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### Glossary

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<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ABARES</td>
<td>Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWRI</td>
<td>Australian Wine Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Grape and Wine Inc (AGWI)</td>
<td>National grower and winemaker representative organisation formed in 2019 following amalgamation of WFA and Australian Vignerons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Vignerons</td>
<td>Former grower representative organisation which amalgamated in 2019 with WFA to form Australian Grape and Wine Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broker</td>
<td>Facilitates buying and selling of grapes and/or wine on behalf of growers, winemakers and other clients.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulk wine</td>
<td>Wine that is transported in containers, such as stainless steel or bladder containers, rather than in bottles or other smaller packaging. Mostly exported, it is packaged at its destination, sometimes after blending with other wines. Bulk wine is usually commercial wine, and on average is sold at a much lower price than bottled wine.</td>
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<td>CCA</td>
<td><em>Competition and Consumer Act 2010</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCW</td>
<td>CCW Co-operative Limited, a co-operative of approximately 600 growers in the Riverland (previously known as Consolidated Co-operative Wineries).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Australian Wine Industry Code of Conduct—a voluntary code which took effect on 1 January 2009.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Code Management Committee</td>
<td>The committee responsible for administering the Code. The Code Management Committee replaced the Code Administration Committee on 1 November 2011.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Collective bargaining group (CBG)</td>
<td>A group of suppliers, such as wine grape growers, who join together and use their joint bargaining power to negotiate with buyers, such as winemakers. Such groups must notify the ACCC or be authorised by the ACCC to engage in collective bargaining. Otherwise they will be in contravention of the CCA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial wine</td>
<td>Lower quality wine than premium wine, often made with grapes from warm climate regions. Often defined as wine retailing for less than $10 per bottle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract processing</td>
<td>A business arrangement where one party pays another party to process grapes owned by the first party. Contract processing services are used by growers wanting to make wine, winemakers who don’t have a winery in a particular region or who are short on processing capacity, and virtual winemakers.</td>
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Cool climate regions

All Australian wine regions except for warm climate regions are referred to as cool climate regions, despite this description not closely corresponding to the climate in some cases. Grapes from cool climate regions are more likely to be used in premium wines than grapes from warm climate regions.

Geographical indication (GI)

Defined by Wine Australia as ‘a word or expression used in the description and presentation of a wine to indicate the country, region or locality in which it originated or to suggest that a particular quality, reputation or characteristic of the wine is attributable to the wine having originated in the country, region or locality indicated by the word or expression’. The names of wine-growing regions are protected under the Wine Australia Act 2013. Wine Australia keeps the Register of Protected Geographical Indications and Other Terms.

Grower survey

In July and August 2018, the ACCC invited growers to provide feedback about competition issues through an online survey. We received responses from 262 wine grape growers from a range of regions. A report of results is available at: https://www.accc.gov.au/winegrapes.

Independent grower

Grower who has no ownership or other controlling interest in a winery.

Indicative price

Regional Indicative Price provided by Code signatories for each variety of wine grape to growers in the Hunter Valley, Riverina, Murray Valley and Riverland by 15 December, and to growers in other regions by 15 January each year.

Inland Wine Regions Alliance

An alliance between Riverland Winegrape Growers Association, Murray Valley Winegrowers and Riverina Wine Grapes Marketing Board to represent growers in the three warm climate regions.

Matter other than grapes (MOG)

Leaves, sticks and other items detected in a load of grapes delivered to the winery weighbridge.

Murray Valley

Combination of the Murray Darling and Swan Hill GI protected regions in southern NSW and northern Victoria.

Murray Valley Winegrowers (MVW)

A levy-funded association representing growers in the Murray Valley.

Must

The grape juice and skin mixture created at the first stage of the winemaking process, containing the skins and prior to fermentation.

National Vintage Report

A report published by Wine Australia each August, describing volumes crushed and prices paid by variety in each region in the previous harvest.

NMI

National Measurement Institute

Non-quality adjusted price
The per-tonne price offered by a winemaker to a grower for wine grapes, before adjustments are made (if any) as a result of quality assessments.

Premium wine
Higher quality wine than commercial wine, primarily made with grapes from cool climate regions. Often defined as wine retailing for more than $10 per bottle.

Quality adjusted price
The per-tonne price paid by a winemaker to a grower for wine grapes, after adjustments are made (if any) as a result of quality assessments.

Quality adjusted weighted average price
The average per-tonne price paid to growers in a particular warm climate region by a winemaker, including any quality-related price adjustments.

Quality assessment
Any assessment of grapes for the purposes of determining: whether the winemaker will accept or reject the grapes, how much the winemaker will pay the grower for the grapes, and the timing of harvest.

Region
A wine-growing region defined in the Register of Protected GIs and Other Terms.

Riverina
A GI protected warm climate region in southern NSW within the Big Rivers zone.

Riverina Wine Grapes Marketing Board (RWGMB)
A levy-funded association representing growers in the Riverina.

Riverland
A GI protected warm climate region in south-eastern SA within the Lower Murray zone.

Riverland Wine (RW)
A levy-funded association representing growers and winemakers in the Riverland. It is the union of the Riverland Winegrape Growers Association and the Riverland Wine Industry Development Council.

Rollover clause
Provides that a new contract term (generally of a specified length) will automatically commence if a termination notice is not given within a certain timeframe prior to a contract expiring.

Supply agreement
Contract between a grower and buyer, usually a winemaker, for the supply of grapes.

Unfair contract terms (UCT)
Unfair Contract Terms legislation was introduced to assist consumers and small businesses that may have limited bargaining power, by empowering a court to declare unfair contract terms in eligible standard form contracts void.

Veraison
Onset of grape ripening.

Virtual winemaker
Winemaker which uses contract processing services rather than owning a winery.

Warm climate regions
The three regions regarded as warm climate are: Riverina (NSW), Riverland (SA) and Murray Valley (Murray Darling/Swan Hill—NSW/Vic).
Wine Defined by Wine Australia as ‘the product of the complete or partial fermentation of fresh grapes, or a mixture of that product and products derived solely from grapes’.  

Wine Australia Brand name of the Australian Grape and Wine Authority, an Australian Government statutory authority governed by the Wine Australia Act 2013 (Cth).

Wine Equalisation Tax (WET) A tax of 29 per cent on the wholesale value of wine, designed to be paid on the last wholesale of wine (which is usually between the wholesaler and retailer). In 2004 a WET producer rebate was introduced to allow producers to offset their WET liability.


Winemaker A business which processes wine grapes to make wine, usually in one or more wineries owned by the winemaker. Winemakers range in size from very large to very small.

Winemakers’ Federation of Australia (WFA) Former national winemaker representative organisation which amalgamated in 2019 with Australian Vignerons to form Australian Grape and Wine Inc.

Winery A facility used to commercially process grapes into wine.

2 ibid.
Executive summary

The Australian wine industry consists of a diverse range of participants, including an estimated 2500 winemakers and more than 6000 wine grape growers, producing wine grapes on an area in excess of 135 000 hectares spread across most states but predominantly in southern Australia. Wine production was estimated to be 1.29 billion litres in 2018, and during the 2017–18 financial year 849 million litres was exported, valued at $2.8 billion. The Australian wine industry is estimated to employ more than 175 000 people, and directly and indirectly contribute over $40 billion annually to the Australian economy.

Approximately two thirds of annual wine grape production occurs in what are referred to as the ‘warm climate’ grape growing regions, which include the Riverina, Murray Valley and Riverland wine regions, located in southern NSW, north western Victoria and SA.

In these regions, growers operating generally small-scale farms typically produce grapes under contract to a relatively small number of very large-scale winemakers, with the bulk of the wine produced from these grapes destined for export markets.

The contractual arrangements between growers and winemakers in these regions has frequently been the subject of concerns raised with the ACCC, as has the level of competition between winemakers for growers’ grapes. These issues were the subject of a market study conducted by the ACCC, the results of which are reported here.

Context of the market study

The Australian wine grape industry is unique when compared to other agriculture sectors in a number of ways, including:

- considerable variance in the quality and price of grapes, and the wine produced from those grapes. Grape prices range from under $300 per tonne for some varieties in warm climate regions, to over $8000 per tonne for some premium quality varieties in cool climate regions.
- the broad diversity of businesses of the approximately 2500 winemakers in Australia. These range from the very small, single label wine producers, to the likes of Treasury Wine Estates with a market capitalisation of around $11 billion.
- long lead times associated with grape growing and winemaking. Newly established vines take at least three years to produce fruit, and wine is not ready for sale for between six months and five years after grapes are harvested.

Similar to other Australian agricultural industries, however, the wine grape industry is characterised by imbalances in bargaining power between major buyers (winemakers) and growers. The industry is also significantly exposed to export markets, in which market conditions and prices can change significantly from year-to-year. The ability of growers to respond to changing markets is limited, given the long lead times associated with wine grape production. This can result in prolonged periods of over or under supply of grapes, as the recent history of the Australian wine industry reveals.

After a period of strong annual production growth which extended from 1990 to 2005, a ten-year period of oversupply of grapes and low grape prices began in 2006 and the industry has only recently emerged from this situation.

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5 The delineation of warm and cool climate regions is not necessarily a direct indication of the climate, for example there are regions with climates which may be considered to have warm weather, though are referred to in the industry as ‘cool’. Warm regions are also known as ‘inland’ or ‘commercial’ regions, while cool regions are sometimes called ‘premium’ or ‘boutique’ regions.
6 Based on Wine Australia data.
Since 2014, international demand for Australian wine has increased. This has been driven by several factors including increasing demand from China, and a downturn in European, South African and Chilean production. At the same time, Australian production has remained relatively static and growers have exited the industry. The resulting correction to the sustained demand/supply imbalance in Australia has resulted in some recovery in grape prices since 2014, but they are still well below the long-run average.

The impact of the decade-long period of oversupply remains evident in many of the contracting practices that currently exist between growers and winemakers. In particular, it resulted in growers placing great importance on securing a buyer for their grapes over the medium to long term.

The ACCC has found that bargaining power imbalances between growers and winemakers has resulted in growers agreeing to potentially unfair and uncertain contract terms. In addition, growers were frequently reluctant to raise concerns with the ACCC because of fear of retribution. This points very strongly to a market which is not functioning well.

**Issues and implications**

The ACCC has identified a range of concerning practices resulting from the bargaining power imbalance and information asymmetry in grower-winemaker relationships, including:

- growers being largely price takers and unable to effectively negotiate with winemakers
- a lack of transparency and certainty over pricing and quality assessment procedures
- supply agreements without price certainty or verifiable price benchmarks
- delayed payment terms for growers, sometimes up to nine months after delivery of grapes
- imbalances in supply agreements which disproportionately allocate transactional risk to growers, allow winemakers to act unilaterally and have the potential to cause significant detriment to growers, and
- low levels of competition between winemakers acquiring grapes in warm climate regions.

These industry features result in practices which ultimately produce inefficient outcomes in grape production and pricing, and discourage innovation and capital investment.

The ACCC considers that future growth prospects for the Australian wine industry will be heavily dependent on reforms to improve competition for wine grapes.

The ACCC’s Final Report includes recommendations to improve industry contracting practices, to foster stronger competition between winemakers, and to provide a greater level of certainty and transparency to growers. Increased competition for grapes and improved price transparency will benefit growers, enabling them to make better-informed production decisions. In particular, growers will be better placed to decide which winemaker or winemakers to supply, which grape varieties to grow, how much key inputs such as water and fertiliser to apply and how to optimise other viticultural decisions.

The findings and recommendations arising from this market study focus on encouraging practices that will facilitate more efficient grape production and processing. As such, these recommendations are focussed on improving the efficiency of the industry as a whole.

The unique characteristics of the wine industry present a challenge in developing recommendations. Recommendations should reform industry practices and address market failures and unfair practices, yet not have unanticipated adverse impacts, particularly on smaller winemakers, cool climate grape growers or on product innovation.
Australia’s competition and consumer laws are capable of addressing isolated behaviours and conduct which harm competition and efficiency in the industry. These include the business-to-business unfair contract terms law and prohibitions on misleading or deceptive conduct, and unconscionable conduct. However, taking enforcement action under these laws is often not the most effective way to address systemic behaviours that undermine competition and efficiency in an industry. Such behaviours can often be better addressed through an industry code of conduct, which can establish minimum behavioural standards, and provide mechanisms to efficiently address code breaches.

The Australian Wine Industry Code of Conduct (Code) is a voluntary code of conduct which was established in 2008 by industry participants, in an attempt to address some of the ongoing issues highlighted in this market study.

The Code has a number of shortcomings and some major winemakers have yet to sign up to the Code. Despite this, the ACCC has found the Code has provided an avenue for dispute resolution for some individual growers, and has been used by some growers to their benefit on some occasions.

The ACCC has made recommendations which aim to improve the Code. However, to be an effective mechanism to improve industry practices, participation by major winemakers is essential. This applies in particular to the Riverina region where none of the major winemakers are signatories to the Code. In the absence of a significant improvement in voluntary Code participation in the near future, the ACCC will consider recommending that a mandatory code be introduced.

While examining contracts between winemakers and growers, the ACCC identified a range of contract terms which we consider may be unfair under the Australian Consumer Law (ACL). The ACCC will be investigating these, separate to this market study. The ACCC encourages all winemakers to review their grower supply agreements and ensure that they do not contain any unfair contract terms.

While agreement terms found by a court to be unfair are void and unenforceable, there are currently no financial penalties under the ACL for unfair contract terms. The ACCC is advocating for legislative reforms to address this. Winemakers found to have unfair contract terms in their agreements with growers may face financial penalties in the future.

Feedback to the Interim Report

The ACCC consulted widely following the release of the Interim Report. The ACCC received strong industry engagement, including through receiving 40 submissions and holding a range of meetings with stakeholders. The feedback provided is reflected throughout this Final Report, and the ACCC has used this information to refine and amend its findings and recommendations.

The ACCC thanks stakeholders across the industry for their engagement in response to the Interim Report, and throughout the market study.

Next steps

The recommendations in this report are developed for the industry, the government and the ACCC to progress.

The ACCC will review the progress of the industry in adopting the final recommendations 12–18 months after the release of the Final Report. Additionally, through its Agriculture Unit, the ACCC will continue to monitor competition and fair trading issues in the wine grapes industry more broadly.
Findings

There is limited competition for wine grapes

Competition for warm climate grapes primarily occurs within or close to a given grape growing region because of:

- transportation costs relative to the value of the grapes
- grape perishability
- bio-security regulations, such as those relating to phylloxera.

Relatively close geographic proximity results in some limited competition between winemakers across the Riverland and Murray Valley regions. In contrast, winemakers in the Riverina do not appear to face competition from winemakers located outside the region. This is because of their geographical isolation from other similar wine regions and resulting prohibitive transportation costs.

Competition is inhibited by market concentration and contracting practices

The ACCC observed low levels of competition for grapes. This may be attributed to a number of factors:

- the high degree of market concentration in wine making
- a lack of price transparency
- limited switching between winemakers by growers, due to the existence of switching barriers, such as long notice periods to exit contracts and inadequate information about market prices.

Markets for grapes are concentrated. A few large winemakers acquire the majority of grapes in each region, and many small scale winemakers buy relatively small volumes. This is particularly the case in the Riverland and Riverina where there are one or two dominant buyers of grapes.

The recent period of oversupply continues to impact competition through agreements negotiated at that time, as well as many growers’ prior experiences of not being able to sell their fruit. The ACCC heard that most growers prioritise securing a grape buyer in the medium term over receiving the best price in the short term. This suggests that they value certainty of sale in all years, over having the flexibility to seek higher prices in periods when market conditions are more favourable.

A lack of transparency in market pricing restricts growers from reliably assessing how competitive a given winemaker’s price offer is. Winemakers do not publicise the prices they pay, and use confidentiality terms to prevent growers from disclosing their indicative and final prices to other growers and winemakers.

Many growers face barriers to switching winemakers. These result from prevalent use of multi-year agreements, roll over clauses, long notice periods, adverse treatment of growers who switch, restrictions on the sale of excess production, and inadequate availability of information about market prices. Many winemakers incorporate at least two or three such barriers in their supply agreements and business practices, thereby discouraging growers from switching.

Collective bargaining is an arrangement where, after obtaining ACCC approval, two or more competitors come together to negotiate with a supplier or a customer over terms, conditions and prices. Collective bargaining is not widely used in the industry. The ACCC found examples of small collective bargaining groups, which have experienced some success in negotiating better outcomes for growers and attracting more competition into a region. However, knowledge of collective bargaining and its potential benefits appears to be low in the industry overall. Growers that responded to the market study expressed interest in participating in collective bargaining in the future.
The state of competition in wholesale and retail wine markets

This market study has not focussed on markets for finished wines. However, the ACCC has considered the effects that these markets have on the competition for grapes.

The vast majority of warm climate grapes are used for commercial, low value wine destined for export markets. Australian winemakers competing in global markets are typically price takers, and this constrains the prices they can offer growers for grapes. Australian wine represents a relatively small share of global wine exports, and mostly consists of near homogenous commercial wine, easily substitutable with wine from South America, South Africa or other regions.

In the domestic market, winemakers face a highly concentrated retail sector with four major retailers accounting for around 80 per cent of total liquor retailing in Australia. Domestic winemakers compete in the wholesale market with one another, the large retailers’ private label wines and imports. This competition puts downward pressure on winemakers’ margins, restricting their ability to negotiate higher wholesale prices or pass on cost increases to retailers. Winemakers are also exposed to risk through the potential delisting of retail brands and changing consumer demand.

The quality assessment of wine grapes is a key issue for growers

The ACCC found a high degree of variation in the quality specifications imposed on growers in warm climate supply agreements. While there are some common specifications such as sugar levels, material other than grapes, and testing for disease, there are also significant differences. These differences relate to whether and how colour measures are applied to red wine grapes, and whether or not subjective taste assessments and other measures are undertaken.

