annual Report 2022–23', The Treasury, Australian Government, Canberra, Australia.

significantly higher in the food and grocery sector than most other sectors in Australia's economy.¹¹

In addition to this market concentration, Australia's major supermarkets also account for a significant majority of the sale of perishable agricultural goods to end consumers. For example:¹²

- 81 per cent of domestically retailed fresh meat is sold by supermarkets;¹³
- 59 per cent of drinking milk produced is sold by supermarkets, with 51% of this being private label;¹⁴
- 45 per cent of eggs produced are sold by the major supermarkets; and¹⁵
- around half of domestically retailed fresh fruit and vegetables are sold through Coles and Woolworths.¹⁶

This discrepancy in market concentration along the supply chain is open to abuse by firms that hold significant market power, often to the detriment of farmers. Practices used by firms with significant market power have been well documented, including by the ACCC in previous inquiries. The 2020 Perishable Agricultural Goods (PAG) Inquiry, outlined that the relationship between suppliers and supermarkets can be characterised as:

- Supermarkets hold significantly more bargaining power due to their concentration in the market;
- Suppliers must commit a considerable amount of time and evidence to negotiate a wholesale price increase with supermarkets;
- Supermarkets can extract a disproportionate level of profits from products; and
- Supermarkets require suppliers to comply with onerous compliance standards.¹⁷

Because of this, it was identified that supermarkets can engage in activities that go beyond 'hard bargaining' and are harmful to the efficient functioning of the market. These practices include:

- Commercial retribution against individual businesses by de-listing supplier's products which can dampen suppliers ability to attempt negotiations;
- Requiring suppliers to inefficiently allocate their resources through requiring cost increases to be offset; and

¹¹ Andrews, A., Dwyers, E. & Triggs, A. 2023, 'The State of Competition in Australia' e61 Institute, Sydney, Australia.

¹² *ibid.*

¹³ Meat & Livestock Australia 2020, Market snapshot – beef & sheepmeat, MLA, Sydney.

¹⁴ ACCC analysis of data from Dairy Australia 2019, The Australian Dairy Industry In Focus 2019.

¹⁵ ACCC analysis of 2018–19 production and sales data from Australian Eggs Limited 2020, Australian Eggs, Sydney, www.australianeggs.org.au/egg-industry/, viewed 9 November 2020.

¹⁶ Roy Morgan 2018, Coles and Woolworths continue to gain share in fresh fruit and vegetable market, Roy Morgan, Melbourne <www.roymorgan.com/findings/7597-coles-and-woolworths-continue-to-gain-share-infresh-fruit-and-vegetablemarket-201805220618>.

¹⁷ ACCC 2020, 'Perishable Agricultural Goods Inquiry' Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Australian Government, Canberra, Australia.

- Requiring suppliers to disclose confidential information to the supermarket.¹⁸

In some cases, the supply relationship between farmers and supermarkets influences different industries' views of the impact of supermarket concentration and these views can change over time. For example, the PAG inquiry received significant reports of concern about the supermarket concentration in the dairy and horticulture industries due to the supermarket's bargaining power and industry-specific supply structures.¹⁹ At the time of the PAG Inquiry, the ACCC received fewer concerns from the beef, sheep meat and seafood sectors due to their more diversified supply channels, including with international marketing options.²⁰

The differences between industries are often most clear where there are long-term supply agreements with supermarkets. Some supermarket supply agreements allow suppliers' costs to 'pass-through' to the wholesale price or seek a price review in response to increases or decreases in certain cost components. However, not all contracts are longterm and do not contain pass-through mechanisms. Horticulture is a key example of this discrepancy. Some horticulture produce arrangements are negotiated and agreed on a weekly basis.

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*

The pattern of price setting between the two major supermarket chains

The NFF appreciates that strong competition between supermarkets can benefit consumers. That is, efforts to compete on price can lower product costs for consumers, leading to better consumer welfare. However, it is the NFF's view that this competition often comes at the expense of prices paid to suppliers. Under existing competition legislation, this behaviour has been allowed to occur, meaning that the lower prices through competition come at the expense of prices paid to farmers.

