Cartels deterrence and detection

A guide for government procurement professionals

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Forward

Public sector procurement is a multi-billion dollar industry, making a vital contribution to our economy and the welfare of all Australians. This process relies heavily on vigorous competition to provide taxpayers with the best value for money. But competition does more than just deliver purchasers with the best possible deal. It encourages businesses to innovate, strive for efficiency and meet the needs of consumers. As such, the activities of public sector procurement professionals have an impact well beyond the sum of moneys spent. They help shape the very nature of the industries that they deal with and the dynamics of the wider economy.

Cartels threaten the effective operations of markets. Their activities are an insidious form of theft that siphons many millions of dollars a year from taxpayers and consumers. They create an illusion of competition while actually inflating prices. By conspiring to control markets, cartels protect and reward their inefficient members while penalising honest, innovative and well run companies.

Cartels have long found public sector procurement an attractive target, due to the large budgets and the unique nature of their business activities. The very factors that protect the integrity of public procurement also provide opportunities for those who seek to undermine competition.

The transparency and accountability of public spending gives cartels much of the information they need to organise their collusive arrangements. For this reason, the ACCC has developed this publication as a practical guide for government procurement professionals.

This publication is designed to give you the knowledge and the tools needed to help you detect possible collusion amongst suppliers. It gives examples of cartels that have been detected and the methods they used to deceive their customers. It gives specific guidance on when you may need to contact the ACCC to investigate suspicious behaviour.

Prevention, however, is better than cure. For this reason, this publication also gives practical advice on simple risk management strategies that, if adopted, will make your activities less prone to being targeted by a cartel. If potential cartelists are aware that you are vigilant, they will be far less likely to collude. For this reason, government procurement professionals are the first line of defence against the activities of cartels.
Introduction

This publication is written to assist procurement professionals understand cartel behaviour. It reviews the provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (the Act) that relate to your procurement practices by describing several types of prohibited, anti-competitive behaviour that can target your procurement budget. It considers some steps you might take to maximise competition and save your organisation money, while also disrupting the possible operation of cartels by suppliers. It describes a range of methods for detecting suspicious conduct and how to report your suspicions to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC).

This publication provides practical tips and warning signs that indicate when tenderers may be colluding, as well as illustrative hypothetical examples of when to report to the ACCC.

Our aim is to help you and your agency avoid becoming the target of a cartel.

What is a cartel?

Our economic system relies on firms competing for business so that prices are truly determined by the market. Competition rewards those firms that innovate and strive to deliver the best value for money. Conversely, firms that are less efficient and fail to respond to the needs of customers will not prosper. Market economies need strong regulations to counter the temptation for inefficient suppliers to collude and undermine the competitive process.

A cartel exists when businesses agree to act together instead of competing against one another. This agreement is designed to drive up the profits of cartel members while maintaining the illusion of competition.

Cartels have been discovered working in a wide range of industries. Large well-known corporations and small local businesses have been involved. The products vary from petrol, concrete and air conditioning to cardboard boxes, freight and fire protection systems.

Cartels targeting the public sector

Government procurement represents significant expenditure in the Australian economy. All levels of government have increased their outsourcing of goods and services. In this environment, a greater emphasis is put on the integrity of competitive tendering to secure value for money and deliver policy objectives. But how do you know if tenderers are colluding to defeat competition and drive prices up?

Government procurement can be easy targets for cartels. While private organisations can be flexible in choosing their procurement strategy, government is generally constrained by legislation and detailed administrative regulations. The accountability of government bodies requires transparency of processes and disclosure of information. Ironically, these same accountability and disclosure requirements can provide colluders with the necessary information they need to establish, maintain and enforce a cartel.

This publication aims to provide you with some useful tools for detecting collusion amongst your tenderers.
How cartels work

It is useful to consider what motivates some firms to collude rather than compete. Their aim is to extract higher prices and to shore up market shares by avoiding the effect of competition. Their loyalty is to other cartel members, not to you and your agency.

Cartels:
- usually know that their conduct is unlawful and will go to great lengths to keep it secret
- want stable membership—if members come and go, they do not have a long-term stake in keeping the arrangements intact
- need to control their members to make sure they bid the way they said they would—in other words, for a cartel to succeed the members must keep to their agreements and not cheat on each other; once in a cartel, the arrangements are usually enforced by threats of retaliation
- need strategies to deal with competitors outside the cartel: they can either dissuade them from entry, try to buy them out or invite them to join
- follow a long-term strategy to benefit their members at the expense of their customers.

There are several circumstances that can increase the temptation for businesses to collude rather than compete:
- A period of vigorous competition (such as price wars) or rapidly rising costs provides a strong motive for businesses to collude.
- An economic downturn may create an incentive for business to shore up their profit margins by colluding.
- Colluders might calculate that there is a low risk of detection.
- They might also calculate that the gains outweigh the potential penalties.

Cartels must continuously adapt to changing market conditions. For instance, if they successfully inflate profits within an industry, this tends to attract new suppliers, which in turn might be conscripted into the cartel.
Collusion and the law

Anti-competitive conduct is prohibited under Australian law. Individuals and corporations now face civil and criminal liability for their involvement in cartel conduct. There are four types of conduct that are defined as cartel behaviour. It is common for cartels to employ more than one strategy at any given time. These are:

- bid rigging
- price fixing
- market sharing
- output restrictions.

These will be discussed in detail now.

Bid rigging

Bid rigging occurs when suppliers communicate before lodging their bids and agree among themselves who will win the tender and at what price. Bid rigging is also referred to as collusive tendering.

Types of bid rigging

Collusive tendering is probably the cartel behaviour you are most likely to encounter, so it is useful to understand the various bid rigging tactics:

- Cover pricing—competing firms choose a winner while the others deliberately bid over an agreed amount (the ‘cover price’), which ensures the selected bidder has the lowest tender and also helps establish the illusion that the lowest bid is indeed competitive.
- Bid suppression—a firm agrees not to tender thus ensuring that the pre-agreed firm will win the contract.
- Bid withdrawal—a firm will withdraw their winning bid so that a competitor will instead be successful.
- Bid rotation—competitors agree to take turns at winning business while monitoring their market shares to ensure they all have a predetermined slice of the pie.
- Non-conforming bids—firms deliberately include terms and conditions they know will not be acceptable to the procurer.

**Signs of possible bid rigging**
- Suppliers appear to be taking turns at winning tenders or appear to be sharing the contracts by value.
- Regular suppliers decline to tender for no obvious reason.
- Bidders appear to deliberately include unacceptable terms within their tenders.
- Bidders sometimes bid low and sometimes high on what appears to be the same type of supply.
- You become aware that bidders meet before the close of tender, without you being present.
- The winning firm regularly subcontracts to competitors that submitted higher tenders.
- One firm of professional advisers represent several tenderers.
Marine hose cartel

The case involved bid rigging, price fixing and market sharing by four foreign companies that supplied Australian customers with rubber hosing used to transfer oil and gas from production and storage facilities to offshore tankers. The four companies each appointed members to a committee that allocated jobs and coordinated bidding and quoting for these jobs. The designated winner of the contract was referred to as the ‘champion’ and the cartel used such codes and other covert tactics to conceal their activities.