Growers have concerns about quality assessment

Growers have raised concerns about the transparency, consistency, timing and subjectivity of quality assessment methods employed by winemakers. In addition, growers have indicated that they lack visibility and understanding of quality assessment processes and have complained about the difficulty and impracticality of disputing quality assessment results.

These shortcomings likely contribute to mistrust around quality assessment processes and outcomes, with some growers claiming that quality assessments are conducted arbitrarily or for ulterior motives.

There is a lack of transparency and certainty in quality assessments

Generally, grape supply agreements and grower manuals issued by winemakers clearly set out quality assessment specifications and relevant penalties and bonuses. However, they do not always specify when testing will occur, or the precise methods that will be used. Some winemakers also retain in their supply agreements a broad unilateral right to change quality specifications during the season, which creates uncertainty for growers.

Timing of deliveries has a significant impact on grower remuneration

The timing of harvest is one of the most important factors influencing grape quality and volume and, consequently, the price paid for grapes. Winemakers usually determine the timing of harvest, which allows them to manage the intake of deliveries at their wineries. This means that growers, unlike winemakers, have little or no ability to mitigate the risk of quality deterioration, adverse weather events or volume loss, and may receive a reduced payment as a result of risk management decisions made by the winemaker.

Colour assessment is a complex issue

Some growers have alleged that colour assessments used for red wine grapes are unreliable, lack scientific credibility, and are used by winemakers to manipulate prices. However, academic literature and experts consulted by the ACCC support the view that while colour assessment is not a perfect measure, it correlates to some characteristics sought by winemakers that would otherwise have to be assessed using subjective sensory methods.
Price transparency in the industry should be improved

Australian warm climate grape prices are strongly correlated with wine export prices, which can change significantly year-to-year based on global supply and demand. Grape prices are also influenced by growing and harvest conditions, strength of competition, quality and condition, pricing mechanisms, contract length, previous prices and regional grape pricing trends.

There are a range of pricing mechanisms used in grape supply agreements, including variable price agreements where the price is determined by the winemaker close to harvest, annual or multi-year agreements where a fixed price is determined in advance, and spot market agreements which are entered into a short time before harvest. Prices offered under each type of supply agreement can differ because of changing market conditions.

Winemakers use a range of procedures for informing growers about the prices they will offer. Signatories to the Code release an indicative price by 15 December in the warm climate regions, and a final price close to harvest. The requirement to publish indicative prices has been controversial among growers and winemakers, and has discouraged some winemakers from signing the Code.

The ACCC has found that:
- final prices are often similar to indicative prices
- indicative prices are released too late in the season to significantly influence growers’ production decisions
- winemakers indicate they are unable to provide reliable indicative prices early in the season because of the uncertainty associated with export market conditions and the absence of yield information
- the dispersion of grape prices is significantly greater in cool climate regions than in warm climate regions, primarily because of the greater variation in grape quality and wine values in the cool climate regions
- of the three warm climate regions, the dispersion of prices received by growers is lowest in the Riverland and highest in the Riverina.

Insufficient price transparency is resulting in inefficient outcomes

The ACCC is concerned that insufficient price transparency in warm climate wine grape markets is distorting the competitive process and impeding efficient and responsive grape and wine production. Specifically, we are concerned that growers are being hindered from effectively negotiating prices and making reliably informed switching, production, risk management and investment decisions.

While growers can access information about current and past prices in global wine markets and historical regional grape prices, this information has limited use to growers looking to make forward-looking strategic decisions. Grape prices are dependent on expected future wine market conditions, which in turn depend on a broad range of factors including global wine inventory levels and movements in consumer trends. Feedback has suggested that it is difficult for individual growers to assess these factors.

In addition, growers have limited access to information about individual winemakers’ prices. While growers commonly share price information by word of mouth, this information is not always accurate, reliable, comparable or representative. This situation makes it difficult for growers to determine whether the price offers they receive are competitive, and which winemaker to switch to, if any, to maximise their profits.

Furthermore, the current aggregated reporting does not capture the range of business models and degree of product differentiation that exist in the warm climate wine grape markets. This is likely preventing growers and winemakers from fully understanding the strategic options available to them, and resulting in a misallocation of resources.
The ACCC recommends that the indicative pricing scheme be discontinued

In the Interim Report, the ACCC made an interim recommendation that indicative prices be disclosed to an independent body and published simultaneously. This was intended to reduce the potential for indicative pricing practices to lead to anticompetitive effects.

However, following extensive consultation with the industry, the ACCC considers that there is very little evidence that the indicative pricing scheme provides significant tangible benefits to growers or the industry. There is not enough evidence to justify the risks and burdens associated with implementing a regulatory scheme for indicative pricing for the following reasons:

- Growers cannot swap winemakers for the current season based on indicative prices, because they have already committed to supply a particular winemaker.
- Winemakers are aware that growers cannot swap in that season, which limits their incentive to negotiate with growers based on indicative prices.
- Past final prices are more helpful for growers looking to enter into a new supply agreement than past indicative prices, because they are actual prices rather than non-binding estimates.
- Indicative prices are released too late to influence major growing decisions, but requiring them to be made earlier would make them less accurate.

The ACCC has removed the interim recommendation on indicative pricing from this Final Report. We recommend that indicative pricing practices be removed from the Code and all grape supply agreements to reduce the potential for price signalling.

In place of the interim recommendation on indicative pricing, the ACCC has made a new final recommendation (recommendation 5) designed to increase the availability of market information to inform production decisions. The ACCC has also refined its recommendation on final pricing (recommendation 6) to inform switching and improve price competition.

While the price reporting mechanism proposed under recommendation 6 is different to the price disclosure mechanisms that exist in other agriculture markets, the ACCC considers it is necessary because:

- unlike in other agriculture markets, such as cattle and dairy, there is no reliable price information disclosed to wine grape growers that informs switching decisions
- the use of ‘fair market price’ contracts by winemakers makes it critical that accurate benchmark prices are reported each year to ensure fair and transparent pricing.

Supply agreements are varied and typically favour winemakers

A wide variety of supply agreements exist

In the three warm climate regions, there are a number of winemakers of varying sizes, producing different products and operating under different business models. Consequently, there is no consistent supply agreement model used within the industry, or in different parts of the industry. Multi-year variable price agreements, often with three to five year terms, are the most common supply agreement in warm climate regions.

Growers have different preferences in dealing with winemakers. Some growers diversify their supply to reduce risk in one or more ways, including:

- producing more than one variety of grapes
- dealing with more than one winemaker (often via having certain vines that are contracted to each winemaker)
- having a written contract or contracts in place for some of their vineyard blocks, but also selling some grapes on the spot market.
In most warm climate regions, growers supply under written contracts. However, informal annual and multi-year oral agreements do exist in the industry and are more common in the Riverina than in other regions. This appears to be attributable to the fact that:

- no winemakers in the Riverina are Code signatories (Code signatories are required under most circumstances to have written contracts)
- many growers feel compelled to continue supply under existing oral agreements because of an industry culture that places a significant emphasis on loyalty to winemakers.

The ACCC considers that supply arrangements should be in writing. Written contracts help to ensure that growers and winemakers have transparency and certainty over their rights and obligations, including how price is determined, quality specifications, and payment terms.

**There is a bargaining power imbalance between growers and winemakers**

Growers tend to be in a significantly weaker bargaining position compared to large winemakers. The following factors contribute to this bargaining power imbalance:

- Significant information imbalances result in winemakers having a better understanding of the price a grower will be willing to accept.
- Winemakers view grapes as a largely homogenous input for lower value wines. Winemakers can therefore purchase suitable grapes from many different sources, which weakens growers’ ability to negotiate based on product differentiation.
- Grapes shrivel if left on the vine past their prime, and quickly deteriorate following harvest. Consequently, growers are unable to delay harvest or delivery to find a better price.
- Despite improved market demand for most varieties in recent years, many growers are concerned that commercial grapes could become oversupplied again. Fear of being penalised in the future for seeking to negotiate terms or dispute quality assessment results mean that growers are not fully benefitting from their improved bargaining positions.

**Some unfair contract terms may exist in supply agreements**

The ACCC identified a number of terms in grape supply agreements which may be considered unfair contract terms. The ACCC is assessing these agreements and may investigate traders who continue to have such terms in their standard form contracts. Contract terms that are declared by a court to be unfair contract terms are void and unenforceable.

The supply agreements seen by the ACCC varied markedly, not only with regard to how price is determined, but also to the types of terms that were included in different supply agreements. However, the ACCC has concerns about a number of similar types of terms across many of the written grape contracts seen during the market study.

**Right to renew clauses**

The ACCC considers clauses that require growers to enter into new supply agreements with winemakers upon expiry of their existing agreements, but do not require winemakers to match competitor offers, are likely to be unfair. Such clauses may prevent a grower from entering into a new agreement with a different winemaker on better terms.

**Ability to vary agreements**

The ACCC considers terms that allow winemakers broad unilateral discretion to vary terms of supply agreements are likely to be unfair.

The ACCC is particularly concerned about the potential unfairness of terms that allow winemakers to vary the quality assessment parameters and final price without limitation.

Price and quality assessment parameters are key aspects of annual and multi-year grape supply agreements. Changing these during the life of the agreement may result in a significant reduction in the value of the agreement and cause financial detriment to the grower who has planned production around the agreement they entered into.
Any legitimate basis for varying these terms, such as in response to regulatory changes, should be clearly stated in written agreements and/or require agreement from the grower.

**Payment terms**

The ACCC is concerned that lengthy payment periods which are prevalent in grape supply agreements may be unfair.

Growers supplying to Code signatories and growers based in South Australia have the protection of minimum payment terms set out in the Code and the *Wine Grapes Industry Act 1991 (SA) (WGI Act)* respectively. These appear to have been intended to be bare minimum payment standards, but have instead become the industry norm in SA and regions where there is significant participation in the Code. In the Riverina, where there are effectively no Code signatories, growers are often subject to even longer payment periods.

The ACCC is most concerned about potential unfairness arising from terms that provide for lengthy payment periods in supply agreements offered by well-resourced large winemakers. In this instance, winemakers are in a much better financial position to bear the cost of holding inventory than growers. The ACCC understands that large winemakers would typically have greater financial assets and ability to service debt than the average grower, and would face significantly lower funding costs. These lengthy payment terms are particularly concerning when growers do not have the opportunity to negotiate higher prices in exchange for delayed payment.

The ACCC considers that lengthy payment terms should be phased out of supply agreements between growers and winemakers.

**Termination clauses**

The ACCC is concerned about the potential unfairness of terms that allow winemakers to terminate agreements with growers where grapes become surplus to their requirements, for any reason, and at short or immediate notice.

Such terms benefit the winemaker, allowing them to push demand risk back to growers. This negates what most growers consider to be their key priority under supply agreements: having a guaranteed buyer.

While winemakers have an interest in reducing risk, the ACCC considers that winemakers, in particular large winemakers, are in a better strategic position than growers to anticipate changes in, and manage demand risks.

**The voluntary Code has not resolved key industry problems**

Overall, the Code has not been effective in addressing industry problems, primarily because of a lack of signatories.

The Code’s key benefit to growers and winemakers is providing a structured process for dispute resolution concerning price and quality assessments of grapes. However, many large winemakers are not signatories to the Code, which means that many growers do not have access to its dispute resolution mechanisms.

While the dispute resolution mechanisms set out in the Code are providing a benefit to the industry, they should be improved to address shortcomings, including:

- quality assessment decisions made at wineries and other types of contractual disputes are not currently covered
- growers are reluctant to progress to stages of dispute resolution requiring the appointment of an independent expert because of the potentially high costs and perceived biases towards winemakers
- there are very few independent experts that can be appointed, and they are not located in warm climate areas where disputes are more common. This may impact on dispute resolution timelines and add to potential cost concerns.
AGWI stated it agreed with the ACCC’s recommendation that the Code be strengthened and indicated it would conduct a comprehensive review of the Code.\(^7\) However, if large winemakers do not sign up to the Code, and the upcoming Code review does not address matters raised in this report regarding quality assessments (see chapter 3), payment terms (see chapter 5) and dispute resolution (see chapter 7), the ACCC may recommend to Government that a mandatory code be introduced.

**Recommendations**

The ACCC’s final recommendations are below.

**Quality assessments**

The ACCC considers that the quality assessment recommendations (1-4) are applicable across warm and cool climate regions.

1. **The ACCC recommends the Australian Wine Research Institute (AWRI) work with the National Measurement Institute (NMI) and the industry to develop uniform national standards for testing and measuring grape sugar levels and colour.**

   This recommendation is designed to increase grower confidence in testing by establishing clear standards for testing methods, and the calibration and use of equipment.

   The ACCC considers the AWRI and industry should establish a working group and set clear timeframe targets for developing standards, such as a commitment to developing draft standards for consultation within 12 months.

2. **The ACCC recommends that winemakers should use well-documented and objective testing and sampling methods for quality assessments in the vineyard and at the winery.**

   Despite some limitations of objective measures, and the importance of sensory assessment, the ACCC considers that winemakers should rely on objective measures to determine payment amounts wherever possible, and should adopt standardised sampling practices in the vineyard and at wineries.

3. **The ACCC recommends that the AWRI, in consultation with industry stakeholders, review current industry guidance on quality assessment standards, and amend the guidance to clearly reflect current best practice and to provide detailed information on standards for sampling in the vineyard and at the weighbridge.**

   This will inform all growers and winemakers about current best practice quality assessment methods. It will increase growers’ confidence in their understanding of the appropriateness of particular quality assessment techniques, and provide them with a basis for disputing inappropriate testing or sampling methods.

4. **The ACCC recommends that supply agreements should clearly outline the testing and sampling methods that winemakers will use to assess grape quality.**

   This will increase the transparency regarding quality testing methods, allowing growers to make more informed decisions when entering into agreements. The information about testing and sampling methods should be accompanied by clear and precise information about quality thresholds and the effect, if any, of failing to reach a particular threshold.

**Price transparency**

Following the consideration of feedback received after the release of the Interim Report, the ACCC considers there is not sufficient evidence to establish that indicative pricing is beneficial to the industry. The ACCC has therefore removed the interim recommendation on indicative pricing and recommends that the indicative pricing scheme be removed from the Code and all grape supply agreements.

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5. The ACCC recommends that warm climate grape grower representative organisations deliver accessible, relevant and timely analysis of market trends to warm climate growers.

The information should indicate short to medium term price trends relating to commonly grown varieties in each warm climate region. The information should inform growers' production and risk management decisions and help them adapt to changing market conditions. The information should be in an accessible form, and provided regularly at key decision points in the grape growing process.

The ACCC also recommends that Wine Australia actively engage with the grower representative organisations to provide technical guidance and support, and, if necessary, develop alternative publications tailored for a grower representative organisation's specific needs.

6. The ACCC recommends that, for grapes purchased from warm climate regions, wine grape buyers be required to provide pricing information to Wine Australia. Wine Australia should aggregate and publish this information by winemaker, for each variety in each warm climate region, before the end of each financial year.

The ACCC recommends that Wine Australia be given legislative powers to compel winemakers to provide price information, and to allow the information to be audited. This will increase the participation rate and increase trust in the information provided.

Winemakers should be identified in the pricing information. This is essential to enable growers to identify which winemakers offer the most competitive prices over time. Growers can then identify and contact these winemakers to understand their supply requirements.

The ACCC recommends that there be amendments to the Code and to all variable price supply agreements, to allow growers to lodge a price dispute up to three weeks after Wine Australia publishes this price information, to assist with dispute resolution in relation to variable ‘fair market’ price terms.

The ACCC will monitor the effects of the implementation of these recommendations to mitigate the risk of unintended consequences.

Payment periods

7. The ACCC recommends that long term payment periods should be phased out of standard form contracts.

The current long payment terms that are imposed by winemakers on growers mean that growers effectively fund winemakers’ inventory holding costs, and the lack of competition between winemakers means that growers are not compensated for these costs.

The ACCC considers an argument can be made that the current industry standard payment terms when applied to grapes produced outside of SA are unfair under the unfair contract term protections. Payment terms consistent with the WGI Act that relate to grapes produced within SA are expressly permitted by a law of a State and so are exempted from the application of the unfair contract term protections.8

If a court were to declare the terms in a standard form small business contract were unfair then the term would be void. Contracts offered to growers by larger winemakers are more likely to be considered standard form contracts as they will generally have greater bargaining power than growers.9 This exposes lengthy payment terms in large winemakers’ contracts to a higher risk of being declared void by a court.

The ACCC will consider taking enforcement action against winemakers that do not remove long payment terms from contracts to which the unfair contract term law applies.

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8 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch. 2 (Australian Consumer Law), s. 26(1)(c).
9 Australian Consumer Law, s. 27(2)(a).
The ACCC also encourages a review of the WGI Act to ensure this legislation does not permit the use of long payment terms to the detriment of SA growers.

8. **The ACCC recommends that a best practice standard of payment within 30 days of the final grape delivery should be adopted for all winemakers in Australia with total processing capacity across all wineries, including subsidiaries, of over 10,000 tonnes.**

The ACCC considers that an appropriate means of introducing this change is through amending the requirements of the Code.

The ACCC acknowledges that it may be appropriate to enable some flexibility of payment terms in the Code, given that a variety of payment term lengths currently exist across the supply chain. However, the ACCC considers this flexibility should not extend to payment terms beyond 60 days.

The ACCC considers that a transition period of two years is appropriate to introduce best practice payment terms. However, winemakers should review their existing payment terms as soon as possible given the risk that the current industry standard payment terms may contain unfair contract terms.