To overcome this, Australia's competition laws and regulations, including the Food and Grocery Code of Conduct, must be fit for purpose and provide clear direction on behaviour in the supply chain and meaningful penalties for any breaches.

In many cases, the impact on producers occurs through pricing in the supply chain. Price is a key tool to transfer information within a market and a supply chain. It is the NFF's view that supermarket's significant market concentration can be used to manipulate pricing within the agricultural supply chain. This occurs by exploiting a lack of market price transparency within the supply chain.

Market price transparency is a key issue within the agricultural supply chain that can be exploited in situations where there is little competition or high levels of market concentration. Market price transparency refers to the information available to a farmer to accurately compare the price offered with product supply, demand, market conditions, and prices paid to other farmers. In other words, can a farmer know they are being offered a fair price for what the market demands?

It is the NFF's view that supermarkets are increasingly using their market power to exploit the lack of price transparency, alternative markets or competitors within the supply chain. Further, data asymmetry is used to determine prices to pay farmers and agricultural firms, with this often being less for their produce than they would otherwise receive in a more competitive market.

Horticultural produce provides a clear example of this. Horticultural produce arrangements are often negotiated and agreed on a weekly basis. That is goods are bought and sold week-by-week with prices dictated by the market price. Because there are many sellers and only a few buyers in the supply chain, wholesalers and retailers can have broad access to data on the price and volume offered for produce across the whole supply chain. At the same time, farmers can only see their own data. This provides a significant commercial advantage to supermarkets to leverage their asymmetric data to offer the price paid to farmers for the product.

Practically, this is conducted through a two-step process that determines prices in the market. Commonly growers will be required to submit a price and volume for their produce to the supermarket every Monday. This provides a near-national snapshot of both volume and prices, while growers only have their own data. On Tuesday the supermarkets will contact growers to advise them of what they consider the price to be for the week. The growers cannot contest these price points or information used to determine the price as they do not have access to the wider market prices.

This situation is compounded by a lack of transparency in how the ‘market’ price is determined. While numerous factors determine how a price is determined, farmers are not provided any information to determine how the price was set. For example, farmers cannot determine if the price they are offered is the lowest price offered, a weighted average, or determined by a supply and demand model that matches the elasticities of other similar agricultural products.

While the asymmetric information often disadvantages farmers, they are often required to accept the prices offered. For example, perishable products must be sold within a specific timeframe before it spoils or degrades in value. This reduces the farmers' bargaining power because products cannot be stored for long periods. Additionally, farmers face potential commercial retribution for their decisions regarding accepting or rejecting the market price.

These practices are consistent with findings from the PAG Inquiry, which outlined that there is often no close link between retail pricing for perishable agricultural goods and the cost of production.²¹ The inquiry reported that this is due to price smoothing so that retail prices are less volatile compared to wholesale and farmgate prices.²² For example, milk prices maintain consistent retail pricing despite different geographical and seasonal production costs.²³ However, it was highlighted that supermarkets can exploit price-smoothing information asymmetries to prevent consumers from valuing products accurately, with the example of branded milk specifically identified:

“For example, there appears to be a commonly held perception that farmers receive a higher farmgate price from the sale of branded milk products relative to private label milk. However, this is not the case. The Dairy Inquiry found that farmers are not paid according to the type or value of the end product that their milk is used in, and that there is no direct relationship between retail private label milk prices and farmgate prices. Indeed, processors and major retailers appear to offset lower margins on private label products with the higher margins earned on branded products”.^{24, 25}

The significant market concentration of supermarkets provides an inherent advantage in price negotiations over farmers and suppliers. In some cases, this can include controlling the wholesale price a supplier can charge as they purchase a product and also determining the retail price of the product.²⁶ This creates a difficult situation for suppliers to try and negotiate a fair price or a price increase.