The cartel was international and the key meetings were held overseas, but the successful court action was based on the cartel participants giving effect to their agreement in the Australian market, following global enforcement action taken by competition authorities in the USA, UK, Europe and Japan.

In 2010, the Federal Court of Australia imposed penalties exceeding $8 million on the four companies and made orders restraining the parties from repeating such conduct.

Queensland pre-mixed concrete cartel

The Pioneer, Boral and CSR cartel involved bid rigging, price fixing and market sharing in the pre-mixed concrete market in south-east Queensland from 1989 until 1994. The participants had more than 50 regular meetings and phone conversations. In addition to fixing prices, they agreed on market shares and not to compete on specified major projects. The participants even engaged an accountant to monitor market shares so they could enforce compliance with the agreement. The arrangement led to considerable overcharging on major construction jobs, including federal, state and local government projects.

Penalties of $6.6 million were imposed on each company. Penalties were also imposed on six executives, the maximum being $100 000. The case demonstrated a blatant disregard for the law, as each of the corporate groups had previously been found to have engaged in similar conduct.

Brisbane fire protection cartel

For about 10 years, until 1997, most of the companies in the fire alarm and fire sprinkler installation industry in Brisbane held regular meetings at which they agreed to allow certain tenders to be won by particular competitors. To ensure that the tenders were won by the agreed participants, the companies agreed on the prices at which they would tender for particular projects.

It has been estimated that this conduct affected business worth more than $500 million. The Federal Court imposed more than $14 million in penalties on the companies and some of their executives.
Price fixing

Price fixing occurs when competitors agree on a pricing structure rather than compete against each other. It can be in the form of minimum prices or an agreed formula for pricing or discounting goods and services. Such agreements might be in writing but are often informal, verbal agreements.

Signs of possible price fixing

- Tenders or quotes are much higher than expected. This may indicate collusive pricing, or it may just be overpricing (not illegal in itself). It may simply reveal that your estimates are inaccurate. It is in your commercial interest to make inquiries and determine whether your price expectations are reasonable.
- All suppliers raise prices simultaneously and beyond what seems to be justified by changes in input costs. You can ask suppliers why this is so. You might also consider surveying suppliers of inputs so you are better equipped to recognise suspicious pricing movements.
- Prices submitted are much higher than previous tenders or published price lists.
- A new supplier’s price is lower than the usual tenderers. This may indicate there has been collusion among the incumbent tenderers.
- Prices drop markedly after a new supplier tenders. This may indicate that the existing suppliers have been colluding and the new supplier has forced them to compete.

Queensland Construction Cover Pricing

Between 2004 and 2007, three Queensland-based construction companies (TF Woollam & Son, JM Kelly and Carmichael Builders) engaged in cover pricing in connection with tenders for three state and one local government construction projects. The companies also made misleading representations by signing statements that they had not colluded with their competitors during the bidding process.

Cover pricing involves communication about prices between two or more potential suppliers (in this case, construction companies) in a tender process. In this particular case, the ACCC alleged that cover pricing was utilised because one or more of the construction companies wanted, or believed it was necessary, to be seen to tender for particular projects. However, they either did not wish to win the tender, or did not have the time or resources to prepare an accurate tender.

An example of this type of cover pricing would be where Company A does not want to win the contract for reasons identified above. Company B intends to try and win the tender. Accordingly, Company A seeks a ‘cover price’ from Company B. This ‘cover price’ will be higher than company B’s tender price. Once the cover price has been received from Company B, Company A then submits its tender at a price which is at or above the cover price.

In 2011 the Federal Court described this cover pricing as ‘illegal price controlling conduct’ and the making of the false statements as ‘a betrayal of trust’. The three companies were penalised a total of $1.3 million and two key individuals received penalties totaling $80 000.

In concluding that the conduct of the companies had amounted to a breach of the cartel legislation, Justice Logan found that seeking and communicating a “cover price” between the companies concerned made it more likely than not that the companies came to an arrangement or understanding to control price, a form of collusive tendering.

The Court commented that whilst tender prices were not fixed, “they were controlled by an agreed ceiling in respect of the person giving the cover price; and an agreed floor in the case of the person requesting and receiving the cover price” with the requester and receiver of the cover price bidding above the floor and the giver of the cover price, bidding below the ceiling.
Visy and Amcor packaging cartel

Between them, Visy and Amcor controlled around 90 per cent of the corrugated fibre packaging market (the humble and generic cardboard carton), which was worth about $1.8 to $2 billion per year. From 2000 to 2004, the two companies conspired to raise the prices of their products while maintaining their respective market shares.

Both companies nominated executives to consult on and coordinate price rises and collude when negotiating quotes for customers. These executives met regularly and secretly in public places, such as hotels and parks, and also communicated using public phones and special prepaid mobiles. When larger customers wished to renegotiate their contracts, the two companies swapped information to ensure that the competitor’s quote was higher than the existing price structure (cover pricing). If a client changed supplier, then an account of around the same value was exchanged.

Visy eventually admitted its role in the cartel. It was fined $36 million by the Federal Court, and fines to individuals totaled $2 million. Thousands of firms (and ultimately millions of consumers) were significantly overcharged by the cartel. The Federal Court subsequently ordered Visy and Amcor to pay $95 million in damages to a customer class action involving more than 4500 businesses.

Animal vitamins cartel

Three Australian suppliers of animal vitamins held meetings and telephone conversations during which they agreed on the prices that they would charge for certain vitamins. They were the Australian subsidiaries of large foreign companies that had also entered into price fixing and market allocation agreements overseas. The Federal Court imposed penalties of $26 million against the Australian suppliers.

Market sharing

Market sharing occurs when competitors agree to divide a market so the participants are sheltered from competition. This sharing might be a preference for customers in certain geographic areas or a division of contracts within an area.

It might also be an agreement not to compete for established customers or not to produce each other’s products or services.

Signs of possible market sharing

Firms charge different prices in different locations, and the difference can’t be explained by transport costs.

- A supplier declines to tender in certain locations, stating that to supply would be an intrusion on someone else’s ‘patch’.
- A supplier states that they can’t supply certain products or services because of agreements with other businesses.
- A firm’s representative states that another firm should not have supplied you because of industry agreements.
- Bidders wait until the last minute to submit their bids and express interest in whether a non-local or occasional bidder is tendering.
Automotive wire harnesses cartel

This cartel involved Yazaki Corporation, a Japanese manufacturer, and its Australian subsidiary making and giving effect to market sharing and price fixing arrangements with competitors.

In particular, Yazaki and fellow Japanese manufacturer, Sumitomo Electric Industries Ltd (‘SEI’), coordinated quotes to supply Toyota with wire harnesses used in the 2002 model Toyota Camry. Wire harnesses are electrical systems that facilitate the distribution of power and send electrical signals to various components of a motor vehicle.