The ACCC will also have regard to the payment period ultimately adopted in the Code when assessing whether to recommend to Government that a mandatory code be introduced.

**The Voluntary Code of Conduct**

9. **The ACCC recommends that the Code be substantially strengthened, and that all winemakers that purchase grapes from growers become signatories to the Code.**

The Code should be amended to:

- provide a structured process for the review of adverse quality assessment decisions made at the winery (including at the weighbridge), including by requiring taking, holding and testing retention samples if a winemaker downgrades or rejects a delivery of grapes in order to assist dispute resolution
- improve the processes and timeframes for dispute resolution under the Code
- provide a structured process for arbitration of contractual disputes, as well as other types of disputes that may arise out of supply agreements. This will improve access to impartial dispute resolution procedures and help address the power imbalance between the two parties
- guarantee equal representation of growers (including grower representative bodies) and winemakers on the Code Management Committee.

A full list of the ACCC’s proposed amendments to the Code are at Appendix A.

The ACCC will review the progress of the industry in adopting the final recommendations 12–18 months after the release of the Final Report. If winemakers do not sign up to the Code, and the upcoming Code review does not address matters raised in this report regarding quality assessments (see chapter 3), pricing (see chapter 4), payment terms (see chapter 5) and dispute resolution (see chapter 7), the ACCC will consider recommending to Government that a mandatory code be introduced.

The ACCC expects all large winemakers to sign the Code.

**Contracting practices**

10. **The ACCC recommends that winemakers review their standard form contracts and remove any unfair contract terms.**

The ACCC has identified a number of potential unfair contract terms in supply agreements and may take enforcement action against winemakers who retain unfair terms in standard form contracts to which the unfair contract term protection applies.
A careful review of contract terms by winemakers is likely to reduce the number of unfair contract terms in supply agreements.

This recommendation applies to all winemakers with contracts to which the UCT law applies. It is not dependant on a winemaker’s size or region.
The market study

Rationale for conducting this market study

ACCC market studies

The ACCC undertakes in-depth market, sector or industry reviews with the aim of improving our understanding of industry practices and dynamics in those sectors. We publish our findings in reports to help inform consumers and industry participants, encourage public debate over competition and consumer matters, and inform policy consideration.

Market studies may also provide the ACCC with information that can lead to investigations of potential breaches of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA). However, these investigations are undertaken separately to the market study itself.

Wine grape market study

The purpose of this study was to conduct an in-depth review of the Australian wine grape industry and to identify any market failures or issues that may prevent the functioning of competitive markets and result in detriment to market participants. This market study is focussed on the three warm climate grape growing regions (see chapter 2).

Competition and consumer issues in the agriculture sector, including a focus on analysis of the wine grape industry, are current ACCC priorities, as set out in our 2019 Compliance and Enforcement Policy.10

The ACCC considered the industry warranted close examination, based on feedback from confidential complaints received by the ACCC, the findings of previous inquiries, the outcomes of targeted ACCC consultations with industry (outlined below), and the broader context of the market.

Previous government reviews

The wine sector has been the subject of a number of government reviews, including the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee’s inquiries in 2005 and in 2016.11 These inquiries considered competition, contracting practices and the effectiveness of the voluntary Australian Wine Industry Code of Conduct (Code).

Industry consultation

The ACCC has consulted with industry in a range of ways before and during the market study, including extensive consultation after the release of the Interim Report. The ACCC thanks all parties who provided information for their time and contributions.

Horticulture and viticulture workshops

In 2016, the ACCC held six workshops in regional Australia focusing on understanding competition and fair trading issues in the horticulture and viticulture industries. The ACCC subsequently published a report outlining the issues raised during the workshops and broader engagement with the industries. The ACCC committed to undertake further work on these issues as part of our focus on competition and fair trading in the agriculture sector.

Grower survey

In July and August 2018, the ACCC invited wine grape growers to provide feedback about competition issues in their industry through an online survey. The survey posed a range of multiple-choice questions to allow growers to share their experience. The survey also included a free text option for growers to provide information on any other industry issues, provide further information or give context to their responses. We received responses from 262 growers from a range of regions across NSW/ACT, VIC, QLD, SA and WA. Of these, 134 growers provided further feedback through free text comments.

The survey helped the ACCC to learn about the interactions between growers and buyers of wine grapes, and to identify issues in these relationships that required particular attention. The responses highlighted various ways in which the market may not be functioning effectively across Australia. The responses also indicated that some concerns, including concerns relating to contracting practices, competition and pricing, are generally more prevalent in warm climate regions than in cool climate regions. A report of survey results is available at the ACCC’s wine grape market study website: https://www.accc.gov.au/winegrapes.

While promoting the survey, ACCC staff spoke with approximately 70 regional organisations representing wine grape growers.

While the grower survey was a valuable input to the market study, the ACCC’s findings and recommendations are informed by the detailed analysis undertaken throughout the course of the market study.

Issues Paper

The ACCC published an Issues Paper on 26 September 2018. The Issues Paper outlined the key issues relevant to the market study, including:
- markets for the sale and purchase of grapes
- contracting practices between growers and winemakers
- the voluntary Code and dispute resolution processes
- transparency and timing of pricing information
- quality assessment.

We requested feedback on the Issues Paper by 2 November 2018.

We received 15 submissions to the Issues Paper, including submissions from growers, grower representative bodies, winemakers and winemaker representative bodies.

We have also received further written feedback, information and documents from winemaker and grower representatives throughout late 2018 and early 2019.
Winemaker information requests

The ACCC sent voluntary information requests to Australia’s largest winemakers (by revenue), seeking information on issues relevant to the market study including winemaker operations, sales channels, supply channels, competition, contracting, pricing and payment, quality assessment, and the Code. Seven winemakers responded to the request, including two winemakers that also made submissions to the Issues Paper.

In addition we sought information on grape pricing and volumes purchased by region from 28 winemakers for the 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 seasons. We received responses from 15 winemakers. Similar information is publicly reported in the Wine Australia National Vintage Survey on an aggregated basis, but receiving the information in a disaggregated form allowed us to perform a more detailed competition analysis. The ACCC also received information directly from Wine Australia.

Grower forums

The ACCC held two grower forums in November 2018. The forums took place in:
- Griffith (NSW)—13 November 2018—16 grower attendees
- Mildura (VIC)—27 November 2018—29 grower attendees.

The forums were attended by ACCC staff and Deputy Chair Mick Keogh. The ACCC heard a range of views from growers regarding issues in the industry.

Stakeholder engagement prior to the release of the Interim Report

During 2018 and early 2019 the ACCC held in-depth telephone and face-to-face conversations with a wide range of parties including:
- grower and winemaker peak industry associations (Australian Vignerons and Winemakers Federation of Australia, now Australian Grape and Wine Inc (AGWI))
- six regional industry associations from warm and cool climate regions
- eleven winemakers of various sizes, including seven site visits
- six academic researchers or research organisations who specialise in the industry
- three state and federal government bodies
- approximately 20 growers and former growers
- CCW Co-operative Limited (CCW)
- a wine broker.

Public sources of information

In addition to information received through consultations, we have relied on public information. A key source of data has been data from Wine Australia including the annual National Vintage Report, annual Price Dispersion Report, and quarterly Export Report. We recognise that the depth of market reporting provided by Wine Australia depends on the provision of quality information from market participants.

We have also frequently referred to data collated in Growth and Cycles in Australia’s Wine Industry by Kym Anderson which is available from the University of Adelaide. 14

Further, we have relied on monthly market reports by wine and grape brokers Ciatti, as well as other public information sources cited throughout the report.

Interim Report

The ACCC released an Interim Report on the wine grape industry on 3 June 2019. The report included proposed recommendations relating to:

- quality assessments
- price transparency in warm climate regions
- payment periods
- strengthening the Code
- unfair contract terms.

We requested submissions from stakeholders on the Interim Report by 28 June 2019.

Interim Report submissions

We received 40 submissions to the Interim Report, including submissions from:

- AGWI
- eight large winemakers
- two small/medium winemakers
- 14 growers from warm and cool climate regions
- three state-based industry bodies
- five warm climate grower/winemaker representative bodies
- CCW
- three cool climate grower/winemaker representative bodies.

Many stakeholders provided feedback on the market study generally, as well as recommendation-specific feedback. Overall, the feedback to the report has been positive. However, some stakeholders disagreed with aspects of the report and recommendations. The ACCC addresses this feedback throughout the Final Report.

Several stakeholders suggested that the warm climate regions should not be considered separately from the cool climate regions. They submitted that each recommendation should apply to all regions because there are similarities, linkages and cross-overs between warm and cool climate regions. In response to this feedback, the ACCC clearly sets out its reasons for whether or not each recommendation should apply across all regions throughout the relevant sections of the Final Report.

Finally, some stakeholders were critical of the level of response to the ACCC’s grower survey, the level of engagement at grower forums and the number of submissions to the issues paper. AGWI submitted that the response rate was low, which suggested that most of the industry is content with the current arrangements. The ACCC notes it has received substantial information on behalf of representative groups to reflect the broader views of growers.

The ACCC considers that it has sufficient evidence to support its findings and recommendations. While subjective accounts of how a market operates are an important part of any market study, the ACCC’s findings and recommendations are based on detailed analysis of the information and documents obtained from winemakers and other stakeholders during the course of the study.

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Stakeholder engagement following the release of the Interim Report

In July and August 2019, the ACCC held in-depth telephone and face-to-face conversations with a wide range of parties to discuss their views on the Interim Report. This included meeting with:

- AGWI
- five warm climate grower/winemaker representative bodies
- seven winemakers of various sizes
- seven growers from warm climates
- two state-based industry bodies
- three state and federal government bodies
- CCW.

In July the ACCC attended the Australian Wine Industry Technical Conference in Adelaide.

Lack of response from some stakeholders

This market study was self-initiated by the ACCC and as such the ACCC did not have the power to compel market participants to provide documents and information. The study relied on information provided to the ACCC by industry participants on a voluntary basis.

In many instances, the ACCC was unable to obtain information from stakeholders to the desired level of detail. This was particularly the case prior to the release of the Interim Report. While many industry stakeholders were forthcoming and cooperative, some stakeholders (including some grower representatives, winemakers and industry organisations) did not engage with the ACCC to the extent requested.

The ACCC found that levels of engagement improved following the release of the Interim Report, and that stakeholders were generally willing to express views on the ACCC’s interim recommendations.

The ACCC has been able to undertake a detailed assessment of the market, and make a range of evidence-based findings and recommendations. The ACCC thanks stakeholders for their engagement with the market study.
1. Industry background

Key points

- Wine production, from grape growing through to winemaking, involves a complex, multi-year production cycle with a range of technical challenges, costs and risks.
- There are over 6000 growers in Australia producing over 100 grape varieties, with approximately equal volumes of red and white grapes.
- The vast majority of growers are small operators, and most have run at a financial loss for several years. Many growers supplement their income with additional employment and diversified crops.
- Winemakers cover a broad spectrum of different business models although there are some observable trends correlating with their size.
- The winemaking market is highly concentrated, with the largest one per cent of winemakers accounting for over 80 per cent of wine production.
- By volume, most Australian wine is exported. Domestic consumption has generally been stable, so the primary drivers of grape prices in recent years have been international market conditions.
- The domestic retail liquor market is highly concentrated, with four retailers accounting for over 80 per cent of sales by value. Direct channels like cellar doors sales collectively amount to 10 per cent of all domestic sales.
- The industry is emerging from a prolonged cyclical downturn that was characterised by an oversupply of grapes and wine, unfavourable exchange rates for export competitiveness and poor international market conditions.
- The regulatory environment in the wine grape market is centred on the *Wine Grapes Industry Act 1991* (SA) and the voluntary Australian Wine Industry Code of Conduct.

1.1 Wine production is a complex multi-year process

Wine production, from grape growing through to winemaking, is a multi-year process with many technical challenges and costs, and a range of agricultural, financial and economic risks. This section outlines the timeframes and technical steps of the process.

1.1.1 Grape growing occurs in an annual cycle

Grapevines take around three years from planting until they begin to produce the necessary quality and quantity of grapes for commercial sale. They begin to produce larger quantities after four or five years, and this stabilises after around eight to 15 years. It can take up to 10 years for vines to reach peak quality for some premium varieties. Vines can live for many decades. Older vines tend to produce less output than younger vines, but produce higher quality grapes.

Growers may decide to plant a particular variety in response to advice or commitments from a particular winemaker, or independently, based on predictions about market trends. When planting new vines, growers must make decisions about the orientation of vineyard rows, the spacing and trellising of the vines, and the treatment of the soil. Growers have indicated that input costs for new plantings are similar across varieties, and it can cost $25 000 to $40 000 per hectare to pull out and replant a block of vines.

Once the vines mature, they are managed through each yearly growing cycle, as outlined in figure 1.1.16 The exact timing of the cycle, growing techniques and required inputs vary from region to region, but are broadly similar.

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Autumn/Winter

Grower activities include irrigation, spraying to control weeds, fertilisation, pruning, trellis maintenance, staking, anchoring and training.

Spring

Budburst occurs around late September and flowering occurs in November or December. Grapes begin to grow rapidly and the growth rate then slows down until veraison (the beginning of ripening).

The grower sprays and trims at various points between budburst and harvest.

The grower waters vines around one to five times a week through drip or furrow irrigation or other means, depending on region and weather.

Summer

Veraison commonly occurs in January or February, around 60 days after flowering. The grapes soften and accumulate sugar. Acids degrade and colour begins to appear in the skin of pigmented varieties. Berries expand, and flavour and aroma compounds build up.

The grower may thin the leaves, depending on desired level of sun exposure.

Depending on region and variety, peak quality occurs from about mid-January to early April. If grapes mature beyond their peak, particularly red grapes, they begin to dehydrate. This results in lower yields, more difficult harvests and higher sugar levels. The grapes then take on a ‘jammy’ quality which is suitable for fortified wines but is usually not desirable for other wines.

Summer/Autumn

Winemakers generally determine the timing of harvest based on the maturity of the grapes and the winemaker’s capacity to receive and handle grapes (see section 3.5).

Harvesting generally occurs at night, particularly for white grape varieties. After harvest, the grapes must be kept as cool as possible and crushed within hours to prevent oxidisation, fermentation or other spoilage.

Harvesting machinery can cost several hundred thousand dollars, and tens of thousands of dollars to maintain each year. Some large-scale growers have their own harvesting equipment, which they may lease to other growers in the area, or they may co-own machinery as part of a syndicate. Other growers must arrange to hire harvesting machinery, sometimes with the help of a winemaker. Harvesting machinery can be in high demand during peak periods and can be difficult to obtain at short notice. Some growers also engage casual staff to assist with harvest.

The price of grape growing inputs, such as water and electricity, can fluctuate from year to year. For example, the ACCC understands that warm climate water prices have risen significantly in the last 12 months and are likely to be very high during the production of the 2020 harvest.

The climate and weather events in a particular season also affect the required inputs. For example, in a very wet season the vines may require increased monitoring for, and management of disease, and in a very dry season the water requirements can be much greater.

1.1.2  Winemaking is a complex multi-step process

Winemaking is a complex multi-step process beginning with the receipt of grapes at the winery, and ending with packaging of the final product. Winemakers have submitted that it typically takes at least half a year for the earliest white wines to reach the consumer market, and longer for wines that require ageing. The finished wine is influenced by many factors, and the steps in production differ depending on the variety and style of wine to be produced. The production process usually follows a broadly similar pattern to that shown in figure 1.2.
**Figure 1.2: The process involved in winemaking**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crushing</strong></td>
<td>Upon arriving at the winery weighbridge, the grapes are weighed and quality assessed, before being crushed and destemmed. Yeast cultures and additives that assist with stabilising and preserving the wine may be added at this stage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fermentation on skins and pressing (reds only)</strong></td>
<td>For red varieties, the must is partially fermented in contact with the skins to extract colour. The must is then drained and the skins are pressed to extract juice. The juices may be combined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clarification</strong></td>
<td>The juice is settled and decanted to clarify it and remove sediment. Decantation can be conducted through centrifuging or filtering.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fermentation</strong></td>
<td>The juice is fermented into wine. Further additives may be used at this stage to assist with fermentation or to adjust the flavour profile or acidity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Filtration</strong></td>
<td>The wine is stabilised, decanted and coarse-filtered. Further additives (such as sweeteners, ascorbic acid or sodium dioxide) may be added.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aging</strong></td>
<td>Wines may be aged in oak barrels (mostly red wines), steel containers (mostly white wines) or plastic containers. The choice of barrel or other container and the length of fermentation depends on the desired style. Red wines may also be aged after bottling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Filtration</strong></td>
<td>If necessary, the wine is sterile-filtered and fined to clarify.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Packaging</strong></td>
<td>The wine is packaged into bottles or into bulk packaging. Bottling can occur within three to six months of harvest for white wines and within one to two years of harvest for red wines. There are a range of bottle and cap types used, depending on the type of wine and target market.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.2 Australia has many diverse wine regions

Australia grows over 135,000 hectares of grapes across 65 geographical indication (GI) regions, as shown in figure 1.3. These regions are mostly concentrated in south eastern Australia, including in SA, VIC, NSW, TAS and southern QLD. There are also wine grape growing regions in the south western corner of WA.

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Australian wine regions can be broadly classified as warm or cool climate. This market study focusses on the warm climate regions. Chapter 2 examines the differences between warm and cool climate regions and details the characteristics of individual warm climate regions.