²¹ ACCC 2020, ‘Perishable Agricultural Goods Inquiry’ Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Australian Government, Canberra, Australia.

²² *ibid.*

²³ *ibid.*

²⁴ *ibid.*

²⁵ Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2018, Dairy Inquiry final report, ACCC, Australian Government, Canberra, Australia, p.xxi.

²⁶ ACCC 2020, ‘Perishable Agricultural Goods Inquiry’ Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Australian Government, Canberra, Australia.

In the PAG Inquiry, the ACCC outlines a number of examples of the misuse of supermarket market concentration. These examples include:

- Suppliers being asked to disclose commercially sensitive information, which can remove any information advantage they have in the negotiation. This includes providing intellectual property or details of input providers, which is of particular concern when the supermarket also retails a competing private label product.²⁷
- Pressuring suppliers of perishable agricultural goods to provide supermarkets with some form of offset in exchange for an increase in wholesale prices. This includes paying for promotional activity to an extent that almost negates the price increase.²⁸
- Retribution for initiating a cost increase discussion, by the de-listing of other products on some occasions.²⁹
- Using tender processes to procure the supply of chicken meat to increasingly reduce margins to barely viable levels, as supermarkets are able to bargain down prices with reference to price guides that may not be current or are below viability.³⁰
- Providing a supplier with very little time to negotiate prices in circumstances where their products have a very short shelf life.³¹

These practices reflect the commercial reality of negotiations which favour the stronger party.³² However, it is clear that these practices move beyond ‘hard bargaining’ into damaging conduct.

In addition to these actions, there are emerging trends within specific agricultural industries where processors will obtain and control production data, enabling them to set prices paid to farmers as a cost-plus basis. This practice eliminates the incentives for farmers to invest in productivity improvements, since any cost savings resulting from these investments will cause a lowering of the output price. The access to and use of this data is compounded by increasing vertical integration of the supply chain where the producer and retailer have access to production data that can be directly compared to other external farmers.

The reduced pricing through asymmetric information is a key contributor to increased fragility within the agricultural supply chain. Farmers are often not able to receive an adequate return for their product, increasing their susceptibility to disruption through market changes, natural disasters, and other unexpected changes. Increasing this fragility and associated risk undermines the long-term productivity of industry, reduces wages paid to employees and reduces the overall market signals that support supply and demand.

²⁷ *ibid.*

²⁸ ACCC 2020, ‘Perishable Agricultural Goods Inquiry’ Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Australian Government, Canberra, Australia.

²⁹ *ibid.*

³⁰ *ibid.*

³¹ *ibid.*

³² *ibid.*

Frameworks to protect suppliers when interacting with the major supermarkets

The NFF believes that Australia's existing competition policy frameworks are not fit-for purpose to prevent the abuse of market power that occurs in Australia's agricultural supply chain. This is primarily due to:

- consumer-centric focus on market power provisions, providing minimal protections to supply chain abuses;
- equal consumer centric focus of fair-trading provisions; and
- unconscionable conduct provisions are so narrowly defined to render them of little use for small to medium businesses, such as farmers.

In addition to these failings, the legislative and regulatory tools available to the ACCC have not been able to prevent increased market concentration. The under-resourcing of the ACCC has meant it is unable to investigate and prosecute the full extent of firms that break existing laws and regulations. The ACCC has also not been able to adopt new capabilities to proactively monitor firms and supply chains for increasing market concentration, abuse of market power and the use of unfair business practices. The ACCC is also not able to review natural changes in the distribution of firms that impact market concentration. This includes changes in the location of activities and changes in market share due to organic firm growth.

To address the lack of competition and subsequent impacts in Australian agricultural supply chains, the NFF recommends a series of policy options. Effectively implemented, these policies will increase fairness, transparency, and competitiveness across the agricultural supply chain. While the recommendations are focussed on supermarkets, they can be applied to broad supply chain participants to improve competitive dynamics in the Australian economy.