When Toyota in Australia requested quotes for wire harnesses, senior management at Yazaki and SEI in Japan agreed on the quote price and agreed that, once the contract was awarded to one party, the other party would not compete in relation to that supply. They coordinated their responses to Toyota’s requests by directing their Australian subsidiaries to submit agreed prices. While it was not established that Yazaki’s subsidiary had knowledge of the cartel in which its parent was involved, it was found to have given effect to the arrangement by submitting prices in accordance with the agreement.

On appeal by the ACCC, in 2018 the Full Federal Court ordered Yazaki to pay penalties of $46 million. This is the highest penalty ever handed down under the Act to date.

Electric cable cartel

Two international companies (Italian corporation, Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi S.R.L. and Japanese cable supplier, Viscas Corporation) were found to have engaged in market sharing conduct in relation to the supply of high voltage land cables in Australia.

The cartel conduct related to a 2003 invitation by Snowy Hydro Limited to tender for the supply of high voltage land cables and accessories. This conduct formed part of an overarching arrangement or understanding between a group of European and Japanese cable suppliers which provided for the allocation of projects around the world.

The Court found that Prysmian was a party to an agreement with other cable manufacturers and suppliers to ‘allocate’ the Snowy Mountains tender to Prysmian and then gave effect to that agreement by providing pricing guidance to its competitors so that they could submit higher amounts in an attempt to ensure that Prysmian won the tender.

In 2016, the Federal Court imposed a penalty of $3.5 million against Prysmian. The Federal Court had earlier imposed a penalty of $1.35 million against Japanese cable supplier, Viscas Corporation, for its part in the conduct.
**Freight cartel**

This case involved TNT Australia, Ansett Industries and Mayne Nickless. In five main meetings between 1987 and 1990 attended by representatives of each of the three companies, a series of agreements were reached.

The companies agreed not to poach each other’s customers and, if one of the companies was requested to quote by a customer of another, it would either fail to do so or would submit a quotation above the price charged by the other company.

There was a balancing of accounts of customers lost and gained and payment of compensation. If a customer moved from one company to the other, compensation would be made by returning other customers of the same value by the process of up-rating them or driving them away by providing poor service. No quotes would be given to customers of another firm over the telephone. They also agreed that uniform prices would be charged for what were referred to as ‘air satchels’.

Each of the companies acted on these agreements on many occasions. The practices were believed to have been implemented by the companies’ executives for 20 years. In 1995, fines of $11 million were imposed.

**Power transformers cartel**

Many of the major suppliers and manufacturers of both power and distribution transformers were involved in price fixing, bid rigging and market allocation within domestic markets with a combined value of around $160 million per year. The customers affected by the cartel included some of the largest electricity transmission and distribution utilities across Australia, resulting in many Australian consumers paying higher electricity bills. A whistleblower alerted the ACCC to the cartel conduct.

The cartel included the principal manufacturers and suppliers of transformers in Australia and covered virtually 100 per cent of the industry, including the ABB companies, Schneider Electric (Aust), Wilson Transformers, Alstom Australia and AW Tyree. The collusion involved executives at the highest level, and featured secret meetings in hotel rooms, airport lounges and private residences in various locations across Australia. These meetings rigged the outcomes of multimillion dollar contracts, with at least 27 tenders being rigged between 1993 and 1999. Some aspects of the cartel ran from 1989 to 1999. A 2004 study by the Australian National University concluded that the cartel extracted an extra $70 million to $80 million from its customers between 1994 and 1999.

In 2004, the Federal Court imposed total penalties of more than $35 million on the participating companies and some of their executives. The Court was particularly scathing about the fact that the arrangement was coordinated by senior executives, including managing directors. Total penalties imposed on individual executives exceeded $1 million, with the highest being $200,000.
Output restrictions

Output restrictions occur when the participants in an industry agree to reduce or restrict supply with the aim of creating scarcity. The purpose of the arrangement is to prop up or increase prices.

Generally speaking, the action needs to be industry wide to achieve the cartel’s desired result. It is probably the type of cartel behaviour government procurement professionals are least likely to encounter.

**Tasmanian Atlantic salmon growers**

In 2002 the Tasmanian Atlantic salmon industry was in financial difficulty and decided that supply was outstripping demand. The Tasmanian Salmon Growers Association decided that if all members culled stocks by about 10 per cent demand would be met and further price falls would be avoided. It sought legal advice, but did not correctly brief its lawyers. Consequently, the advice that the cull would not breach competition laws was flawed. After a meeting of growers approved the plan, agreements were circulated. One member, Tassal, subsequently culled its stocks. The ACCC investigated and the cull was stopped.

Because of the parlous state of the industry and the fact that legal advice had been sought and cooperation shown, the ACCC chose not to pursue penalties. Instead, it obtained court orders requiring the industry to establish trade practice compliance training and to not proceed with any future culls.
How to detect collusion

Role of procurement professionals

If you work in a field of government procurement, you are almost certainly going to know more about that market than outside agencies and be in a position to notice the first warning signs of collusion. The ACCC’s role is to investigate and prosecute cartel behaviour, but you are the front line of defence and detection.

Experienced procurement professionals are uniquely placed to detect collusion. By comparing bids with what your experience tells you should be the norm, an astute procurement professional can develop a hunch about suspicious bidding patterns.

While talking with company representatives, you may also pick up valuable information or tips that indicate something may be amiss. In these circumstances, we encourage you to report your concerns.

Market risks

While collusive behaviour may occur in any industry, there are some specific market conditions that make the formation and continuation of cartels an easier and more tempting option for suppliers. Understanding the market allows you to assess the risks and your level of exposure. (See table on page 14).

Warning signs

There is rarely a simple indicator of cartel activity, but there are some warning signs that suggest a closer look is in order. There may be reasonable explanations for some of the following signs but, if there is not, you may need to inquire further.
Cartels often go to great lengths to remain secret and are usually very hard to detect. Many warning signs can be ambiguous. For example:

- similar pricing may indicate collusion or it may simply reflect similar input costs and even highly competitive tendering
- an active trade association might make collusion easier, or it may promote high standards within an industry
- simultaneous price rises might be suspicious or may be explained by industry-wide cost increases.

If you are concerned about overpricing, make inquiries to ensure that your expectations are reasonable. High prices are not illegal.

A supplier can set their prices wherever they like and compete on whatever terms they choose, such as quality or level of service. It is when competitors agree not to compete that the conduct is unlawful.

We recognise that effective cartel detection may require several suspect or unusual incidents or a developing pattern of behaviour before your suspicions are aroused. But a simple error in competing tenders, such as identical misspelling or miscalculations, may expose collusion by apparent competitors.

And statements by businesses that refer to ‘industry agreements’ and the like may indicate market-sharing arrangements. It is you, the procurement professional, who is most likely to notice telltale signs. If and when you suspect cartel behaviour, you should inform your management and your organisation’s legal adviser.