1.3  The wine supply chain involves a range of transactions

The Australian wine sector incorporates a range of participants, from small family farms through to large corporate winemakers and major retailers. This section details the characteristics of the growing and winemaking steps of the supply chain. Figure 1.4 summarises the key features of the wine supply chain.
1.3.1 Vineyards tend to be small scale

There were reported to be 6,251 wine grape growers in Australia in 2018, producing over 100 red and white wine grape varieties. The five most widely grown varieties are Shiraz, Cabernet Sauvignon, Chardonnay, Merlot and Sauvignon Blanc, and these comprise 75 per cent of national vineyard plantings. In 2018, 52 per cent of grapes crushed and wines produced were red varieties, and the remaining 48 per cent were white varieties.

Grape growing businesses are mostly small operations, and many are family-owned. About 80 per cent of grape growing businesses operate on farms of less than 50 hectares, and almost 98 per cent employ fewer than 20 people.

Most growers in warm climate regions are not involved in wine production, in contrast to many (but not all) cool climate growers. Warm climate growers generally supply grapes to winemakers under supply agreements and are paid based on volume and quality. Under most supply agreements, growers are exposed to various risks relating to grape production, harvest, grape price and finance (see chapter 5).

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19 Wine Australia, Australian wine sector 2018 at a glance.
21 Wine Australia, Australian wine sector 2018 at a glance.
1.3.2 Many growers do not cover their production costs

Analysis by the Winemakers’ Federation of Australia (WFA) shows that 77 per cent of growers made a loss in 2012, 84 per cent made a loss in 2014 and 85 per cent made a loss in 2015. However, profitability varied greatly between different wine regions. For example, an estimated 97 per cent of Riverina growers made a loss in 2015, compared to 2 per cent of Mornington Peninsula growers (see figure 1.5).

Figure 1.5: Average profitability of Australian, Mornington Peninsula and Riverina growers (2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Profitability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mornington Peninsula</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverina</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Winemakers Federation of Australia.

A comparison of WFA’s estimated regional production costs with the 2018 average grape prices suggests that in certain regions most growers continued to make a loss in 2018.

In warm climate regions, growing costs tend to be lower and yields tend to be higher, but grape prices tend to be lower per tonne than in cool climate regions. We present a closer analysis of grower profitability in the warm climate regions in chapter 2.

1.3.3 Winemakers have a diverse range of business sizes and models

Australian winemakers comprise a diverse range of business sizes and models, from family-owned boutique winemakers to publicly listed multinational companies operating wineries and vineyards across Australia and overseas. Collectively, winemakers produce wines of different varieties, regions and styles for a wide spectrum of sales channels, market segments and prices.

In this report we refer to winemakers of various sizes as follows:

- **Small winemakers**: those crushing less than 500 tonnes of grapes per year.
- **Medium winemakers**: those crushing 500 to 10 000 tonnes of grapes per year.
- **Large winemakers**: those crushing 10 000 tonnes of grapes or more per year, including some major corporate winemakers who crush more than 100 000 tonnes.

Small winemakers tend to produce higher value wines than large winemakers. In 2016–17, small winemakers sold wine at an average price of $11.41 per litre, compared to an average of $6.60 per litre for all winemakers. Collectively, small winemakers accounted for 18 per cent of domestic sales volumes, but 35 per cent of domestic sales value. Similarly, small winemakers accounted for 3 per cent of domestic sales volume.

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25 ibid.
26 ibid.
of export sales volumes, but 10 per cent of export sales value. In addition, compared to large winemakers, small winemakers tend to:

- grow a greater proportion of their own grapes (see section 1.3.5)
- be more reliant on contract processing (see section 1.3.7)
- export a smaller proportion of their wine (see section 1.4.1).

In addition to traditional winemakers, major domestic retailers like the Woolworths-owned Endeavour Drinks Group and the Coles Liquor Group are also significant winemakers and purchasers of wine grapes.

### 1.3.4 The winemaking market is heavily concentrated

The Australian winemaking market is heavily concentrated, with many small winemakers and a small number of very large winemakers.

The four largest winemakers have a combined market share of around 37 per cent based on revenue. In 2014, 75 per cent of winemakers processed less than 100 tonnes of grapes. More than 90 per cent of winemakers were small winemakers and only 1 per cent were large winemakers. However, as of 2009, large winemakers produced 83 per cent of wine and winemakers who processed less than 100 tonnes produced less than 1 per cent of wine, as shown in figure 1.6.

![Figure 1.6: The winemaking market is heavily concentrated](image)

Source: Anderson 2015.

The skew toward large winemakers is highlighted by the fact that the three largest winemakers alone accounted for 41 per cent of all grapes crushed and 40 per cent of all wine produced in 2009.

Considered individually, the warm climate regions are even more concentrated. Between one and three large winemakers buy half or more of the grapes in each warm climate region. We discuss market concentration in each region and its implications in chapter 6.

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31 ibid.
32 ibid.
33 ibid.
Similar levels of concentration are also seen in the Australian wine export market, in which the five largest winemakers account for an estimated 87 per cent of volume. In contrast, small winemakers, despite making up over 90 per cent of all winemakers by number, account for only three per cent of export volumes.

In recent years, the trend has been towards even greater consolidation of large winemakers and increased new entry of small winemakers. This is discussed in section 1.5.3.

### 1.3.5 Vertical integration into grape production has remained steady

Most major winemakers have some degree of vertical integration in grape production, sourcing most grapes from independent growers but also using grapes produced in vineyards that they own or lease.

In recent years, the level of vertical integration has remained relatively stable. The proportion of grapes grown by winemakers was 31 per cent in 2018, compared with 33 per cent in 2017 and 30 per cent in 2012. Some large winemakers submitted that their vineyard investment is weighted towards particular varieties which are more difficult to source from growers located in cool climate regions. This is reflected in the comparatively lower average yield in winemaker vineyards in 2012 (8.6 tonnes per hectare), compared to non-winemaker vineyards (12.3 tonnes per hectare).

Vertical integration enables winemakers to guarantee their supply of grapes of particular varieties, grades and other attributes from particular regions. Vertically integrated winemakers are also partly shielded from price competition for these grapes, although they face an opportunity cost when deciding to use or sell them. They have control over vineyard management and production decisions that could impact grape quality and yield, but are also exposed to the associated agricultural risks. Because of their size, large winemakers are generally better able to manage the risks associated with grape growing than small independent grape growers.

Small winemakers are generally more vertically integrated than large winemakers. On average, small winemakers grew 67 per cent of the grapes they crushed in 2016/17. Around half of small winemakers (52 per cent) self-supply more than 90 per cent of their own grapes. In contrast, around one-fifth of small winemakers (18 per cent) have minimal vertical integration and purchase more than 90 per cent of their grapes from growers.

### 1.3.6 Most major Australian winemakers have wineries in warm climate regions

Wineries require major capital investments by winemakers. Specialised equipment is required at each step of the winemaking process. Much of the equipment, such as the crusher, is only used for a small part of the year. In addition to winemaking equipment, some winemakers also have their own bottling facilities, while others outsource bottling.

Some winemakers have undertaken substantial capital investment in wineries or bottling facilities in warm climate regions since 2016. Most significantly, a new entrant has recently constructed and begun operating a winery in the Murray Valley with 80 000 tonnes’ approved capacity and the potential to expand to 168 000 tonnes’ capacity.

The wineries with the largest capacities are located in the warm climate regions. Most major winemakers have at least one winery with sufficient capacity to process large volumes of grapes in the warm climate regions.
Some major winemakers also have smaller wineries in cool climate regions. These are often attributed to specific wine brands, and were generally gained through acquisition rather than new construction. Depending on its market segment focus, a large winemaker’s smaller wineries can collectively account for a significant proportion of its total production. For example, one major winemaker has as much production capacity in its cool climate wineries as its warm climate winery, even though the warm climate winery is one of the largest capacity wineries in Australia.

1.3.7 There is a limited amount of contract processing in the industry

Contract processing refers to the outsourcing of one or more steps of the winemaking process to a separate winemaker.

Most Australian winemakers retain their wineries for their exclusive use, but some offer contract processing services for a fee. One winemaker submitted that offering contract processing services allows it to make use of unused processing capacity and diversify its demand risk and payment cycle. Its services are often used by larger-scale growers seeking to capture a greater proportion of supply chain profits, or seeking flexible harvest times to avoid the risk of weather events affecting the quantity and quality of their harvest.

Many small winemakers use contract processing because of the high capital cost of winemaking equipment. In 2016–17, 41 per cent of small winemakers relied on contract processing for their entire production, and an additional 10 per cent relied on contract processing for a proportion of their production.

In contrast, the largest winemakers generally have multiple winery and vineyard assets, so they only rely minimally on contract processing, such as to make up for marginal shortfalls in processing capacity. However, at least one major winemaker engages contract processors for a significant proportion of its production. This winemaker submitted that the use of contract processing allows it to avoid inter-region grape transport costs and the risk of quality degradation when sourcing grapes from regions where it does not have a winery.

1.4 Australian wine is sold to international and domestic markets

The markets for Australian wine can be broadly divided into export and domestic, each having distinct characteristics and demand factors. This section details these distinctions and their implications for winemakers and growers.

1.4.1 The export market is the primary driver of demand

The value and volume of Australian wine exports in a given year is a function of multiple international and domestic factors including:

- the relative value of the Australian dollar
- the volume and quality of exports from other major wine exporting countries
- international economic, political and regulatory conditions
- consumer and cultural shifts within target markets
- local supply conditions in Australia.

In 2018, Australia exported 850 million litres of wine at a value of $2.82 billion. Australia’s top five export markets by value in 2017–18 were China ($1.14 billion), the United States ($425 million), the...
United Kingdom ($389 million), Canada ($210 million) and New Zealand ($93 million).\footnote{By volume, 63 per cent of wine produced in Australia was exported in 2018.} Larger-scale winemakers have a greater reliance on export markets. In 2016–17, an estimated 14 per cent of small winemaker sales were exports, compared to 60 per cent for all winemakers.\footnote{Australian winemakers exported a greater volume but lesser value of bulk wines than bottled wines in 2018 (480 million litres/$560 million for bulk wines and 361 million litres/$2.24 billion for bottled wines).} Bulk wine may be blended with local or other region wines and then bottled at destination. This finished wine may then be labelled as Australian, local or other region wine depending on the proportion of wines used in the blending process, labelling laws and marketing strategy.\footnote{The fact that wine is transported in bulk does not in itself indicate that it is of a lesser quality than bottled wine. Premium wines are also sometimes transported in bulk for various reasons. Transferring bulk wine is generally cheaper than transferring bottled products and it may also be subject to lower import taxes.}

On average, bulk wine is sold at a much lower price per litre than bottled wine. In 2018, the average export price of bulk wine was $1.17 per litre, compared to $6.20 per litre for bottled wine.\footnote{For discussion of advantages of transporting in bulk, see Wine Network, \textit{Bulk wine vs bottled wine}, Wine Network, 2012, \url{http://www.winenetwork.co.nz/site/news/industry-articles/bulk-wine-vs-bottled-wine}.} This is partly because it is an unfinished product, and partly because a large proportion of bulk wine consists of commercial wine. Commercial wine is sometimes sold at very low prices without differentiation by variety, year or region.

Many winemakers who export bulk commercial wine consider the product to be relatively homogenous. They therefore focus on obtaining a large volumes of grapes that meet basic quality standards, rather than more expensive grapes with more distinctive characteristics.

\subsection*{1.4.2 The domestic retail market is highly concentrated}

Approximately 40 per cent of wine produced in Australia is sold in the domestic retail market.\footnote{Approximately 40 per cent of wine produced in Australia is sold in the domestic retail market.} Australian wines account for over 80 per cent of domestic wine sales.\footnote{The remaining proportion consists of imported wines, amounting to around 95 million litres per year, of which two-thirds comes from New Zealand.} Wine is sold in retail outlets at various price points. Retail pricing is a primary factor in consumer decision making, and consumers generally choose their wine with a particular price point in mind.

The domestic retail market has become increasingly concentrated over the past five years, largely as a result of Woolworths and Coles having grown their presence in the liquor retailing market. Together, the four largest retailers, which also include Metcash Limited and Aldi, have an 84 per cent share of the liquor retail market.\footnote{We present analysis of the implications of this in chapter 6.} We present analysis of the implications of this in chapter 6.
Additionally, the four largest retailers each source wine which they market using numerous ‘private label’ brands.\(^{55}\) Private labels are exclusive to individual retailers, and are therefore not subject to direct price competition from other retailers. One retailer submitted that it earns higher profit margins on private label wine brands, and that private label wine brands are used to promote customer loyalty.

Retailers source private label wines under a number of different arrangements, including purchasing finished wines, and purchasing unfinished bulk wines to be blended with other wines and bottled. At least one major retailer also owns a traditional winemaking company that sources grapes and produces its own wines. Private label sales have increased significantly, from an estimated 5 per cent in 2005 to an estimated 16 to 25 per cent in 2016.\(^{56}\) A report commissioned by Wine Australia suggests that supermarket preference for producing private label wine has contributed to downward pressure on grape prices.\(^{57}\)

Direct channel sales represent an estimated 10 per cent of domestic wine sales.\(^{58}\) The largest sources of direct sales are cellar doors (estimated 44 per cent of direct channel sales in 2017) and wine and loyalty clubs (14 per cent).\(^{59}\)

Wine tourism is a selling point and source of income for many winemakers. It is estimated that 88 per cent of Australian winemakers operated a cellar door retail outlet in 2017. Of these, 86 per cent also provided food, and some also offer vineyard or winery tours and hosting services for functions and exhibitions.\(^{60}\) Small-scale winemakers generally have a greater reliance on direct channels than large-scale winemakers.\(^{61}\)

1.5 Recent market conditions have reflected cyclical international factors

Recent market conditions have been characterised by relatively stable domestic sales and fluctuating international demand for Australian wine (see figure 1.7).\(^{62}\) This dynamic, together with a prolonged oversupply of grapes and wine, has increased the exposure of the industry to cyclical international demand factors.

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57 Gillespie Economics, p. 12.
59 ibid, p. 19.
60 ibid, p. 23.
61 ibid, p. 16.
62 See also, Anderson, table 34(a).
This section examines the most recent market cycle for the Australian wine industry, its primary drivers and its implications for growers and winemakers.

1.5.1 Supply and demand has followed long cycles

Supply and demand movements in the Australian wine market have historically followed long cycles lasting two or more decades. During the most recent cycle, which began in the late 1980s, the volume of exports and total vineyard area substantially and rapidly increased, peaking in the late 2000s.

In 1995, the Australian wine industry published an industry target of a three-fold increase in the real value of wine production by 2025, with 55 per cent of the production destined for export markets. Although some market participants considered the targets to be optimistic, the rapid and continued growth in wine production and exports meant that the industry was halfway to achieving its 30-year target in just 5 years.

The strong demand for Australian wine drove average export prices to increase from under $2.00 per litre in 1986 to over $5.00 per litre in 2001 in nominal terms, while the industry also rapidly increased its wine production. Between 1991 and 2005, overall production increased from less than 400 million litres to over 1.4 billion litres, and total exports rose from just over 65 million litres to over 640 million litres (see figure 1.8).

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65 Anderson, chart 1.
66 ibid, p. 24.
This rapid growth was mainly driven by the combination of a low Australian dollar exchange rate and a technological competitive advantage in efficient wine production. The expansion also benefitted from several government initiatives including the wine equalisation tax (WET) rebate discussed in section 1.6.3, and the Managed Investment Act 1998 (MIA). The MIA encouraged production by allowing for the establishment of managed investment schemes which allowed large numbers of investors to collectively finance large-scale grape growing operations. The number of agribusiness managed investment schemes grew steadily after the introduction of the MIA. However, high profile collapses later resulted in substantial financial losses for investors in such schemes.

Growers benefitted immensely from the flow-on demand for grapes. From 1986 to 2001, the average grape price rose from slightly above $200 per tonne, to over $1000 per tonne (in nominal terms), and total vineyard area more than doubled (see figure 1.9). We present a more detailed analysis of grape prices and their main drivers in chapter 4.

Source: Anderson 2015 and Wine Australia.

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67 ibid, pp. 175, 183, Wine Australia, Production sales and inventory report 2017-18.
68 ibid, p. 23.
70 Anderson, chart 17.
1.5.2 Multiple factors resulted in a severe market correction

Coinciding with the rapid increase in grape and wine production in Australia in the early 2000s was a rise in production and exports by other winemaking countries, mainly Italy, Spain, Chile and Argentina. This quickly resulted in greater competition in export markets. Additionally, the Australian dollar significantly appreciated after 2001, reducing the international price competitiveness of Australian wine. These two factors contributed to diminished export demand for Australian wine, and lower prices for grapes.

The stronger Australian dollar also encouraged wine imports and therefore increased competition for Australian wines in the domestic retail market. Since 2009, New Zealand Sauvignon Blanc has been the highest selling white wine in Australia. The surge in wine imports from New Zealand was partly driven by the application of the WET rebate to New Zealand wines sold in Australia.

Demand for Australian wines, and consequently grapes, also softened in response to a number of international market factors. These factors included the global financial crisis in 2008, an oversupply of European wines flowing into the global market, and an erosion of Australia’s natural advantage in producing low cost wines. Many Australian winemakers are also changing their product mix to include a greater proportion of premium wines in an effort to improve their competitiveness in Australia and overseas.

However, earlier market signals had already stimulated structural increases in grape and wine production. This contributed to a prolonged and severe oversupply of grapes and wine. Wine export prices and grape prices fell (see figure 1.10), even though export volumes continued to increase until 2007 (see figure 1.11).

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63 See Anderson, table 23(a).
64 ibid, p. 1.
65 ibid, p. 25. See section 1.6.3 for discussion of the WET rebate.
66 ibid, chart 17.
Meanwhile, increased consolidation in the Australian and global retail markets and vertical integration by some retailers into winemaking led to further tightening of profit margins for winemakers and growers. The constraints on winemakers to pass on increased costs to their wholesale customers is analysed in chapter 6.