1. Mandatory Price Reporting and Disclosure

Require supermarkets to disclose information used to determine pricing offers. This may include:

- how prices are determined;
- volumes offered;
- average pricing; and
- any contractual terms.

More effective price reporting and disclosure will improve farmers understanding of how supermarkets determine prices paid to suppliers. This would include providing clear guidelines and documentation to ensure consistency and clarity. However, this scheme must be carefully designed to ensure the increase in price transparency does not come with unintended consequences. Previous price transparency schemes have resulted in tacit price collusion, reducing the competitive outcomes intended through the policy. As such, the agricultural pricing scheme should focus on providing greater transparency to farmers to support their business decision-making without increasing awareness within retail competitors.

2. Price Reporting Platforms

The Inquiry should recommend the greater development and promotion of digital platforms that provide real-time market price information to farmers. These platforms can aggregate data from various sources to help farmers make informed decisions about when and where to sell their products.

The Australian Government has supported the development of these platforms in targeted agricultural industries, including dairy, wine and horticulture. These platforms provide a tool to collect, collate and communicate price information through online analytics platforms.

While these platforms offer a market-driven tool to support greater price transparency within agricultural industries, it is essential they have the right regulatory framework to ensure they function to provide long-term benefits. The development of these platforms may not have broad support along the supply chain. As such, there may be disincentives for some supply chain participants to not participate or not provide effective information. This would undermine the effective functioning of the online tools.

The Australian Government should explore options of mandatory compliance to ensure long-term participation and compliance to ensure successful long-term application.

3. Fair Contract Terms

The Inquiry should recommend strengthening legislation and regulations to ensure contracts in agricultural supply chains are fair, transparent and enforceable. This includes clear terms on pricing, delivery schedules, and dispute resolution mechanisms. This will ensure clarity and surety in the relationship between farmers and purchasers of goods. These changes should be additional to the unfair contract terms reforms implemented in 2022.

4. Access to assistance and justice mechanisms

In addition to implementing fair contract terms, access to justice mechanisms must be easier to access for farmers and small businesses with lower barriers to challenge unfair contract terms or misconduct. Where farmers have contracts with supermarkets or other retailers, there is no effective mechanism to contest issues or breaches of the contract.

In the current system, unfair terms and compliance with contracts must be decided by courts. This adds a clear barrier for farmers to contest issues in contracts. Relying on the legal system as the sole avenue to contest contracts reduces the efficacy of existing unfair contract term legislation. It also allows the ongoing prevalence of unfair contract terms within the agricultural supply chain.

Not only does legal action provide a financial barrier to contesting contract issues, but it also exposes individuals to potential commercial retribution. As such, access to justice mechanisms should also include whistleblower protection. This would include protections for farmers and industry insiders who expose unfair or anti-competitive practices within the supply chain. This can encourage more individuals to come forward with information about market abuses.

These mechanisms may take the form of enforceable codes of conduct within agricultural industries with significant market concentration along the supply chain. Effective design of these codes may present clear options for dispute resolution and whistleblower protection to provide farmers with confidence without adding significant cost burden on the supply chain. Easier access to dispute resolution mechanism can support farmers through better access to existing protections and better functioning of the existing regulatory framework.

The Dairy Code of Conduct provides an example of an appropriate avenue for dispute resolution between farmers and processors. The Dairy Code of Conduct provides clear guidance and framework for dispute resolution options and provides better information for farmers to decide how to address issues in their relationship with their suppliers. This is supported by the positive role of the Australian Small Business and Family Enterprise Ombudsman providing information and support to farmers and small businesses.

This contrasts to the Food and Grocery Code. Under the Food and Grocery Code, supermarkets appoint their own Code Arbiter is responsible for investigating and resolving supplier complaints in relation to conduct regulated by the Code. However, the direct appointment of the Code Arbiter by the supermarket reduces farmers' confidence that the complaints process will be fair and independent. The 2022 Independent Review of the Food and Grocery Code has suggested this may be responsible for the proportionally low number of complaints being brought to the Code Arbiters, compared with the number of informal complaints filtering through other avenues, including reports made to industry bodies.