A checklist of the warning signs is provided in the Cartel checklist included with this publication.
## Market risk factors

This table outlines particular market conditions that can stimulate the formation of cartels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions that may make it easier for cartels to operate</th>
<th>Why?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suppliers</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A small group of suppliers might control most of a market for many reasons:</td>
<td>The more suppliers available, the more choices a procurer has. If there are many potential suppliers, it is more difficult and risky for them to communicate with each other and attempt to establish a cartel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- long-established firms have come to dominate the market</td>
<td>If new suppliers regularly enter an industry, they are not likely to be cartel members. They will need either to be enlisted, bought out or scared off for a cartel to maintain its control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- the industry is specialised or capital-intensive; therefore, it is costly and difficult for new firms to set up (e.g. airlines)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- many competitors are unable or unwilling to supply because of geographic isolation (e.g. regional Australia).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Products</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A product or service may lend itself to control by suppliers if:</td>
<td>The more product choices a buyer has, the harder it is for suppliers to conspire to control a market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- it is essential and has few or no alternatives (e.g. fire protection)</td>
<td>If a product is relatively generic, and demand is stable and predictable, it is easier for suppliers to attempt to share markets and fix prices. A volatile market is far harder for a cartel to control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- demand is stable and predictable (e.g. construction, steel or bricks)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- it is a standard ‘off the shelf’ product or service and the same for all providers and buyers (e.g. premixed concrete)</td>
<td>Clearly, if buyers lack expertise in an area of procurement, it is easier for suppliers to fix higher prices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- the product or service is highly technical or specialised (e.g. medical supplies).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Procurers</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The way that procurement operates may create opportunities for cartels:</td>
<td>A cartel needs to be able to monitor procurers and understand their requirements to effectively allocate contracts and fix prices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Procurement activities are regular and predictable (e.g. local government road works).</td>
<td>A cartel also needs to be able to monitor its own members to ensure that they keep to their agreements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Procurement activities are open and transparent (e.g. government tendering)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unusual mistakes

Despite the fact that cartels are usually secret arrangements, there is a long history of cartels coming undone because of plain old carelessness. Everyone makes mistakes, but if a mistake indicates collusion it may be crucial evidence of illegal behaviour. It pays to be on the lookout for the following telltale signs:

- There are identical spelling or calculation errors in competitors’ bids.
- There is an uncanny similarity in the layout or language in competing tenders.
- A tender document is in electronic form and has been prepared on a competitor’s computer. (This can sometimes be revealed by checking the document’s metadata, usually under ‘properties’ in the file menu).
- A firm’s representative says something that indicates they are aware of the details of a competitor’s tender.
- All bids are delivered by one agent—or even delivered in the same envelope.

Whistleblowers

Illegal cartel activity is often exposed by insiders who have knowledge of, or been involved in, the arrangement. Should they be willing to provide information, you should encourage them to reveal what they know and provide that information directly to ACCC investigators.

- Let informants know that information can be provided confidentially, including on an anonymous basis, to the ACCC.
- The ACCC immunity policy for cartel conduct can be used by cartel members who break rank and report their involvement.
- If a supplier’s employee or agent suggests that they are aware of collusion, do not ignore it. Note the details and report the incident to the ACCC.

Identical pricing

Identical bids can be evidence of a highly competitive market (price convergence) or, alternatively, a lack of competition. By themselves identical bids do not necessarily indicate collusion.

The significance of identical pricing cannot be fully appreciated without a broad understanding of the product’s price history. For example, are any fluctuations consistent with the supplier’s previous pricing? Identical bids become questionable if they mark a change from earlier competitive bidding.

Quotes for supply may be identical by pure chance, but this is more likely if:

- the goods have a well-established market price or a brand name with a ‘suggested retail price’
- the quantity is a small proportion of the supplier’s total sales
- the goods are supplied from stock rather than ordered
- freight expenses are a low proportion of the total cost.

The probability of a chance, identical bid is very low when the tender is for complex, non-standard products or if the quantity is a large proportion of the supplier’s total sales. Larger sales are more likely to encourage a supplier to examine their margins and provide a more competitive quote.

There is obviously more chance of identical bids if the quotes are in round figures. For example, if two building contractors both quote $1.25 million for a project, it may not in itself be suspicious; it may arouse suspicion, though, if both quotes are for $1 253 312.

Overseas experience has shown it is very risky to split contracts between tied bidders, as it can make market sharing all too tempting and easy. When all else is equal, it is better to randomly select a winner than reward both bidders.
Tender analysis

It is often useful to study the bidding history of a product. This may provide evidence that supports a suspicion of collusion. For example, the receipt of identical bids is generally suspicious. A pattern of close bids may also suggest collusion, but can just as easily be the result of price convergence in a highly competitive market. Tender rotation is usually only detectable by studying the bidding patterns of successive winning and losing tenders over time.

Ask yourself:

- Do your records suggest that bidders seem to be taking turns at winning tenders? This may indicate tender rotation.
- Do tenderers seem to win around the same percentage of the contracts from year to year? This may indicate market sharing.
- Do suppliers seem to win contracts in certain areas but not in others? This may also indicate market sharing.

We also suggest that you occasionally check with other agencies that procure the same goods or services and compare notes. For example, if a seller of office supplies only bids on contracts let by state departments—but declines to bid on contracts for schools—this may indicate market sharing.

It may only be at an aggregated level across an entire industry sector that the extent of cartel behaviour is evident. Your suspicions may lead the ACCC to an industry-wide inquiry that unravels large-scale collusion.
How to deter collusion

Anti-collusion tender clauses

Clauses in your tender documents that indicate you are alert to collusion will go a long way to deterring such behaviour:

1. Warn bidders in your tender documents that you will report all suspected instances of collusion to the ACCC. This is a strong deterrent to collusion that enables agencies to share otherwise confidential tender information with the ACCC.

2. Require disclosure of all subcontracting arrangements that involve dealings with competitors, including those made after awarding the contract. Also ensure that you are notified if a winning bidder assigns their contract to a competitor. If unsuccessful bidders receive work from the successful bidder, the subcontracts may be a reward for submitting a non-competitive bid. As a procurement professional, knowing whether your bidders are sharing work amongst themselves may provide critical information indicating market sharing or tender rotation schemes.

3. Require bidders to sign a warranty confirming that their bid has been developed independently from their competitors and that no consultation, communication, contract, arrangement or understanding with any competitor has occurred regarding:
   - prices
   - methods, factors or formulas used to calculate prices
   - the intention or decision to submit, or not submit, a bid
   - the submission of a bid which is nonconforming
   - the quality, quantity, specifications or delivery particulars of the products or services to which this call for bids relates
   - the terms of the bid.