1.5.3 There was consolidation and exit in the grape and wine industries

Vineyard and winery asset values plummeted after 2007 because of the collapse in grape and wine export prices. Some vineyards were sold at unimproved land values, even though the average vineyard planting cost was about $30 000 per hectare.

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77 ibid, tables 15, 37.
In 2009, the Australian wine industry, represented by four industry bodies, Australian Wine and Brandy Corporation, Wine Research Development Corporation, Winemakers Federation Australia (WFA) and Wine Grape Growers Australia (WGGA), published a joint statement recognising the need to rebalance supply and demand in the wine industry, and launched the ‘Wine Restructuring Action Agenda’. The Agenda included initiatives to increase information transparency to regional associations, growers and winemakers regarding the viability of the industry and their businesses. It also included an initiative to consult with the Commonwealth and state governments regarding exit packages and land use proposals that could incentivise growers and small winemakers to exit the industry.

Since 2008, a large number of growers exited the industry, and there has been significant consolidation of vineyard assets. Between 2008 and 2015, the total vineyard area fell by 19 per cent and the total number of growers dropped 35 per cent. This led to a 25 per cent increase in average vineyard area per grower (see figure 1.12).

**Figure 1.12: Changes in vineyard area, number of growers and average vineyard area per grower**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Vine area (hectares)</th>
<th>Growers</th>
<th>Vine area per grower (hectares)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>166 197</td>
<td>7915</td>
<td>21.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>145 382</td>
<td>6251</td>
<td>23.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>135 133</td>
<td>5160</td>
<td>26.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Anderson 2015 and Australian Bureau of Statistics.79

In contrast, there has been a significant increase in the number of winemakers and relatively stable levels of wine production since 2008 (see figure 1.13).
The new entrants are predominantly small winemakers, while there has been substantial consolidation among large winemakers. Between 2006 and 2014, the number of winemakers crushing 20,000 or more tonnes of grapes decreased from 23 to 13, while the number of winemakers crushing less than 1000 tonnes increased from 1827 to 2330.

1.5.4 Recent demand conditions have gradually improved

The volume of Australian wine sales has increased over 14 per cent from a decade low of 1.18 billion litres in 2013–14 to 1.35 billion litres in 2017–18. This increase in sales has almost entirely been driven by exports, which have increased over 22 per cent over the same period. Meanwhile, domestic sales volumes have remained mostly stable.

As seen in figure 1.14, this increase in exports has been almost entirely driven by red wine. Red wine exports increased over 37 per cent from 385 million litres in 2013–14, to 529 million litres in 2017–18.

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80 Anderson, tables 9, 21(a).
81 ibid, table 21(c).
82 ibid.
It is likely that this increase in red wine exports was driven by a surge in sales to China, following the commencement of the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA) on 20 December 2015 (see figure 1.15).

There was also a significant increase in the number of Australian wine exporters following the commencement of ChAFTA (see figure 1.16). Wine exporters can be winemakers or other entities exporting Australian wine.86

83 Wine Australia, Production, sales and inventory 2017–18, appendix 1.
84 ABARES, table 22.3.
Australian wine exports have also benefitted from reduced wine supply in the global bulk wine market, the result of poor harvests in Europe and Chile in 2016 and 2017.\footnote{Wine Australia, Production, sales and inventory 2017–18, p. 9, Agence France-Presse, ‘France faces worst wine grape harvest since 1945’, The Guardian, 26 August 2017, \url{https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/25/france-faces-worst-wine-grape-harvest-since-1945}.} Additionally, since 2012, the Australian dollar has generally depreciated in value against the currencies of the major wine exporters, increasing the price competitiveness of Australian wine in the global market.

This revival in demand for Australian wines has contributed to a slight increase in the average grape price since 2014.\footnote{Wine Australia, Production, sales and inventory 2017–18, p. 6.} We present analysis of the factors influencing grape prices in chapter 4.

Despite these improvements in global demand, and wine and grape prices, the changing market conditions make it challenging for the ACCC to assess the underlying potential for competition between winemakers. These concerns are addressed in chapter 6.

## 1.6 Regulatory environment and previous reviews

The Australian wine industry has been the subject of a number of reviews and changes to its regulatory environment in the past 30 years. These have included government measures that encouraged new vineyard plantings in the 1980s and 1990s, wholesale sales tax measures that dampened domestic sales and legislative and regulatory changes that led to greater standardisation and codification of trading practices. This section details some of the changes to the regulatory environment that continue to shape the industry today.

### 1.6.1 State-level regulation

The wine grape industry has previously been subject to various state government regulatory measures. For example:

- In VIC until 1990, under the Wine Grapes Processing Industry Act 1978 (Vic), the Wine Grape Processing Industry Negotiating Committee could establish grape prices and nominate grape graders to assist with quality assessment.
- In NSW until 2000, the Riverina Wine Grapes Marketing Board previously held various statutory powers relating to pricing and payment terms, as described in section 2.2.1.

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SA is the only state that has retained wine grape industry-specific regulation. The *Wine Grapes Industry Act 1991* (SA) (WGI Act) establishes timeframes for payments for wine grapes and interest rates for late payments, and requires winemakers to pay in full for all grapes received in previous years before accepting further deliveries of grapes. This is discussed in section 5.4.4.

The WGI Act also allows the relevant Minister to recommend a price for wine grapes grown in SA and sold to winemakers.\(^89\) The ACCC understands that to date, this power has not been used.

### 1.6.2 Voluntary Australian Wine Industry Code of Conduct (Code)

The Code is a voluntary industry code established in 2008 by WGGA and WFA that sets out minimum standards for wine grape purchase agreements and provides dispute resolution mechanisms for disputes relating to price and quality assessment. We examine the Code and its impact on the wine grape market in chapter 7.

### 1.6.3 Wine equalisation tax (WET) rebate scheme

All sales of wine in Australia attract the WET, which is a tax of 29 per cent on the wholesale value of wine. As wine may be bought and sold many times during the production process, the WET is normally applied on the last wholesale wine transaction, which is usually a transaction between a wholesaler and a retailer.\(^90\) The WET was introduced in 2000 along with the Goods and Services Tax (GST), replacing the Wholesale Sales Tax (WST) which had been operating since 1974.\(^91\)

In 2004 the WET rebate was introduced. The WET rebate allows wine wholesalers to offset their WET liability by exempting some of each wholesaler’s wine sales from the WET. It was originally capped at $290 000, but the cap was increased to $500 000 in 2006 and reduced to $350 000 in 2018.\(^92\) The WET rebate was designed to benefit small wine producers in rural and regional Australia, who would benefit from having their WET liability reduced or completely offset. It was also intended to replace state and federal cellar door subsidies, but VIC and SA retained their cellar door rebates after its introduction.\(^93\)

By 2015 the ATO believed the WET rebate was not being claimed as initially envisaged. A number of schemes had arisen for improperly accessing the rebate, including artificial blending, contractual and business structural arrangements, for the sole purpose of accessing the rebate. The schemes took advantage of broad eligibility criteria for claiming the rebate, and sometimes involved claiming the rebate multiple times on the same wine.\(^94\)

The WET rebate may have distorted production in several ways.\(^95\) Industry participants criticised the WET rebate for subsidising inefficient winemakers and growers, encouraging overproduction of bulk wine, inhibiting industry restructure, eroding the value of premium wine, and discouraging mergers.\(^96\) The 2016 Senate Inquiry recommended that the government phase out the WET rebate.\(^97\)

Several integrity changes to the WET rebate took effect from 1 July 2018.\(^98\) The maximum amount that producers can claim was reduced to $350 000, and there are tightened eligibility criteria and circumstances in which the rebate will apply.\(^99\) The changes restrict many bulk wine exporters and

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89 *Wine Grapes Industry Act 1991* (SA), s. 5.
93 Treasury, p. 6.
94 ibid, pp. 18–22.
97 Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Reference Committee, *Australian grape and wine industry*.
99 ATO, *Wine equalisation tax*. 

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other cheap wine producers from accessing the rebate\textsuperscript{100} and are designed to realign industry incentives. They are intended to ensure that wine producers are the beneficiaries of the rebate and not wine traders and retailers\textsuperscript{101}, and to stop the rebate being claimed multiple times on the same wine throughout the supply chain.\textsuperscript{102}

Several industry stakeholders submitted that the WET rebate scheme has had a significant impact on industry dynamics, and that they expect to see structural changes in the industry as a result of the recent changes to the scheme.

\textsuperscript{100} IBISWorld, \textit{Industry report C1214: Wine Production in Australia}, pp. 8–9.

\textsuperscript{101} Explanatory memorandum, \textit{Treasury Laws Amendment (2017 Measures No 4) Bill 2017}.

\textsuperscript{102} B Joyce (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Agriculture and Water Resources) and A Ruston (Assistant Minister for Agriculture and Water Resources), Uncorking the Benefits for Wine Producers, media release, Treasury, 17 August 2017, \url{http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/kelly-odwyer-2016/media-releases/uncorking-benefits-wine-producers}. 

2. **Warm climate grape growing regions**

**Key points**
- This market study focusses on the three ‘warm climate’ grape growing regions: Murray Valley, Riverina and Riverland.
- Two-thirds of Australian wine grapes (by volume) are grown in the warm climate regions.
- Winemakers generally consider there to be little differentiation between grapes of a given variety produced within a warm climate region.
- Grapes from warm climate regions generally sell for lower prices and in a narrower price range than grapes grown in cool climate regions.

This market study focusses on what are referred to in the industry as warm climate grape growing regions. The three warm climate regions are the Riverland, Murray Valley (which includes the Murray Darling and Swan Hill regions) and Riverina (see figure 2.1). Around 1500 growers operate in these regions, which produce approximately two thirds of Australia’s wine grapes. All other wine regions are broadly classified as cool climate, despite differing widely in their individual climates and grape characteristics.

**Figure 2.1: Map of warm climate grape growing regions**

![Map of warm climate grape growing regions](source)

Source: Wine Australia.

The warm climate regions have very different environmental conditions, production volumes and input costs than the cool climate regions. There is a perception that the warm climate regions produce lower quality grapes than the cool climate regions, reflected in lower prices per-tonne for warm climate grapes than for cool climate grapes.

In warm climate regions most grapes are produced by growers who have written or verbal supply agreements with a major winemaker. By contrast, cool climate regions have a greater presence of small winemakers growing their own grapes.

These production characteristics have a major influence on grape prices, the commercial relationships between growers and winemakers, and the extent of competition between winemakers (which is analysed in chapter 6).

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103 Warm regions are also known as ‘inland’ or ‘commercial’ regions, while cool regions are sometimes called ‘premium’ or ‘boutique’ regions.
This market study has focussed on warm climate regions because these have frequently been the subject of confidential complaints raised with the ACCC.

2.1 The characteristics of warm climate regions magnify competition issues

2.1.1 Warm climate regions have higher yields and lower production costs

Compared to cool climate regions, warm climate regions have higher average temperatures and longer growing seasons, and the vines grown there are less prone to disease. Warm climate regions also tend to produce significantly higher yields (figure 2.2). In 2018, grapes from the warm climate regions accounted for 67 per cent of grapes processed in Australia, despite vineyards in these regions only accounting for 37 per cent of total national vineyard area (figure 2.12).

Vineyards in cool climate regions tend to operate on a smaller scale, sometimes with less mechanisation, and tend to have lower yields.

Figure 2.2: Average tonnes per hectare in top 32 growing regions

![Figure 2.2: Average tonnes per hectare in top 32 growing regions](image)

Source: ACCC analysis of Wine Australia data.

2.1.2 Warm climate grapes are predominantly used for bulk wine

Winemakers tend to place less emphasis on the distinct qualities of the grapes grown by individual growers in warm climate regions: instead they focus on differentiating by variety.

Most of the largest processing facilities are in warm climate regions. The majority of wine produced in these regions is exported. The wine is commonly exported in bulk, in bladder-lined shipping containers to be bottled at the destination. It may be bottled alone, or blended with locally made wine. Much of the remainder is retailed domestically in lower priced casks or bottles. Wine produced using grapes from warm climate regions is generally not marketed by reference to its region of origin. In some cases, the label refers to South Eastern Australia rather than a particular region.

In contrast, grapes from cool climate regions are used to produce wine sold at a wider range of price points than those from the warm climate regions. A proportion is also exported, either in bulk or bottled. In their submissions to the ACCC, winemakers indicated that when producing cool climate

wines they are looking for attributes relating to flavour, region, variety and price to use across their product portfolio. Winemakers will often work with individual growers to achieve these attributes.

Brand recognition impacts the extent to which wines and grapes from cool climates attract a premium price. Labels for cool climate wines often specify the region the grapes were grown in, particularly for regions with high brand recognition such as the Barossa Valley or the Mornington Peninsula. Grapes and wines from cool climate regions with lower brand recognition, while generally attracting a higher price than grapes from warm climate regions, will not attract the same prices as grapes from well-recognised cool climate regions.

A small proportion of wine from warm climate regions is used in mid-range or premium wine. The Wine Australia Regulations 2018 allow winemakers to include up to 15 per cent of volume derived from grapes grown in a region other than the region of origin on the label. This enables winemakers to reduce production costs for cool climate wines by blending wine from warm climate regions into cool climate wines.

2.1.3 Warm climate grapes generally sell for lower prices and in a narrower price range

As a result of the high volumes supplied and lower level of quality differentiation, grapes grown in warm climate regions generally sell for lower prices and in a narrower price range than grapes grown in cool climate regions (figure 2.3).

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Figure 2.3: Comparison of grape prices by region and type (2018)

The overlap in prices between warm and cool climate regions evident in figure 2.3 is only for a small proportion of grapes. Most warm climate grapes sell at significantly lower prices than cool climate grapes of the same variety. In 2018, 80 per cent of warm climate grapes sold for between $254 and $502 per tonne. By contrast 80 per cent of cool climate grapes sold for between $681 and $2139 per tonne. Each of the six most popular varieties, as well as red grapes and white grapes as separate categories, sell at significantly lower prices in warm climate regions than in cool climate regions (figure 2.4).

Note: Excludes prices above $3,000 per tonne.
Source: ACCC analysis of Wine Australia’s Price dispersion report 2018 and data supplied by winemakers.\textsuperscript{107}

Figure 2.4: Middle 80 per cent price range by type and variety ($ per tonne)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type/variety</th>
<th>Warm climate grapes</th>
<th>Cool climate grapes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>$380 to $530</td>
<td>$800 to $2300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>$242 to $420</td>
<td>$599 to $1614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiraz</td>
<td>$399 to $540</td>
<td>$850 to $2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabernet Sauvignon</td>
<td>$400 to $530</td>
<td>$800 to $2035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merlot</td>
<td>$358 to $503</td>
<td>$586 to $1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chardonnay</td>
<td>$314 to $370</td>
<td>$535 to $1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sauvignon Blanc</td>
<td>$380 to $435</td>
<td>$725 to $1503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinot Gris</td>
<td>$490 to $528</td>
<td>$850 to $1849</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ACCC analysis of Wine Australia’s Price dispersion report 2018 and data supplied by winemakers.

2.1.4 Average prices are similar across warm climate regions

Average grape prices in each of the warm climate regions are relatively similar in most years, as shown in figure 2.5. Riverland and Murray Valley prices are the most closely correlated, which is likely to be because of their geographic proximity to each other (see chapter 6). Although the Riverina is further away, average Riverina prices are also broadly comparable with Riverland and Murray Valley prices and follow the same trends.

Figure 2.5: Average grape prices in the warm climate regions (2008-2018)

Source: Data supplied by Wine Australia.

In addition, in 2018, the average prices for particular commonly grown varieties in warm climate regions were also similar, as shown in figure 2.6. Warm climate regional average prices were within five per cent of each other for Shiraz, Cabernet Sauvignon, Sauvignon Blanc and Pinot Gris, and within eight per cent for Chardonnay.
2.1.5 The level of price dispersion varies across warm climate regions

Although average prices are comparable between warm climate regions, there are differing levels of variation in prices within each region, as illustrated in figure 2.7. Price dispersion tends to be greater for red varieties than for white varieties. Price dispersion for red varieties is highest in the Riverina.

2.1.6 Warm climate growers are less profitable than cool climate growers

Estimates prepared by the Winemakers’ Federation of Australia (WFA) indicate that in the later years of the recent grape oversupply and price downturn, a significantly greater proportion of warm climate growers were making a loss compared to growers in cool climate regions. In the three years for which estimates are available, 2012, 2014 and 2015, the vast majority of growers in warm climate regions...
made a loss (figure 2.8). In the cool climate regions more growers were profitable, with under half making losses and around a third considered profitable each year (figure 2.9).

**Figure 2.8: Warm climate grower profitability 2012, 2014 and 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Loss</th>
<th>Breakeven</th>
<th>Low profitability</th>
<th>Profitable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WFA.¹⁰⁹

**Figure 2.9: Cool climate grower profitability 2012, 2014 and 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Loss</th>
<th>Breakeven</th>
<th>Low profitability</th>
<th>Profitable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Breakeven is defined as profit between 0 to $100 per tonne, low profitability is defined as profit between $100 and $300 per tonne and profitable production is defined as profit of greater than $300 per tonne.

Source: WFA.¹¹¹

In 2015 only one per cent of warm climate growers were considered profitable, compared to 33 per cent of cool climate growers. However, there were significant differences between the profitability of different cool climate regions. For example, in 2015, 99 per cent of Tasmanian growers were reported to be profitable, while 94 per cent of Hunter Valley growers made a loss.


¹¹¹ ibid.

ibid.
There are also significant differences between the profitability of growers from each of the warm climate regions. For example, Riverina growers produce a lower average yield, which significantly increases their growing costs per tonne compared to the Riverland and Murray Valley regions.