The Inquiry may also consider the proposal put forward by the Small Business and Family Enterprise Ombudsman. Under this proposal, the Australian Government could introduce a Federal Small Business and Codes List into the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. This could provide a low-cost alternative for small businesses and regulators to seek redress and timely enforcement action from unfair conduct by large entities in a costeffective and timely manner. Disputes appearing on the list would be capped at \$1 million (award or fine) and delivered via online hearings, significantly reducing the time and cost burden on a small business. Critically, the list would:

- operate as a 'no costs' jurisdiction;
- include a reduced or capped 'court book' evidentiary entitlement • provide a guaranteed turnaround time; and
- include compulsory pre-hearing alternative dispute resolution.

This reform could reduce barriers to justice for small businesses and entrepreneurs by supporting them in protecting their own commercial interests in a way that is affordable, timely and able to deliver adequate sanctions, interventions and recompense from counterparties engaging in anticompetitive or unfair conduct.

5. Education and Training

Understanding the market is an essential element of effectively navigating the complex environment of the agricultural supply chain. As such, training and education programs are important tools in supporting farmers. These programs could focus on supporting farmers to improve their negotiation skills and

understanding of market dynamics. This can empower them to navigate price negotiations better.

This education and training should also extend to using and adopting price and risk management tools. Australian agriculture has been successful in the use of sophisticated price management tools. These include physical sales, forward contracts, futures, options, swap markets and index derivatives. While these tools have increased, their adoption is not even across the sector.

To support greater uptake and use of these tools, the Inquiry should recommend the development and promotion of tools and strategies to increase the uptake of price management tools. These include tools that help farmers manage price risk, such as futures contracts or insurance products.

6. Promote the ACCC collective bargaining provision

The collective bargaining 'class exemption' allows eligible small businesses to bargain collectively without breaching competition laws. While this exemption provides a model for farmer collaboration, its implementation has hindered effective uptake.

The ACCC should develop additional resources to help farmers and industry groups understand how to navigate the collective bargaining provision. As it stands, there is often confusion and apprehension about exploring the collective bargaining provisions. These concerns are due to concerns about inadvertent or accidental misconduct or cartel behaviour.

Increasing awareness of the collective bargaining provisions will provide more clarity and confidence in their use. This will support the formation and use of producer cooperatives that can collectively negotiate prices and contract terms on behalf of their members, giving farmers more bargaining power.

In addition, the Inquiry should recommend the Government increase the existing limit on businesses that can access this provision. As it stands, the exemption is capped at an aggregated turnover of \$10 million. This cap should be increased to allow a more effective uptake by farm businesses without distorting the policy's intention.

7. Increased ACCC powers to access data from supply chain companies

The ACCC has an important role in monitoring and analysing markets. This often occurs through ongoing market studies that examine the operation of markets, sectors and industries. These studies provide a positive tool for identifying potential new and emerging competition issues and recommending potential policy solutions.

However, these market investigations are limited by the ACCC existing powers and ability to request information. Under current legislation, the ACCC can only compel companies and supply chain actors to provide information and documents if their investigation is directed by the Minister. If the study is instigated by the ACCC, there are no powers to compel companies to comply. This limits the ACCC's ability to respond to conduct thorough investigations with clear information and data from supply chain actors.

The Inquiry should recommend the ACCC be granted broader powers to request, collect, and analyse data from all participants in the agricultural supply chain. This includes data related to pricing, procurement, distribution, and other relevant operational aspects. With increased data access, the ACCC can more proactively analyse industry and market data to identify patterns or practices that might indicate anti-competitive behaviour or a lack of price transparency. Periodic reports should be published to inform stakeholders, including farmers, about market conditions and potential areas of concern.

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