It is recognised, however, that certain types of agreements between competitors are not unlawful so tenderers should be required to disclose such exceptions as part of the warranty.
Arrangements that are not unlawful can include:

- certain joint ventures
- conduct authorised by the ACCC
- communication with a competitor for the purpose of subcontracting a portion of the tender, and where the communication with that competitor is limited to the information required to facilitate that particular subcontract.

Only bidders that have something to hide would be reluctant to sign. Such a warranty requirement should be part of your tender terms and conditions and would feature as a contractual clause.

The warranty requirement signals that you are alert to collusion and consider it unacceptable. It may also facilitate your agency seeking damages for a contractual breach if collusion is subsequently discovered.

If you are unclear about the information disclosed, you can contact the ACCC.

(4) It is also worth considering requiring tenderers to disclose to you any proceedings involving anti-competitive conduct, in Australia or overseas. This should include the company making the bid and any other party associated with that bid, including related companies, directors and senior management.

Tenderers should be required to tell you:

(a) the names of the parties to the proceedings
(b) the case number
(c) the general nature of the proceedings
(d) the outcome or current status of the proceedings.

Information about past collusive conduct will allow you to properly assess the marketplace behaviour of bidders, and will allow you to implement appropriate risk management strategies. For ACCC recommended tender clauses see the Cartel checklist included with this publication.

Confidentiality

Keep your decision-making processes and policies confidential. Cartels need to be able to monitor bids to ensure that members are sticking to their agreements. Where possible, guard the identity of bidders and the value of bids, at least until after a contract has been awarded. In particular, don’t alert existing operators of new potential suppliers.

Competitive tender design

Try to get as many bidders as possible and compare their bids rigorously. Approaching a wide range of suppliers may not always prevent collusion, but it can disrupt the operation of a cartel when you broaden the field.

Predictability and transparency can aid the operation of a cartel, especially where they attempt to manipulate tenders. By periodically changing the way you engage with the market, you can improve competition and your outcomes.

Consider the following:

- Do your processes tend to exclude possible suppliers, such as smaller operators? You may in some instances reduce the size of certain supply contracts to attract alternative suppliers. Or, you can actively encourage joint ventures by smaller suppliers, so they may better compete with the market heavy weights for your tenders.
- You may wish to extend the term of a supply contract so the arrangement will not lend itself to tender rotation.
Another useful procedure is cooperative procurement, where several agencies combine to obtain the benefits of purchasing much larger volumes. This practice increases the incentive for suppliers to compete and can also disrupt bid rotation.

Do you require suppliers to always tender to maintain registration? This may lead to smaller suppliers submitting ‘cover prices’ if the contract is beyond their capacity, simply to remain registered for future jobs.

Do your systems tend to favour incumbents?

A prolonged cycle of ‘select tenders’ may lead to bidder complacency. It is always a good idea to periodically test the broader market through an open tender.

It is not unusual for state and local government bodies to prefer to deal with local operators, to stimulate local employment and economic activity. As with select tenders, test the broader market occasionally.

Effective tender design can improve your outcomes as well as being a good tool to deter and disrupt cartels.
Monitor your outcomes

Keep track of past tenders and pricing movements so they can be analysed over time. This will help you to understand your market and assist you with estimating and budgeting, as well as making it harder for cartels to target you. It may also help you detect irregularities such as tender rotation. In summary, there is no substitute to being alert to possible collusion when conducting a tender.

**Deterrence tips**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assists cartels</th>
<th>Deters cartels</th>
<th>Why?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Predictability of tender timing</td>
<td>Deliberate strategic choice to occasionally alter your tender schedule</td>
<td>Regularity makes it easier for cartels to share contracts by rotating tenders or other bid rigging tactics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular size of supply contracts</td>
<td>Varied size and scope of supply contracts</td>
<td>Regularity makes market allocation easier. Smaller supplies may attract smaller operators that are not members of an existing cartel. A larger supply (say for a longer period) might achieve a better price and also deter tactics such as tender rotation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small group of regular suppliers</td>
<td>Larger group of suppliers that often changes</td>
<td>It is harder to maintain collusion when new operators continually need to be enlisted to ensure the coverage of a cartel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Splitting contracts between identical tenders</td>
<td>Choosing another method of solving tied bids, including random choice</td>
<td>Splitting makes market allocation extremely easy and partially removes the incentive to compete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disclosing identity of all bidders before the close of tender</td>
<td>Limited disclosure of identity of bidders</td>
<td>Full disclosure makes it easier for cartel members to contact all bidders and attempt to collude.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disclosing all bidders’ prices</td>
<td>Limited or no disclosure of prices bid in unsuccessful bids</td>
<td>Full disclosure allows a cartel to monitor all bids to ensure members stick to their arrangements and don’t cheat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement professionals are not experts on the value of the goods/services they purchase and the dynamics of their market</td>
<td>Procurement professionals understand their market and the approximate value of what they purchase</td>
<td>It is much harder to fix prices if buyers are alert to industry trends or overpricing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement professionals rely solely on suppliers and the competitive process to calculate value of supply</td>
<td>Procurement professionals obtain independent estimates of value before seeking quotes or tenders</td>
<td>The estimate will give procurement professionals a warning if quotes or tenders are excessive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff are not trained to reduce risks and detect cartels</td>
<td>All staff are trained in reducing risk and detecting warning signs</td>
<td>Without training, staff may not notice warning signs or not know what to do about them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement professionals do not keep detailed records or analyse tenders over time</td>
<td>Procurement professionals analyse tenders for trends and irregularities</td>
<td>Tender analysis may reveal trends over time that might not be apparent in the short term.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed shortlists require suppliers to submit tenders regularly to remain on a shortlist of preferred tenderers</td>
<td>Regular open tendering</td>
<td>Shortlists should only be used for as long as they are needed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The role of the ACCC

The ACCC is responsible for enforcing the relevant parts of the Competition and Consumer Act, including provisions against anti-competitive conduct. It is Australia’s sole agency for litigating breaches of competition law.

Contacting the ACCC

The ACCC does not expect you to undertake a complex investigation or to provide irrefutable proof that bidders are colluding. However, it is helpful if you assemble the facts that demonstrate your concerns.

Investigators generally seek three kinds of information concerning suspicious behaviour:

- **Details of any incidents that have aroused your suspicion**—if possible, this should be backed up by relevant documents, such as copies of the bids.
- **Any other evidence, such as notes of phone calls and conversations with bidders**—it is best that you write down any such anecdotal information at the earliest convenient time.
- **Whatever background information is available, such as past tenders, the history of relevant products and dealings with the industry sector**—this might include retained records or more general perspectives on past practices.

The ACCC wishes to assure you that we are not seeking to stop, interrupt or overturn any tendering exercise you are involved in. Cartel investigations can take many months before they are concluded, so we have no intention of upsetting your business processes in the meantime.
Confidentiality

You can report to the ACCC on a completely confidential basis, and investigators will keep your identity a secret. Even if an investigation leads to litigation before a court, it does not automatically mean you will be asked to provide evidence.