**Figure 2.10: Estimated growing costs and profitability in warm climate regions, 2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Proportion of growers making a loss</th>
<th>Growing costs</th>
<th>Average yield</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Riverland</td>
<td>94 per cent</td>
<td>$393–472 per tonne</td>
<td>19.6 tonnes per hectare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murray Valley</td>
<td>89 per cent</td>
<td>$397–477 per tonne</td>
<td>19.4 tonnes per hectare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverina</td>
<td>98 per cent</td>
<td>$545–654 per tonne</td>
<td>14.2 tonnes per hectare</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WFA.\textsuperscript{112}

Based on the above figures and assuming that growing costs have not decreased since 2014, it is likely that the majority of warm climate growers were still unprofitable in 2018 (see figure 2.11).

**Figure 2.11: Estimated warm climate region growing costs and average grape prices**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Growing costs in 2014</th>
<th>Average grape price in 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Riverland</td>
<td>$393–472 per tonne</td>
<td>$391 per tonne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murray Valley</td>
<td>$397–477 per tonne</td>
<td>$402 per tonne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverina</td>
<td>$545–654 per tonne</td>
<td>$399 per tonne</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WFA and Wine Australia.\textsuperscript{113}

One stakeholder submitted that, in its experience, grape growing costs are often lower than the estimated costs put forward by WFA. The ACCC acknowledges that grape growing costs vary from grower to grower, and can be strongly influenced by the target yield and the cost of inputs including water and electricity.

In support of the above finding that the majority of warm climate growers operate at a loss, many growers have reported needing to find paid employment to supplement their income. Many growers have also submitted that they have diversified their businesses in order to service debts and remain viable.

A 2017 ABARES report using data from its 2014–15 irrigation survey found that 86 per cent of grape farms in the Murray-Darling Basin produced three different crops (most commonly grapes, citrus and another horticulture crop).\textsuperscript{114} Despite this, the grape industry was the least diversified of all irrigated industries covered by the survey.\textsuperscript{115}

In addition, a significant proportion of warm climate growers exited the industry during the years of the grape oversupply and price downturn, particularly in the Murray Valley and Riverina. The degree of exit in the three warm climate regions in the context of recent changes to market conditions is discussed in chapter 1.

\textsuperscript{112} ibid.


\textsuperscript{115} ibid.
2.2 Each of the warm climate regions has unique characteristics

Each warm climate region has its own industry association. All or most of each industry associations’ members are growers who have no ownership or other controlling interest in a winery. These growers are referred to in this report as ‘independent growers’.

Figure 2.12 shows key information for each of the warm climate regions, including the number of growers, vineyard area, volume of grapes produced, and the main varieties.

Figure 2.12: Characteristics of the warm climate regions (2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Riverina</th>
<th>Murray Valley</th>
<th>Riverland</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of growers</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vineyard area (ha)</td>
<td>18,765</td>
<td>15,700</td>
<td>19,024</td>
<td>53,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>percentage of national</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume of grapes harvested (tonnes)</td>
<td>333,682</td>
<td>345,458</td>
<td>526,235</td>
<td>1,205,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>percentage of national</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main grape varieties (%)</td>
<td>Chardonnay (23)</td>
<td>Chardonnay (28)</td>
<td>Chardonnay (27)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shiraz (19)</td>
<td>Shiraz (18)</td>
<td>Shiraz (15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cabernet Sauvignon (9)</td>
<td>Cabernet Sauvignon (12)</td>
<td>Cabernet Sauvignon (14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Semillon (8)</td>
<td>Pinot Gris/Grigio (8)</td>
<td>Colombard (6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pinot Gris/Grigio (6)</td>
<td>Merlot (7)</td>
<td>Merlot (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The number of growers excludes wineries that grow grapes. The remaining data includes wineries that grow grapes.

Source: Information provided by various wine industry bodies, including Wine Australia and Murray Valley Winegrowers’ Incorporated.

There have been varying degrees of vineyard rationalisation for each region over the 2000s and 2010s for a number of reasons, including the oversupply of grapes and the mechanisation of harvesting.

2.2.1 Riverina

Riverina growers are represented by the Riverina Wine Grapes Marketing Board (RWGMB), which is funded by a levy payable by all independent growers producing more than 20 tonnes per harvest, under the NSW Agricultural Industry Services Act 1998. When an independent grower’s volume increases to the point that they have to pay the levy, they become members of the RWGMB by default.

The RWGMB has operated in the Riverina since 1933. It was given statutory powers from 1976, which allowed it to set minimum grape prices and conditions of payment, to pursue late payments by winemakers, and to require that payments to growers be made through it. However, in 2000 it lost its power to determine minimum prices for grapes, and in 2012 it lost its ability to set and enforce terms and conditions of payment. Since 2012 it has operated solely as an agricultural industry services committee.

RWGMB estimates that independent growers, and therefore its membership, represents 65 per cent of grape production in the region. RWGMB currently has just under 300 members, which is about half of the 568 members it had in 2000.

116 Wine Australia, Regional snapshots.
118 For further detail, refer to the Agricultural Industry Services Act 1998 (NSW) and the Agricultural Industry Services Regulation 2015 (NSW).
Many growers in the Riverina have unwritten agreements with winemakers. This is in contrast to the other warm climate regions where the majority of growers have written agreements. The reliance on unwritten agreements in the Riverina is likely the result of the culture of grower loyalty towards winemakers in the region. A large number of growers have supplied the same winemaker for many years.

None of the major winemakers in the Riverina are signatories to the Code.

2.2.2 Murray Valley

Murray Valley Winegrowers’ Incorporated (MVW) is a grower representative association with about 310 members. MVW represents 100 per cent of independent growers and its members account for an estimated 70 per cent of grape production in the region.

MVW’s activities are funded by a compulsory levy on independent growers. The levy is collected by the Murray Valley Wine Grape Industry Development Committee, a statutory body established in 1994 under the Agriculture Industry Development Act 1990 (Vic). Although this is a Victorian Act, it also applies to the part of the region in NSW. As independent growers have to pay the levy, they by default become members of MVW.

Additionally, MVW advises there is a voluntary levy which most growers pay which is used to fund the association’s administration costs.

MVW has advised it had 1294 members in 2006, which is a 76 per cent decrease in grower numbers over the last 13 years.

The majority of growers have multi-year supply agreements with one or more winemakers.

Three of the major winemakers with wineries in the Murray Valley are signatories to the Code: Treasury Wine Estates, Accolade and Trentham Estate. Other buyers of grapes from the region are also signatories, including Pernod Ricard and Brown Brothers.

2.2.3 Riverland

The Riverland is Australia’s largest grape growing region in terms of the number of growers, vineyard area and the volume of grapes crushed.

In 2010 the Riverland Wine Industry Development Council and the Riverland Winegrape Growers Association combined to form Riverland Wine (RW). These organisations retained their separate structures within the combined organisation. RW represents both growers and winemakers in the Riverland region. It has 980 members, of which about 900 are independent growers.

RW’s activities are financed through two funds created under the Primary Industry Funding Schemes (Riverland Wine Industry Fund) Regulations 2016 (SA). One of the funds is financed by a levy on growers and the other is financed by a levy on winemakers. The funds are intended to be used to assist growers, winemakers and the industry as a whole.

From 2000 to 2018 the number of growers in this region fell by 21 per cent. By contrast, the number of growers in SA’s cool climate regions increased by 47 per cent over the same period.

Of the major winemakers with a winery located in the Riverland, Accolade is the only Code signatory. Pernod Ricard, a major buyer of grapes from the region, is also a signatory.

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120 For further detail, refer to the Agricultural Industry Development Act 1990 (Vic), the Victorian Murray Valley Grape Industry Development (Extra-Territorial) Order 2016 (Vic), the Agricultural Industry Services Act 1998 (NSW) and the Agricultural Industry Services Regulation 2015 (NSW).


CCW Co-operative Limited

Annual and multi-year agreements are particularly prevalent in the Riverland compared to other regions. RW estimated that 90 per cent of growers are contracted to a cooperative or to a winemaker. Approximately 57 per cent of the region’s growers supply to Accolade under 15-year rolling contracts with CCW, a grower cooperative that operates in the region.

These supply agreements are a legacy of CCW previously owning a winery in Berri which was supplied by its members. After CCW divested the winery, it entered a long-term supply agreement with the buyer of the winery, which transferred to subsequent owners. The current owner is Accolade and the winery is currently the largest in Australia.

The supply agreements require CCW to purchase, and the grower to supply, all grapes from defined parcels of land. In turn, Accolade has a grape supply agreement with CCW. CCW negotiates prices and specifications on behalf of the growers.

These agreements have a significant impact on the competitive dynamics of the Riverland wine grape market. As CCW has an agreement to sell its grapes to Accolade, it cannot threaten to switch supply to another winemaker. This means a large proportion of the Riverland’s grapes are not available to be purchased by other winemakers. However, the agreement also provides long-term surety of supply for CCW growers.
3. **Quality assessment**

### Key points

- Grape quality assessment measures, methods and procedures vary significantly depending on the winemaker, variety, location and intended use of the grapes. The characteristics assessed can relate to the maturity, purity, condition, flavour and character of the grapes.

- Based on quality assessments in the vineyard or at the winery, winemakers determine when the grapes will be harvested, whether they will be accepted or rejected, and whether the winemaker will adjust grower payments.

- Growers lack transparency about the quality assessment process and the end use of their grapes. Final results of the quality assessment process and related grape price sometimes do not meet grower expectations, but it is difficult for growers to dispute them.

- Some winemakers reserve the right to unilaterally change specifications or wait to compare the amount of anthocyanins (colour levels) in the grapes against others in the region before confirming the price. This creates uncertainty for growers.

- Quality assessments sometimes return inconsistent results because they involve a degree of subjectivity, or they are not carried out using best practice.

- Measurement of colour levels in red grapes is controversial, but the ACCC understands that such measurements can indicate the quality of the final product when carried out using best practice.

- There is no registered standard for measurement of sugar and colour levels in grapes under national trade measurement legislation. The ACCC considers that standardisation of the methodology used for testing sugar and colour levels would increase grower confidence in quality assessment results.

- Winemakers have discretion over the timing of harvest, but growers bear significant risks associated with harvest scheduling.

### 3.1 Growers are concerned about quality assessment practices

#### 3.1.1 Quality assessments can significantly impact grower payments

Winemakers conduct various wine grape quality assessments in the vineyard and at the weighbridge, as described in section 3.1.4, to ensure that grapes will be suitable for the winemakers’ product lines. Growers harvest and deliver grapes at a time specified by the winemaker, and are paid a per-tonne rate which can be adjusted depending on the quality assessments.

Quality assessments can have a significant impact on grower payments because they are used to determine:

- **Whether the winemaker will accept or reject the grapes**: Winemakers can reject grapes that do not meet particular quality requirements, based on assessment of a sample from the vineyard or delivery load.

- **How much the winemaker will pay the grower for the grapes**: Winemakers generally establish a starting price per tonne of grapes by variety for each warm climate region. The price is then adjusted for particular batches of grapes based on how samples perform against a range of quality specifications.

- **The timing of harvest**: Winemakers consider grape maturity assessment results, such as sugar levels, in determining the harvest date. Growers bear the associated timing risks, as discussed in section 3.5.

In this report, ‘quality assessment’ refers to any assessment of grapes for the purposes listed above.
Winemakers also sort grapes into processing streams or make other decisions based on various specifications which do not directly affect acceptance, rejection or payment amount. Examples include titratable acidity (TA) and pH assessments, or taste tests that are used for internal purposes only. Assessments that do not impact the transactional relationship between growers and winemakers are not a focus of this market study.

3.1.2 Growers have raised concerns about quality assessment procedures

This chapter discusses grower concerns about the transparency and reliability of quality assessment procedures. Growers have reported that they lack:

- visibility over the quality assessment process
- the ability to dispute results
- certainty about how results will translate to payment adjustments
- control over the timing of harvest, which impacts the final quality assessment.

These concerns result in a lack of trust in the quality assessment process and exacerbate the power imbalances between growers and winemakers referred to in chapter 5.

Many of the concerns relate to entrenched and widespread industry practices in the quality assessment process. However, not all winemakers engage in the practices discussed.

3.1.3 Winemakers use a wide range of quality assessment procedures

There is a general consensus among growers, winemakers and experts that quality assessment is best thought of as determining the ‘fitness for purpose’ of grapes. It is an assessment of whether the grapes possess the characteristics that will achieve a desired product type or style, rather than of the ‘level of quality’ of the grapes on a linear scale.

As such, quality assessment measures, methods, procedures, targets and thresholds vary between winemakers. They also depend on the grape variety, the region and the intended use.

Testing methods include chemical laboratory testing as well as sensory assessments such as visual or taste tests. Testing can relate to:

- **maturity**: such as sugar levels, TA, pH and flavour ripeness
- **purity**: such as level of disease, foreign material and contamination
- **condition**: such as level of uniformity, spoilage and damage
- **flavour and character**: such as colour and sensory assessments.

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124 Feedback the ACCC heard from growers and winemakers is consistent with academic literature. For references to fitness for purpose see, for example: RG Dambergs, ‘Validation of an industry vineyard assessment system’, proceedings of the Australian Society of Viticulture and Oenology (ASVO) and Wine Industry Suppliers Australia (WISA) seminar on objective measures of wine and grape quality, Mildura, 2012, p. 14, P Smith, ‘Recent advances in objective chemical measures of wine quality’, proceedings of the ASVO and WISA seminar on objective measures of wine and grape quality, Mildura, 2012, p. 44, PK Boss, ‘Towards the prediction of wine outcomes from grape compositional measures’, proceedings of the ASVO and WISA seminar on objective measures of wine and grape quality, Mildura, 2012, p. 60, TH Lee, ‘What does the future hold for Australian vineyard managers?’, proceedings of the ASVO and WISA seminar on objective measures of wine and grape quality, Mildura, 2012, p. 65.

125 Note: Sugar levels are usually measured by refractometry on a juice sample. They are measured as total soluble solids (TSS) expressed in degrees Brix (grams of soluble solids per 100 grams of juice). The result is divided by 1.8 to convert to degrees Baumé. The number of degrees Baumé approximately corresponds with the alcohol percentage in the wine after fermentation.

126 See W Allan, *Winegrape assessment in the vineyard and at the winery*, Winetitles Media, Adelaide, 2003, prepared for and endorsed by the Winegrape Growers’ Council of Australia (WGCA) and the Winemakers’ Federation of Australia (WFA) Liaison Committee.
Some specifications may be thought of as quality control specifications, which are used to ensure there are no defects in the grapes. These include thresholds for matter other than grapes (MOG), disease and contamination. Some winemakers focus on these specifications and do not assess flavour and character, particularly in warm climate regions.

Flavour and character specifications are more commonly assessed in cool climate regions, and contribute to a more direct ‘grading’ process which differentiates batches of grapes from one another. Under this process a grade is assigned to each batch of grapes (e.g. A, B, C, D or E), and higher graded grapes are priced above lower graded grapes.

In feedback on the Interim Report, stakeholders noted that there are various definitions of ‘quality’ in the industry. Some stakeholders contrasted quality control specifications related to suitability for commercial sale (such as level of disease), against flavour and character specifications which are more directly linked to ‘quality’ or ‘fitness for purpose’. The ACCC understands that different assessments may have different purposes. However, in this market study we refer to ‘quality assessment’ as any assessment of the grapes that impacts the transactional relationship between the grower and winemaker. This includes any assessment used to determine whether the winemaker will accept or reject the grapes, how much the winemaker will pay for the grapes, or when the grapes will be harvested.

3.1.4 Quality assessment occurs in the vineyard and at the weighbridge

Figure 3.1 provides a timeline of commonly used quality assessment processes.

**Figure 3.1: Quality assessment of wine grapes**

**In the vineyard—throughout the season**
- In-vineyard assessments occur throughout the season, particularly after veraison, to monitor progress and predict the likely quality and volume of grapes.
- Factors measured can include maturity factors such as sugar and colour levels, quality control factors like disease and vine health, assessments relating to taste, and vineyard attributes like shoots and leaf size. Warm climate assessments are often less frequent and comprehensive than cool climate assessments. Many winemakers also require growers to submit yield estimates during the period from November to January.
- Winemakers provide varying levels of viticultural advice during in-vineyard assessments. However, most supply agreements provide that winemakers will not be responsible for the outcomes of growers’ viticultural decisions.
- In-vineyard assessments are typically carried out by winemaker representatives, such as grower liaison officers (GLOs) who are sometimes viticulturists, but growers may self-report for some measures. Samples may be tested on-site, or taken to a laboratory at the winery for analysis.

**In the vineyard—final ‘pre-harvest’ assessments**
- Most winemakers conduct a final in-vineyard assessment between two days and two weeks before harvest.
- Final in-vineyard assessments are primarily used to schedule a harvest date. At least one winemaker also finalises its assessment of all of the parameters that can be assessed before delivery to determine any related price adjustments or rejections.
- Factors measured are similar to vineyard assessments throughout the season, but with a focus on maturity factors like sugar levels, colour levels and ‘flavour intensity’.
At the weighbridge

- A final assessment to determine whether there will be quality-related price adjustments or rejections occurs upon delivery of grapes to the winery.
- The characteristics assessed at the weighbridge usually relate to MOG, contamination, disease, fermentation, taints, temperature, varietal integrity and adherence to documentary and procedural requirements. It is not possible to test some of these parameters at the vineyard because they relate to aspects of harvested grapes. Testing for taints may be completed shortly after the weighbridge assessment, if a taint is suspected but not readily confirmable at the weighbridge.
- At the weighbridge most winemakers also conduct a final assessment of maturity factors that have previously been measured in the vineyard, such as sugar levels.
- Samples are generally taken from each truck load, and assessed at the weighbridge or in the winemaker’s laboratory. Growers usually receive a harvest docket recording the tonnes delivered and basic quality indicators such as sugar levels.