Penalties

The Act provides serious penalties for cartel conduct. For a breach by a corporation, the Federal Court of Australia can impose a maximum penalty of:

- $10 million, or
- when the value of illegal benefit can be ascertained, three times the value of the illegal benefit, or
- when the value of the illegal benefit cannot be ascertained, 10 per cent of the turnover of the corporation in the preceding 12 months.

A civil penalty of up to $500 000 can be imposed on an individual.

The court may disqualify directors and officers from managing a company. It can also prohibit any indemnity for legal costs and financial liabilities such as fines.

Cartel conduct is considered so harmful that criminal penalties may be imposed on individuals including imprisonment of up to 10 years and/or fines of up to $420 000 per contravention.

Immunity for cartel members

The ACCC has established an immunity policy for both corporations and individuals involved in a cartel that then go on to supply important information that exposes the collusion. Should you be contacted by a whistleblower who may be involved in cartel activity themselves, it is important that you refer them to the ACCC’s immunity policy. The immunity policy states that, in certain circumstances, immunity from civil proceedings and criminal prosecution may be offered to those who assist the ACCC. The immunity is strictly conditional and subject to the following:

- Only the first person or corporation to bring the matter to the attention of the ACCC may qualify for immunity (those who subsequently cooperate may be offered leniency).
- Generally immunity will not be granted to an informant in circumstances where the ACCC already possesses evidence of the cartel conduct that is likely to establish a contravention of the Act.
- They must not have coerced others to join.
- They must cooperate fully—and continue to cooperate—with the ACCC, or the immunity may be withdrawn.

A person or corporation may request a ‘marker’ for a limited period. This will, in effect, preserve first place in the queue while the applicant collects information or seeks legal advice.

The policy has been extremely successful, both in the detection of cartels and in providing a powerful deterrent to those considering such arrangements. Clearly, the policy can inject distrust and suspicion among the members of a cartel and destabilise their relationships.

The ACCC’s Immunity Policy and FAQs are available on the ACCC’s website.

Powers to investigate

The ACCC is best placed to investigate collusive conduct. It has a legislated capacity to compel any person or company to provide information about a suspected breach of the Act, including documents or verbal evidence, as long as there is reason to believe they are capable of doing so.
The ACCC also has the authority to begin civil court actions, seek enforceable undertakings and apply for penalties where appropriate. In appropriate cases, the ACCC may also refer a matter to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) for consideration of criminal charges against corporations and individuals.

You can keep yourself informed about cartel developments around the country. The ACCC provides a free email subscription service to the Competition Law Newsletter, where subscribers will receive updates on developments in competition law and cartel enforcement actions, as well as other matters to help you stay informed.

You can register by providing your details through the online form on the ACCC website at: https://www.accc.gov.au/media/subscriptions/competition-law

Reporting and inquiries

If you would like to know more, or wish to report suspicious behaviour, contact us.

ACCC Infocentre

1300 302 502

The ACCC has a large collection of resources on its website: www.accc.gov.au/business/anti-competitive-behaviour/cartels

Anonymously report a cartel

The ACCC has an anonymous reporting site which allows you to provide a tip-off, make a complaint or engage in a two-way online conversation with an ACCC investigator. To anonymously report an issue, please visit our website at www.accc.gov.au/business/anti-competitive-behaviour/cartels and click on the link ‘Anonymously report cartel conduct’ and follow the prompts.

You can also email the ACCC confidentially to the dedicated cartels address: cartelimmunity@accc.gov.au

ACCC Immunity Hotline

If you’re involved in a cartel be the first to apply for immunity from prosecution in exchange for helping us with our investigations.

The only valid way to make an immunity application or request a marker is to contact the ACCC Immunity Hotline:

General Manager
Cartels Branch

Telephone: (02) 9230 3894 (business hours)

Email: cartelimmunity@accc.gov.au

If you call the telephone hotline, it will not be adequate to leave a voicemail or other message.
Questions and answers

What do cartels cost the Australian economy?

It is very difficult to calculate the total cost of cartels to the Australian economy, but the cases exposed suggest that the damage could annually be hundreds of millions of dollars. When a cartel is operating, the effect is usually to inflate the price of goods and services by at least 10 per cent—probably a conservative estimate. In the private sector, this cost is ultimately paid by consumers. In the public sector, ratepayers and taxpayers bear the cost, which in turn may reduce the services government agencies can deliver. Some overseas cartels have even been shown to contribute to inflation.

What is the extent or prevalence of cartels?

From the cases the ACCC litigates or settles, we know that cartels are extremely damaging to the competitive process and therefore the wider economy. Overseas or international cartels demonstrate the same detriment, sometimes on an even larger scale.

An Australian National University study suggests the south-east Queensland concrete cartel inflated profits (by overcharging customers) by as much as $88 million over five years (from 1989 to 1994), while the transformer cartel netted an extra $70 million to $80 million over six years (from 1994 to 1999). The same study estimates the Queensland fire cartel extracted an extra $75 million over 10 years (from 1987 to 1997)—the list goes on.

An estimate of the number of cartels that avoid detection is obviously speculative, as is any estimate of undetected illegal behaviour. However, some overseas economic studies have concluded that only around 10 per cent to 17 per cent of cartel conduct is ever discovered. The only thing we can be sure of is that not all cartel behaviour is detected.

Will I breach confidentiality of the tender if I notify the ACCC?

Commercial confidentiality is not designed to protect illegal behaviour, but in any case if you have included the suggested clauses (see Cartel checklist included with this publication) in your tender documents the possibility of reporting has been accepted by the bidder. If you are concerned about breaching confidence, you may wish to seek advice on your obligations.

Is it appropriate to talk to tenderers if you have a suspicion they are colluding?

Probity requirements often prevent you from contacting tenderers lest it appear you are favouring one over another. However, asking questions of a tenderer to test whether they might have colluded and therefore broken the law would not appear to confer an unfair advantage or raise probity issues. The manner in which you undertake those inquiries would nevertheless require careful management and appropriate documentation.

The ACCC recommends that you do not reveal to tenderers any suspicions you may have lest you inadvertently tip them off. The ACCC does, however, encourage procurement professionals to collect, document and assemble as much information as possible to support and substantiate any concerns.

Asking a supplier direct questions about their tender may be the only way in which further information can be gathered. If you are unsure whether you should contact a tenderer please contact the ACCC for advice and guidance.
If an investigation discovers that I have previously (but unknowingly) awarded a contract to a cartel, will I have broken the law?

Inadvertently awarding business to a company involved in a cartel is not illegal, and should not reflect badly on your integrity. The reality is that cartel members usually know that their agreements are unlawful and go to great lengths to conceal them from procurers.

The ACCC’s only concern is whether your suppliers have been colluding, not the internal processes of the procuring agency. Investigators may seek details of the procurement, such as copies of bids and other relevant documents but your procurement practices and the continuance of existing contracts is a matter upon which you should take your own advice.

Are ‘buy local’ and similar procurement policies anti-competitive?

It is not unusual for state and local government bodies to prefer to deal with local operators to stimulate local employment and economic activity. This is not a breach of the Act; however, if you are not testing the broader market from time to time, local suppliers may feel too comfortable and not compete as vigorously as you would wish. It pays to be aware of this and manage the risk.

Is ‘select tendering’ a breach of competition law?

How you select and qualify your suppliers is up to you. However, be aware that such policies might make the formation of a cartel easier and therefore more tempting if the field is small and the competitors know each other. As with ‘buy local’ policies, it is good practice to occasionally test the broader market.

Are there any exceptions to anti-competitive behaviour?

There are some instances when apparently anti-competitive arrangements do not breach the Act.

They include:

- Buying groups—some businesses combine their purchasing to achieve greater economies of scale.
- Joint ventures—where businesses combine their operations for a particular project.
- ACCC authorised—sometimes there is a unique circumstance where the detriment of an anti-competitive arrangement is outweighed by a countervailing public benefit and should be allowed.
- Overseas selling—if goods are to be exported, then some provisions of the Act do not apply.

It must be stressed that that there are strict guidelines for exceptions and authorisations. The ACCC can advise you if suppliers make such claims.
Hypothetical 1

Four building firms have tendered for several projects with no apparent problems. The tenders have been close and all four have been successful at different times. All four firms have submitted tenders between $2.3 million and $2.4 million, a little over the estimated price. However, a new firm has recently appeared and has lodged its first tender. The new firm is awarded the contract.

### Possible price fixing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>The new tenderer bids $1.85 million, around 20 per cent below the others.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALERT</td>
<td>Suggests the other bidders were overpricing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>Note and monitor subsequent bids.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT</td>
<td>At the close of the next tender, the new firm is now the highest bidder. One of the original firms wins the tender at a price above estimate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALERT</td>
<td>Suggests, but does not prove, that the new entrant has been communicating with the established firms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>Note and continue to monitor.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Possible market sharing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>The new tenderer bids $1.85 million, around 20 per cent below the others.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALERT</td>
<td>Suggests the other bidders were overpricing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>Make a note and monitor subsequent bids.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT</td>
<td>At the close of the next tender, all bids are below expectations. It appears that the four original bidders have reduced their prices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALERT</td>
<td>Suggests that there has been a competitive response to the new entrant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>Make a note, continue to monitor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT</td>
<td>During the next tender, the new firm declines to bid. When asked why, the manager quotes ‘industry agreements’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALERT</td>
<td>Suggests a cartel is present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>Report to the ACCC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Hypothetical 2**

For a number of years, the three largest local suppliers of concrete have been tendering to supply for civil engineering projects. The bids have generally been at the high end of estimates, but there are few firms with the capacity to contract for such large jobs. The bids have always been close and appear to be competitive.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible price fixing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EVENT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALERT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACTION</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| EVENT | Later, when asked, all three managers reply that the industry’s rate of return on capital has been too low and needs to rise. |
| **ALERT** | Suggests possible collusion and price fixing. |
| **ACTION** | Report to the ACCC. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible whistleblower</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EVENT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALERT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACTION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EVENT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALERT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACTION</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hypothetical 3

Your organisation plans to develop a large portion of land for low-cost housing. Before the major contractors tender, the site needs to be cleared and drained. It is decided to put the job out to select tender among six firms that have demonstrated the capacity and experience to perform the job. Five of the six firms lodge their bids two days before the close of tender.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible bid rigging</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EVENT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALERT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACTION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EVENT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALERT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACTION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EVENT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALERT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACTION</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible ‘throwing the bid’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EVENT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALERT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACTION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EVENT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALERT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACTION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EVENT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALERT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACTION</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Hypothetical 4

Your organisation plans to build a new works depot. After the plans have been approved and the costs estimated, you approach three large local firms with sufficient capacity to tender that, on past experience, would be suitable for the task.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible bid rigging</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EVENT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALERT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACTION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EVENT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALERT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACTION</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Hypothetical 5

Your organisation annually tenders for roadworks and, therefore, has a good understanding of the market, the regular contractors and the pricing structure. It has estimated the current tender to be worth around $1 million and tenders are received from six regular contractors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible bid rigging</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EVENT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALERT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACTION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EVENT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALERT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACTION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EVENT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALERT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACTION</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These examples are purely hypothetical and are intended as illustrations only. They are not intended to be definitive examples that would apply to all circumstances—nor should they be construed as legal advice.
**Tender analysis example**

**Electrical construction contracts**

(Contracts awarded every six months—assume all bids above estimate and lowest bidder wins contract)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTRACT NO. 1</th>
<th>CONTRACT NO. 2</th>
<th>CONTRACT NO. 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contractor A $1 800 000</td>
<td>Contractor C $800 000</td>
<td>Contractor D $650 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractor B $1 944 000</td>
<td>Contractor B $1 100 000</td>
<td>Contractor B $800 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractor C $2 088 000</td>
<td>Contractor D $1 800 000</td>
<td>Contractor A $1 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractor D $2 232 000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTRACT NO. 4</th>
<th>CONTRACT NO. 5</th>
<th>CONTRACT NO. 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contractor B $1 800 000</td>
<td>Contractor C $1 000 000</td>
<td>Contractor D $1 150 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractor A $2 100 000</td>
<td>Contractor A $1 500 000</td>
<td>Contractor B $1 510 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractor D $2 100 000</td>
<td>Contractor B $1 900 000</td>
<td>Contractor A $1 525 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractor C $2 300 000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Contractor C $1 575 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Hypothetical example represents three years of regular six-month tenders.

**Factors to consider**

1. Are each of the tenderers winning equal market share? Yes, each has won $1.8 million of business over a three-year cycle. Contractor A wins in contract no. 1 but not again. Contractor C wins $800 000 in contract 2 and $1 million in contract no. 5 for a total of $1.8 million.

2. Is there any pattern to losing bids? For contract no. 1 there are equal increments of 8 per cent ($144 000) between each tender amount.

3. In a competitive market you would think that prices would be close. It may therefore be useful to compare the difference between the lowest and highest bid—for example, identical losing bids in contract no. 4 of $2.1 million.

4. Companies sometimes bid high and sometimes bid low—there is no pattern suggesting they’re taking their own actual costs into account (for example, contractor A is low on contract no. 1 and high on all others).

5. What is the average price, and how far under the average is the winning bid?
   For example, contract nos. 4, 5 and 6 suggest there may have been floors to bid above: $2 million and $1.5 million. Cartels may be quite sophisticated about where they pitch non-competitive bids—remember, they need to create the impression of competition. For example, non-competitive bidding can lead to a clustering of bids in an attempt to influence engineers/departmental estimates of the cost of future tenders.