Post-weighbridge

Some winemakers make ‘bonus’ payments (for premium grade grapes) based on quality assessments conducted throughout the winemaking process, including after fermentation.

3.2 Quality assessment lacks transparency

3.2.1 Growers lack trust in quality assessment procedures

Warm climate growers have expressed distrust in quality assessments and submitted to the ACCC that some are made arbitrarily or with ulterior motives. Growers submitted that winemakers have:

- used the process primarily to minimise the price they pay growers and the quantity of grapes they accept, rather than to meet market expectations
- filled their quota for a particular grade of grape and subsequently ‘downgraded’ other fruit that would otherwise have met the grade
- at times of oversupply, used the process to get out of their obligation to purchase grapes under a supply agreement.

Winemakers have told the ACCC that they do not engage in these behaviours, and that there is no incentive to deliberately downgrade grapes. However, some winemakers have suggested that other winemakers have engaged, or have an incentive to engage, in the practices described.

3.2.2 Quality assessments lack transparency

Some grower representatives submitted that quality specifications are not clearly communicated in supply agreements. The ACCC found that quality specifications and associated price penalties or bonuses are generally clearly set out in supply agreements or grower manuals. However, the mechanisms or techniques that will be used to determine compliance, the standards that will be applied to ensure accuracy, and the points in time when testing will occur are rarely specified.

In addition, growers have limited visibility over the testing process itself. Much of the testing process usually occurs at the winery (for samples taken from the vineyard as well as samples taken at the weighbridge), making it inaccessible to growers. Growers have also told the ACCC that winemakers provide insufficient information and evidence to justify adverse quality assessment decisions.
This lack of transparency causes problems by:

- decreasing the accuracy of market signals reaching growers, as discussed in chapter 6
- reducing growers’ ability to assess and dispute quality assessment decisions: it is difficult for growers to form a view, supported by evidence, about whether their grapes meet the specifications
- discouraging new entrants (growers) and mobility in the market (switching winemaker)\(^\text{127}\)
- exacerbating power imbalances between growers and winemakers, as discussed in chapter 5
- increasing the risk of grower and winemaker expectations being misaligned. Consequently growers’ financial planning may be based on unrealistic expectations about coming payments.

The ACCC recommends that supply agreements should clearly outline the testing and sampling methods that winemakers will use to assess grape quality. This will increase the transparency regarding quality testing methods, allowing growers to make more informed decisions when entering into agreements.

Winemakers and growers expressed a high level of support for this recommendation in response to the Interim Report. Some stakeholders questioned whether the information needs to necessarily be provided as part of supply agreements. The ACCC recommends that, at a minimum, the information be provided as part of all supply agreements (for example, embedded in the agreement or as an appendix) in such a way that:

- the testing and sampling methods are binding on the parties
- the grower can consider the quality assessment parameters when deciding whether to enter the supply agreement.

The ACCC would welcome additional measures suggested by winemakers to further improve the accessibility of the information, such as by making it available to growers online.

The information about testing and sampling methods should be accompanied by clear and precise information about quality thresholds and the effect, if any, of failing to reach a particular threshold. In feedback on the Interim Report, grower representatives commented on the importance of having a clear understanding of target sugar levels that affect the timing of harvest, in order to estimate their expected yield.

The Code should be amended to reflect this recommendation.\(^\text{128}\)

### 3.2.3 Final results can be inconsistent with prior feedback

As discussed in section 3.1.4, quality assessment is conducted in a number of stages at the vineyard and in the winery. Growers have told the ACCC that final assessments of their grapes sometimes do not match expectations established at previous appraisals. Final results may also conflict with growers’ own viticultural experience, or independent testing.

In contrast, winemakers have submitted that:

- quality assessments are undertaken several times throughout the growing season so that both parties are fully informed
- growers provide their input during quality assessments
- winemakers seek to manage grower expectations and educate them about the differences between grape grades
- most of the grapes that winemakers receive meet the winemaker’s quality requirements, and winemakers do not frequently ‘downgrade’ grapes

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\(^\text{127}\) Winemaker representatives submitted that growers with long-term relationships with winemakers understand their requirements and therefore are better able to provide grapes according to specifications.

\(^\text{128}\) Section 2.8 of the Code relates to ‘Winegrape standards, assessment and harvest’. However it does not refer to minimum sampling standards, and does not appear to require methods of assessment to be disclosed unless they are ‘directly inconsistent with the methods described in W Allan, *Winegrape assessment in the vineyard and at the winery* (as amended from time to time and endorsed by WGGA and WFA).’
‘downgrading’ grapes without an appropriate reason would not be an effective business practice

some winemakers finalise all quality assessments in the vineyard, and only conduct quality control assessments at the weighbridge, so the grapes cannot be ‘downgraded’ at the weighbridge.

3.2.4 Final results are difficult to dispute

An unexpectedly poor quality assessment result at the weighbridge is more difficult for the grower to dispute than if they had been informed of this at the vineyard, because:

with the exception of CCW growers (see box 3.1), growers or their representatives are generally not present at the weighbridge, making it difficult to form a view about whether the unexpected result is justified. Growers submitted that best practice would require them to be present at all assessments, but that the fast pace of harvest means that this usually does not occur

grapes are highly perishable after being picked, and must be crushed as soon as possible. This makes it almost impossible to find an alternative buyer for the grapes by the time they reach the weighbridge

it is logistically difficult to remove the grapes from the winery, particularly after they have been tipped into the crusher

in some cases there may be a delay between the rejection and the time the grower is notified of it

one major winemaker stipulates that their determination at the weighbridge will be final

the Code sets out a detailed procedure for settling quality disputes in the vineyard, including determination by an independent expert. However, for quality disputes at the weighbridge the Code states that they should be resolved within 12 hours and does not require the appointment of an independent expert to resolve the dispute.129

While the ACCC understands that it is not always feasible for all testing to be carried out and to have the final price determined in the vineyard, vineyard assessments should be as indicative as possible of the final result.

**Box 3.1: CCW grower representation at the weighbridge**

CCW is a member-owned and controlled co-operative of around 600 growers in the Riverland that has a supply agreement with Accolade (see chapter 2).

CCW employs two viticulturists who provide technical support to growers during the season. A viticulturist can attend the weighbridge during harvest, usually at the request of CCW or Accolade, if notified of an issue. The viticulturist can assist growers in the event of a potential quality-related price deduction.

CCW representatives have told the ACCC that this measure has given growers more confidence in Accolade’s quality assessment results at the weighbridge, and resulted in less conflict between growers and Accolade.

However, the ACCC notes that services like this are not available to non-CCW growers because of the resources required for grower representative organisations to provide such a service.

3.2.5 Growers want transparency over grape end use

Some growers have told the ACCC that being formally advised of the end use of their grapes would provide a better understanding of their product quality, and strengthen their ability to negotiate prices. For example, a grower who has evidence that their grapes have been used in a high quality wine could ask the winemaker, or a competing winemaker, to pay a higher price for their grapes in the following season.

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129 See Australian Wine Industry Code of Conduct, clause 3.3. See chapter 7 for more discussion of the Code, and section 5.5 for discussion of dispute resolution processes.
Some winemakers already share this information with growers, particularly for cool climate grapes or for supply agreements where payments are linked to the final product.

Growers submitted that, to comply with labelling requirements, winemakers already keep detailed records tracking which grapes are used in which products. However, the ACCC acknowledges there may be an administrative cost associated with sharing the information with growers. In addition, growers would need to consider that their grapes may have been blended with those of a different quality to produce the final product.

### 3.3 Quality assessment lacks certainty

#### 3.3.1 Quality specifications are subject to change

Some supply agreements provide winemakers with a broad unilateral ability to change quality specifications throughout the season or between seasons. Growers are generally not in a position to dispute such changes.

A number of warm climate growers submitted that winemakers have used this to ‘shift the goalposts’ during the growing season or during the supply agreement term in relation to quality, quantity, colour or sugar thresholds. Growers have also suggested that some specifications are only enforced during times of oversupply.

The resulting uncertainty reduces grower ability to accurately assess the benefits and risks before entering a supply agreement. Changes to specifications may result in growers receiving lower payment than anticipated, negatively affecting their profitability. It also affects their ability in the long run to make optimal decisions about the varieties they grow and, in the shorter term, the inputs they use and other production decisions.

In effect, such agreements enable winemakers to share some of the demand risk of changing consumer preferences with the grower, by adjusting the grape quality parameters being sought under the grape supply agreement.

One winemaker submitted that it requires the ability to change specifications as a result of legislative or other changes, such as if withholding periods for chemicals change, and that it has not sought to vary specifications during the past few years. Another winemaker submitted that in practice it would only change specifications to benefit growers in the event of unusual seasonal conditions.

#### 3.3.2 Some growers do not know how results will impact payment until after harvest

One large winemaker adjusts payments based on how the level of colour (milligrams of anthocyanin per gram of berry weight) in the grapes compares to the regional weighted average.\(^\text{130}\) It pays more for grapes with colour levels that are higher than average, and less for grapes with colour levels that are lower than average, in a particular region and season.

For this winemaker, within a single region and red grape variety, the amount paid for grapes that have the highest colour levels can be $200–$300 per tonne more than (and in some cases double) the amount paid for grapes with the lowest colour levels. This winemaker specifies minimum and maximum amounts that it will substitute for the regional average in years where the regional average is particularly low or high. They may (at their discretion) decrease the minimum to improve grower payments in an excessively low colour year.

This method of calculating payment can cause a period of uncertainty for the grower, as the winemaker reserves the right to adjust payments months after harvest. Growers do not have access to other growers’ colour measurements. They cannot independently determine the effect of their grapes’ colour level on their likely payment because they do not have access to the regional average.

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\(^{130}\) Grower concerns about the accuracy of colour measurements are discussed in section 3.4.4.
Growers appear to lack information about, and understanding of, the method and rationale for calculating payment in this way, and are unable to verify the regional average calculated by the winemaker. Some growers also appear to lack good information about how to grow grapes to produce high colour readings.

The winemaker told the ACCC that the purpose of colour-based payment adjustments is to reward growers producing the best quality grapes, and that weighted averaging corrects any strong seasonal variations that shift all grape colour levels up or down. Winemaker representatives submitted that if they failed to adjust against averages, or cap or normalise colour results it would cause financial difficulties in years where colour was high across the region.

The ACCC considers that methodologies for comparing a grower’s colour levels to regional averages should be clearly and transparently communicated, in as much detail as possible. The information provided when prices are communicated should include a clear statement of the maximum and minimum prices that are possible following colour-based adjustment.

### 3.3.3 Some assessed quality factors are beyond growers’ control

Some winemakers continue to assess grape quality throughout or after processing, particularly for cool climate grapes. Growers may receive a ‘bonus’ payment that is contingent on the quality or performance of the final product.

Growers generally have no control over winemaking processes that might impact the quality of the final product, creating uncertainty over the outcome. One winemaker using this process outlines in its contracts that this is not a pure assessment of the quality of the grapes because the grapes may be blended with others before the assessment.

The ACCC does not necessarily have concerns with bonus payments, so long as they are in addition to the component of the price that directly reflects the grapes’ value and quality.

### 3.4 Growers have questioned the integrity of quality assessment

#### 3.4.1 Growers have received inconsistent results

Inconsistent or unexpected results have caused growers to question the integrity of quality assessment techniques. For example, some said they received different results when the same grapes were tested by different winemakers or independent assessors.

Growers, winemakers and other industry stakeholders can submit grape, juice or wine samples for compositional testing on a fee-for-service basis to the Australian Wine Research Institute’s (AWRI) Commercial Services or other testing laboratories.

Inconsistent or unexpected results can occur when testing methods are not objective, or when testing is not carried out using accurate equipment, sampling and procedures.
Box 3.2: Objective quality measurements

Objective quality measurements are impartial, and can be clearly described and accurately and consistently reproduced. They do not rely on subjective judgement by an assessor and they are able to be reliably carried out in the same way, with the same result, by different parties.

To be effective for growers and winemakers, objective measurements should be meaningful (related to value and relevant to the specifications of the result being sought), simple (easy to perform), affordable, timely, robust (precise, reproducible and repeatable), related to something that can be controlled, and transparent.\(^\text{131}\)

In contrast, subjective quality assessment techniques rely partly or fully on personal opinion or discretion, and are not reliably reproducible by different assessors. Generally, the more a quality assessment relies on the discretion of the winemaker, the harder it is for the grower to dispute the result.

In contrast, when objective quality assessment methods, understood by both winemakers and growers, are used accurately and transparently, they can reduce the potential for mistrust or misuse. This is because the results can be verified by the grower, winemaker or a third party in the event of a dispute.

In addition, if growers can measure progress against objective, transparent criteria they can more confidently make production decisions to improve their crops, thereby delivering a desirable product to winemakers and increasing their profits.

3.4.2 Many quality assessment techniques involve a degree of subjectivity

Growers have raised concerns about the subjectivity involved in some quality assessment techniques. For example, sensory assessments (involving tasting, smelling or carrying out visual assessments of the berries) usually involve a degree of subjectivity, even if conducted according to defined parameters.

Sensory assessments can involve evaluation of grape colour, aroma, flavour, taste and mouthfeel by assessing the grape, pulp, skin and seeds.\(^\text{132}\) They are commonly used for grapes destined for premium wines that are strongly defined by their distinctive sensory profiles, but can also be used for commercial grapes. Not all winemakers use sensory assessments to determine prices.

In some cases, limitations can be a barrier to assessing quality without relying on winemaker discretion. Although the commonly used chemical measures (such as sugar and pH) are objective, winemakers have submitted that it is impossible to assess the quality of grapes using these measures alone.

Winemakers contend that subjective measures are appropriate where there are no objective measures available to assess certain qualities, and that the chemical interactions that contribute to wine flavour are not well understood. Academic literature supports the view that the existing standard objective techniques are relatively unsophisticated.\(^\text{133}\)

There appears to have been little change in the way quality is assessed since the early 2000s despite years of ongoing research.\(^\text{134}\) Researchers have identified a need to develop rapid, objective and affordable methods of measuring flavour and aroma compounds that correlate well with the sensory

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\(^\text{131}\) See W Cameron, ‘Objective measures of grape and wine quality’, proceedings of the ASVO and WISA seminar on objective measures of wine and grape quality, Mildura, 2012, p. 5.

\(^\text{132}\) SEP Bastian, ‘Wine grape descriptive analysis to examine sensory impacts of different vineyard management strategies and berry quality’, proceedings of the ASVO and WISA seminar on objective measures of wine and grape quality, Mildura, 2012, p. 29.

\(^\text{133}\) For example, P Smith, p. 48, PK Boss, p. 60.

\(^\text{134}\) For example, M Longbottom, C Simo, M Krsetic and D Johnson, p. 34, found little change in the methods used to assess grape quality from 2003 to 2013. Some of the methods described in W Allan, *Winegrape assessment in the vineyard and at the winery*, appear to be current based on industry feedback to the ACCC. The 2005 Senate Report noted that there has been a strong research focus on developing better and quicker assessment of grape quality since about 1990, at [3.35].
characteristics of the final wine.\textsuperscript{135} The ACCC considers that industry should support research into affordable and reliable ways to measure wine grape specifications.

The ACCC recommends that winemakers should use well-documented and objective testing and sampling methods for quality assessments in the vineyard and at the winery where they are available. Despite some technological limitations of objective measures, and the importance of sensory assessment, the ACCC considers that winemakers should rely on objective measures to determine payment amounts wherever possible, and should adopt standardised sampling practices in the vineyard and at wineries. For example:

- Sensory assessments that affect payment should be conducted according to criteria and predefined scales that can be understood by the grower and should be capable of being reassessed as accurately as possible by a third party.\textsuperscript{136}
- Where objective measures are available to measure the same or similar characteristics or outcomes, those should be used instead of subjective measures.
- Where a sensory assessment is unavoidable because of technological limitations, and it cannot be conducted according to clearly defined criteria, results should only be used for internal purposes and should not influence payments to growers.

In addition, winemakers using sensory assessments should engage with growers to ensure they understand the specifications being assessed as thoroughly as possible.

Stakeholders generally provided positive feedback in response to this recommendation in the Interim Report. Several stakeholders submitted that the recommendation should apply in both warm and cool climate regions, particularly as many growers and winemakers sell to or buy from both warm and cool climate regions. The ACCC agrees and the recommendation and the principles outlined in this section are applicable to all regions.

Some stakeholders made submissions on what kinds of characteristics can be objectively assessed using existing technology. Others noted that there will be a cost associated with implementing existing objective techniques and with developing new objective techniques. The ACCC recognises that there is a cost involved but understands that some winemakers have made significant investments aimed at improving the objectivity of their quality assessments, and that the industry has funded research on quality assessment for multiple decades.

In addition, many stakeholders stressed the importance of well-documented, rigorous sampling techniques, particularly in the vineyard.

Overall, industry feedback indicated a support for the recommendation and a willingness among industry participants to reduce reliance on subjective measures to determine payment amounts wherever possible.

3.4.3 **Objective quality assessments should be carried out accurately**

**Appropriate calibration of equipment is required**

Quality assessments will not necessarily be accurate and representative just because an objective test, such as a quantitative measurement of sugar or colour, is used. Accurate calibration of equipment and correct administration of testing methods are important for the accuracy of results.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{135} K Boss, p. 64, TH Lee, p. 67, Cleary et al, ‘A perspective on grape chemical quality assessment to support streaming and harvest decisions’, proceedings of the ASVO and WISA seminar on objective measures of wine and grape quality, Mildura, 2012, p. 59.