Detecting bid rigging directly from bid data is very difficult. It only provides circumstantial evidence, enough to raise your suspicions. From a legal point of view, it is often difficult to draw strong conclusions because of a lack of direct evidence. The ACCC would need to investigate the circumstances more thoroughly before it could litigate.

Note: This example is purely hypothetical; it is intended as an illustration only. It is not intended to be a definitive example that would apply to all circumstances—nor should it be construed as legal advice.
References and further information

We wish to thank the following sources for information used in this publication.


Scott Palmer, 2007, Antitrust training for purchasing professionals, PowerPoint presentation, Office of the Florida Attorney General


National Association of Attorney General, 1977, Government purchasing and the antitrust laws, North Carolina, USA

Dr Christine Parker, Dr Paul Ainsworth, and Natalie Stepanenko, 2004, ACCC Enforcement and Compliance project: the impact of ACCC enforcement activity in cartel cases, working paper, The Australian National University, Centre for Competition and Consumer Policy, Canberra, Australia


ACCC contacts

Infocentre: 1300 302 502

Website: www.accc.gov.au

Callers who are deaf or have a hearing or speech impairment can contact the ACCC through the National Relay Service: www.relayservice.com.au.

Voice-only (speak and listen) users—phone 1300 555 727 and ask for 1300 302 502.

Anonymously report a cartel


Click on the link ‘Anonymously report cartel conduct’ and follow the prompts.
Apply for immunity for cartel conduct

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General Manager
Cartels Branch
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Cartel checklist

It is difficult to give black and white advice as to the telltale signs of cartel behaviour, or a bright red line as to when to contact the ACCC. You should trust your instincts and, if you smell a rat, take a closer look.

Signs of possible bid rigging

- Suppliers appear to be taking turns at winning tenders or appear to be sharing the contracts by value.
- Regular suppliers decline to tender for no obvious reason.
- Bidders appear to deliberately include unacceptable terms within their tenders.
- Bidders sometimes bid low and sometimes high on what appears to be the same type of supply.
- Bidders meet before the close of tender, without a procurement professional being present.
- The winning firm regularly subcontracts to competitors that submitted higher tenders.
- One firm of professional advisers represent several tenderers.

Signs of possible price fixing

- Tenders or quotes are much higher than expected. This may indicate collusive pricing, or it may just be overpricing (not illegal in itself). It may simply reveal that estimates are inaccurate. Making some inquiries may help determine whether price expectations are reasonable.
- All suppliers raise prices simultaneously and beyond what seems to be justified by changes in input costs.
- Prices submitted are much higher than previous tenders or published price lists.
- A new supplier’s price is lower than the usual tenderers. This may indicate there has been collusion amongst the incumbent tenderers.
- Prices drop markedly after a new supplier tenders. This may indicate that the existing suppliers have been colluding and the new supplier has forced them to compete.

Signs of possible market sharing

- Firms charge different prices in different locations, and the difference can’t be explained by transport costs.
- A supplier declines to tender in certain locations, stating that to supply would be an intrusion on someone else’s ‘patch’.
- A supplier states that they can’t supply certain products or services because of agreements with other businesses.
- A firm’s representative states that another firm should not have supplied you because of industry agreements.
- Bidders wait to the last minute to submit their bids and express interest in whether a non-local or occasional bidder is present.
Unusual mistakes

- There are identical spelling or calculation errors in competitors’ bids.
- There is an uncanny similarity in the layout or language in competing tenders.
- A tender document is in electronic form and has been prepared on a competitor’s computer. (This can sometimes be revealed by checking the document’s metadata, usually under ‘properties’ in the file menu).
- A firm’s representative says something that indicates they are aware of the details of a competitor’s tender.
- All bids are delivered by one agent or even delivered in the same envelope.

Whistleblowers

- Let informants know that information can be provided confidentially to the ACCC.
- The ACCC immunity policy for cartel conduct can be used by cartel members who break rank and report their involvement. This can give them both criminal and civil immunity.
- If a supplier’s employee or agent suggests that they are aware of collusion, do not ignore it. Note the details and report the incident to the ACCC.

Tender analysis

- Do records suggest that bidders seem to be taking turns at winning tenders? This may indicate tender rotation.
- Do tenderers appear to win around the same percentage of the contracts from year to year? This may indicate market sharing.
- Do suppliers appear to win contracts in certain areas but not in adjoining areas? This may also indicate market sharing.
Anti-collusion tender clauses

Tender clause 1: facilitating reporting to the ACCC

**Option 1**

The procuring authority reserves the right, at its discretion, to report suspected collusive or anti-competitive conduct by tenderers to the appropriate regulatory authority and to provide that authority with any relevant tenderer information.

**Option 2**

The procuring authority’s obligation to keep tenderer information confidential will not be breached if the information is disclosed by the procuring authority to the appropriate regulatory authority because of suspected collusive or anti-competitive tendering behaviour.

Tender clause 2: disclosure of subcontracting

Tenderers must indicate if they intend any person (or organisation) who is not an employee to perform work on the services, and they must provide their details. The contract with the successful tenderer will require the procuring authority’s prior written approval for any changes to these arrangements, and any further subcontracting.

Tender clause 3: warranty

The bidder warrants that their tender has not been prepared with any consultation, communication, contract, arrangement or understanding with any competitor, other than:

- where certain joint venture arrangements exist between the bidder and a competitor
- where the bidder and a competitor have an agreement that has been authorised by the ACCC
- where the bidder has communicated with a competitor for the purpose of subcontracting a portion of the tender, and where the communication with that competitor is limited to the information required to facilitate that particular subcontract.

In such a situation the bidder agrees to fully disclose the full nature and extent of any agreements with competitors to the procuring authority.

In the event that no such disclosure is made, the bidder warrants that their bid has not been prepared with any consultation, communication, contract, arrangement or understanding with any competitor regarding:

- prices
- methods, factors or formulas used to calculate prices
- the intention or decision to submit, or not submit, a bid
- the submission of a bid that is non conforming
- the quality, quantity, specifications or delivery particulars of the products or services to which this call for bids relates
- the terms of the bid.

The bidder acknowledges that if the [department/agency, etc.] accepts the bidder’s offer and completes any contract the [department/agency, etc.] will do so in reliance of this warranty.
Tender clause 4: disclosure of prior anti-competitive conduct

Tenderers must indicate if they, or any corporation or person associated with their tender, including directors and senior management, are or have ever been subject to proceedings related to anti-competitive conduct in Australia or overseas. The information must include:

- the names of the parties to the proceedings
- the case number
- the general nature of the proceedings
- the outcome or current status of the proceedings.

The [department/agency, etc.] reserves the right, at its discretion, to exclude any tenderer from the procurement process if the tenderer, or any corporation or person, including directors or senior managers associated with their tender, have ever contravened the anti-competitive provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 or equivalent laws in Australia or overseas.

The [department/agency, etc.] reserves the right, at its discretion, to exclude any tenderer from the procurement process if full disclosure of any or all contraventions of the anti-competitive provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act or equivalent laws in Australia or overseas has not been made.