\textsuperscript{136} See, for example, the 20 specific criteria in E Winter, J Whiting and J Rousseau, *Winegrape berry sensory assessment in Australia*, Winetitles Media, Adelaide, 2004.

\textsuperscript{137} Standardisation of equipment is discussed in section 3.4.5.
Growers have complained about unreliable sampling

Appropriate sampling techniques are also important. Variability can occur from vine-to-vine, bunch-to-bunch within a vine, and grape-to-grape within the vineyard, and between loads of grapes at the weighbridge. The ACCC understands that measurement of highly variable specifications, such as colour, requires particularly rigorous sampling when compared to less variable specifications, such as sugar content.

Growers have told the ACCC that winemakers have used unreliable sampling processes in the vineyard such as:

- collecting limited samples within a single row of vines to represent the whole vineyard
- choosing grapes from sections of the vine that are likely to be at an extreme end of the scale (such as the ends of rows)
- engaging untrained/inexperienced staff to conduct the sampling process.

When carried out transparently, representative sampling can lead to greater certainty and trust in the results of quality assessment at the vineyard and the weighbridge.

Sampling inaccuracies are more likely to harm growers than winemakers, as growers are generally penalised for failing to meet requirements, but are not correspondingly rewarded for exceeding them. Poor sampling can harm growers in the following ways:

- **In the vineyard:** this can build up grower expectations and increase the risk of later ‘downgrading’ at the weighbridge, and can also cause inefficient harvest scheduling
- **At the weighbridge:** this can increase the risk that the grower will be underpaid for the grapes.

Disputes are generally more difficult to resolve at the weighbridge than in the vineyard, as discussed in section 3.2.4.

Growers lack the ability to dispute sampling procedures

Growers have a limited ability to dispute sampling methods because many supply agreements do not specify the methods to be used. Some supply agreements make reference to ‘representative samples’, ‘random selection’ or a specified minimum sample size, but do not provide further details about how this will be achieved.

In addition, there is a lack of accessible and consistent industry standards on sampling. In response to the Interim Report, AGWI nominated a publication called *Winegrape Assessment in the Vineyard and at the Winery* (Allan Report), compiled by Wendy Allan and referred to in the Code, as a reference point for generally accepted sampling techniques. However, as noted in the Interim Report, the Allan Report emphasises the importance of obtaining representative samples, but does not provide detailed and accessible information on the minimum sampling standards that would ensure that representativeness is achieved. For more information on sampling, the Allan Report refers to a guide for growers on meeting winemakers’ quality standards, which is available for purchase and appears to be directed at growers rather than relied on by the industry as a whole.

Where insufficient information about sampling is provided, this can create a real or perceived opportunity for winemakers to consciously or unknowingly select an unrepresentative sample. Some winemakers who require growers to submit samples from the vineyard provide detailed sampling instructions to those growers. This illustrates their awareness of the importance of representative sampling and the potential for unrepresentative sampling to occur in the absence of appropriate

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139 W Allan, p. 6.
140 Growers have expressed also similar views in other forums. See, for example, M Longbottom, C Simo, M Krstic and D Johnson, p. 35. Academics have also referred to a need for better sampling efficiency. See, for example, P Dry, M Longbottom and M Essling, ‘Vineyard characteristics used in assessment schemes: theory and practice’, proceedings of the ASVO and WISA seminar on objective measures of wine and grape quality, Mildura, 2012, p. 9.
sampling constraints. Other risks associated with a lack of transparency in quality assessment are discussed in section 3.2.2.

### 3.4.4 Some warm climate growers are concerned about colour assessment

Colour assessment is a controversial measure generally only used for red wine grape varieties.

Some winemakers use subjective, visual assessment which involves crushing a grape between the assessor’s fingers to assess colour. This raises concerns about reliability.\(^2\)

Colour, in terms of milligrams of anthocyanins present in each gram of berries, is also commonly measured using spectrophotometry or near infra-red spectroscopy.\(^3\) Anthocyanin measurements were adopted by some medium to large winemakers in the early 2000s. Today at least one winemaker uses them as a determinant of prices (in combination with other quality parameters), as described in section 3.3.2.

Growers have submitted that these tests are unreliable. Some growers view colour assessment as a mechanism lacking in scientific credibility, used by winemakers to manipulate prices. In contrast, other growers told the ACCC that they are in favour of colour assessments based on anthocyanins because they have consistently received better prices as a result.

Winemakers acknowledge there are technical difficulties in developing and maintaining calibrations of colour measurement equipment, and that results can vary depending on sampling methods. However, they have also reported that these methods are the most effective and objective available, and are reliable enough for commercial use.

Academic literature and experts consulted by the ACCC support the view that while measurement of anthocyanins is not perfect, it correlates to some degree to some characteristics sought by winemakers that may otherwise be assessed using subjective sensory methods.

Although there is a correlation between colour and certain quality specifications, academic and industry literature suggests only using colour as one of many assessment measures in a multivariable approach to increase the integrity of quality results.\(^4\)

### 3.4.5 Improved quality assessment guidance materials would benefit the industry

In 2003, the Winegrape Growers’ Council of Australia and the Winemakers’ Federation of Australia endorsed the Allan Report, a summary of quality assessment techniques referred to above at 3.4.3. The Allan Report was designed to represent contemporary best practice and to evolve over time, but it has never been updated. In addition, the Allan Report refers to a grower handbook that was published in 2003.

The ACCC recommends that the AWRI, in consultation with industry stakeholders, review current industry guidance on quality assessment standards, and amend the guidance to clearly reflect current best practice and to provide detailed information on standards for sampling in the vineyard and at the weighbridge. The AWRI should also establish a timeframe for further periodic reviews of the guidance material.

This will inform all growers and winemakers about current best practice quality assessment methods. It will increase growers’ confidence in their understanding of the appropriateness of particular

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142 See section 3.4.1.
quality assessment techniques, and provide them with a basis for disputing inappropriate testing or sampling methods.

### 3.4.6 The standardisation of measurement techniques would increase grower confidence

The ACCC recommends that the AWRI work with the NMI and the industry to develop uniform national standards for testing and measuring grape sugar and colour levels.

This recommendation is designed to increase grower confidence in testing by establishing clear requirements for testing methods and the calibration and use of equipment.

Stakeholders generally supported this recommendation in principle in feedback to the Interim Report, although some raised concerns about practicalities and timing. The ACCC understands the long term nature of quality assessment research, but considers the AWRI and industry should establish a working group and set clear timeframe targets for developing standards, such as a commitment to developing draft standards for consultation within 12 months.

Some stakeholders mentioned that there are difficulties with developing objective quality assessment techniques, that significant research has already been conducted on this topic, and that there will need to be significant amounts of funding allocated to further research. However, this recommendation is targeted at ensuring that the techniques that are already in use are supported by a transparent evidence base, and that results from the same types of assessments are comparable from winemaker to winemaker. It is not necessarily targeted at developing new quality assessment methods.

Some stakeholders, including AGWI and AWRI, submitted that growers and winemakers of different sizes justifiably use different types of equipment to measure the same parameters, with varying levels of speed and sophistication. These stakeholders raised concerns about the cost of converting to standardised measuring equipment, noting that different types of equipment are appropriate for smaller or larger scale operations.

The AWRI suggested that an alternative approach to making pattern approvals for equipment, which could be audited by the NMI, would be to clearly define the analytes (chemical components) to be measured in quality assessments and the reference methods for measuring the analytes. Under this approach, winemakers wanting to use a method that is different to the reference method (a secondary method) would need to be able to show that their method meets a particular level of precision and accuracy that has also been defined.

The approach suggested by the AWRI is consistent with the intent of the ACCC’s recommendation. The recommendation is designed to increase grower confidence in testing by establishing clear requirements for testing methods, calibration and use of equipment.

The AWRI also submitted that an agreed and efficient mechanism should be established to evolve the process as new technologies or analytes emerge. The ACCC recommends that the system be reviewed periodically according to a timeframe established in advance.

The ACCC would expect the AWRI to consult with the NMI and relevant parties including growers, winemakers and academic researchers to develop appropriate standards.

Some growers suggested that other types of measurements should be covered by the recommendation in addition to sugar and colour levels. The ACCC suggests that standardisation of sugar and colour measurements be prioritised initially because sugar measurements are most widely used and growers have expressed high levels of concern about colour measurements. However, we recommend that other types of measurements be considered for standardisation in the future.
Box 3.3: National Measurement Institute and legislation

Growers have raised concerns that colour measurement using spectrophotometry or near infra-red spectroscopy is in breach of the legislation and regulations administered by the National Measurement Institute (NMI), Australia’s peak measurement body, because the equipment used is not standardised or formally verified.

The NMI has confirmed to the ACCC that there is no registered standard for wine grape sugar or colour level measurements, consequently, it cannot assess instruments to verify that they will operate appropriately. The measurement legislation does, however, broadly require all measurements to be accurate.

3.4.7 Growers have raised concerns about assessment of vineyard attributes

Some major winemakers assess vineyard attributes such as canopy density and vine layout in a way that can affect payment. Growers have disputed the relevance of these attributes to the quality of the final product.

Academic literature is not conclusive regarding the relationship between vineyard specifications and the quality of the resulting wine. One study suggests that features like leaf health, fruit distribution and berry size can be significant indicators of other characteristics.

There is an element of subjectivity in many types of vineyard attribute assessment, and therefore reliance on such assessments to determine price should be minimised. However, the ACCC considers the use of such assessments is a commercial decision for the winemaker, providing that:

- the specifications that impact on price/rejections are transparent from the time the supply agreement is entered into
- as far as possible, the specifications are transparently, accurately and objectively applied.

3.5 Winemakers control timing of quality assessment and harvest

3.5.1 Winemakers have discretion over the timing of harvest

The timing of the harvest of wine grapes is one of the most important factors influencing grape quality and the prices received by growers.

Harvest dates are generally determined by winemakers at their absolute discretion. This is based on assessments of maturity submitted by growers or field officers, as well as the winemaker’s capacity to receive the grapes. Winemakers are in a better position than growers to consider the ripeness of all of the grapes they are purchasing, and their processing capacities.

Although some winemakers consult growers on the harvest schedule, growers usually have little or no ability to influence or dispute their allocated harvest booking time. As a result, growers with initially similar quality grapes could receive significantly different payments because of scheduling decisions made by the winemaker.

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145 This legislation includes the: National Measurement Act 1960 (Cth), National Measurement Regulations 1999 (Cth) and the National Trade Measurement Regulations 2009 (Cth).
146 RG Dambergs, pp. 16–7.
147 P Dry, M Longbottom and M Essling, p. 9, notes, for example, that bunch clumping is regarded as a negative characteristic in many assessment schemes, but does not appear to be quantified.
3.5.2 Growers bear risk associated with the timing of harvest

Growers’ lack of control over the timing of harvest exposes them to the risk that their profit will be reduced, as they:

- cannot ensure their grapes will be assessed and weighed when they are at, or close to, their most profitable condition. Some grapes may be at their peak for as little as a few days. All grapes within the same region tend to mature around the same time, and harvest has recently become compressed in some regions because of changes in climate.\(^{149}\)

- bear the risk of a weather event damaging the crop in the lead up to harvest, but are unable to manage this risk through discretion over harvest timing. Even if final assessment occurs in the vineyard, winemakers reserve the right to reassess if there is a major event before harvest, such as heavy rainfall or high temperatures.

- are unable to prevent harvest from occurring late in the season, when the grapes can become dehydrated. In some cases, the grapes can lose up to 30 per cent of their volume.\(^{150}\) Consequently, harvesting late in the season can result in the grower losing revenue because grapes are sold by weight.

Due to capacity limitations, some winemakers face significant constraints in scheduling harvest because they must stagger deliveries to reduce bottlenecks within the winery. Consequently, they are usually unable to receive all grapes at the time they are at optimum quality.

Mechanical breakdowns or other delays in the winemaker’s receive process can also necessitate harvest delays for some growers. Winemakers lack incentives to improve their intake capacities because growers bear the loss of profits caused by the lower yields associated with late harvests.

Winemakers submitted that they seek to schedule harvest times to ensure sugar levels are within an optimum range. They have an interest in harvesting grapes in optimal condition to fulfill their product requirements, and some winemakers have addressed significant delays by diverting grapes to alternative facilities to prevent spoilage.

The incentive for winemakers to prioritise harvest timing for growers is also reduced to the extent they are able to ‘correct’ quality problems with over-ripened grapes, such as by adding water (see box 3.4). The ACCC understands that research into the effect of adding water to wine has so far been limited and is ongoing\(^{151}\), and that risks associated with the addition of water include the possibility of taints, salts and dilution of flavour, acidity and nutrients.\(^{152}\) Winemakers have submitted that excessively high sugar levels cannot be corrected by adding water, except for wine of an extremely low quality.

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\(^{149}\) See Wine Australia, Managing the impact of vintage advancement and compression, Wine Australia, Adelaide, 2019, [https://www.wineaustralia.com/research/strategy-4-improving-resource-management/climate-adaptability/awri-1701-4-1-1].


\(^{151}\) J Schremmer, ‘Climate change ‘creeping up’ on winemakers and putting pressure on grapes, says scientist’, ABC, 22 November 2018, [https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-22/climate-change-creeping-up-on-winemakers/10519206].

Box 3.4: Changes to the Food Standards Code

A recent change to the Food Standards Australia and New Zealand Code (Food Standards Code) has allowed a limited amount of water to be added to wine from 2018. This was designed to help winemakers through shorter, warmer seasons that produce grapes with higher sugar content, to reduce the chance of problems arising during fermentation.\textsuperscript{155}

Growers have argued that this incentivises winemakers to delay harvest timing and allow the grapes to dehydrate, resulting in lower weights and therefore lower payments to growers. Grower representatives noted in the media in 2018 that growers considered that their grapes were left to hang on vines for longer than normal and felt the system was being abused. One grower said they were told to wait to pick until the sugar level was extremely high because 'the flavours weren’t there'.\textsuperscript{154} Growers disagreed with statements from winemakers that the delay was because of a heatwave.

Winemakers have publicly denied delaying harvest with the intention of adding water later.\textsuperscript{155} One winemaker described the practice to the ACCC as ‘unethical’ and emphasised that it would damage the winemaker’s relationship with its growers. Winemaker representatives submitted to the ACCC that it is not a common or prevalent practice.

Under most supply agreements, growers can be penalised for sugar levels not meeting minimum thresholds, but are not rewarded for exceeding them. Some growers have suggested they should receive a bonus payment if their grapes reach high sugar levels, to compensate for lost volume and incentivise winemakers to harvest on time.

Winemakers have reported that some growers have attempted to mitigate the risk of late harvest by overstating the ripeness of the grapes to the winemaker. These winemakers submit that these growers preferred to risk being penalised for sugar levels being too low, instead of risking significant losses in volume because of the sugar level being too high. This has led to the harvest of unripe grapes by some growers and delay in harvesting ripe grapes by other growers.

The ACCC considers that clear communication and transparency around harvest timing is critical to maintaining trust between growers and winemakers.

\textsuperscript{153} AWRI, \textit{Winemaking Treatment—Water Addition}, A Laskie.
\textsuperscript{154} A Laskie.
\textsuperscript{155} Pernod Ricard Winemakers and Accolade wines in A Laskie.
4. Pricing

Key points

- Winemakers use a range of measures to estimate the volume of grapes they need to meet expected demand and to inform their strategy for pricing and buying grapes.

- The major influences on warm climate grape prices are bulk wine export prices and local harvest conditions.

- Supply agreements can be fixed price, variable price or spot price. The most widely used are variable price terms where the winemaker sets the price close to harvest, often by reference to a ‘fair market price’. Prices offered under ‘fair market price’ terms are not benchmarked against any visible, objective or verifiable measures.

- Signatories to the Australian Wine Industry Code of Conduct (Code) are required to provide an indicative price to growers before the final price is released. Growers and winemakers have raised concerns about how this operates in practice.

- After considering feedback received in response to the Interim Report, the ACCC recommends that the indicative price scheme be discontinued, and that instead, warm climate grower representative groups periodically provide market information to growers.

- Growers do not have access to reliable grape price information (especially individual winemaker indicative or final prices). The ACCC recommends that Wine Australia receive and publish information about final prices paid for grapes in the warm climate regions.

This chapter discusses how winemakers make grape pricing decisions, pricing mechanisms used in grape supply agreements, and factors influencing the prices received by growers. In the context of price transparency, we also consider how winemakers in warm climate regions inform growers of their prices.

Price transparency is important for market efficiency. It allows growers to make informed decisions using accurate information (including decisions about inputs and who to supply). Growers can currently access publicly available aggregated market information but not specific purchase prices offered by individual winemakers, or easily understandable information about future price trends for particular varieties in their region.

Figure 4.1 provides an overview of the current timing of major price notifications, which are discussed in this chapter, in the context of major production, contracting and payment dates for each season.

**Figure 4.1: Key price notification, production, contracting and payment dates for each season**

- Winter dormancy, Irrigation, spraying, fertilisation, pruning
- Budburst, flowering, grapes grow. Spraying, trimming, watering.
- Ripening and harvest.

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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Jan, Feb, Mar</td>
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- Annual/multi year agreements are entered any time before harvest. This is often soon after a previous harvest. If this has not occurred, the grapes can be sold on the ‘spot market’ close to harvest for a fixed price.

- For grapes under variable price agreements, winemakers communicate indicative prices by 15 December and final prices close to harvest in the warm climate regions under the Code.

- Under the Code and in SA there are three deadlines for payment:
  - 1/3 by the end of the month following harvest
  - 1/3 by 30 June
  - 1/3 by 30 September.

Some growers wait even longer for their payments.
4.1 Winemaker pricing decisions are based on market forecasts

Winemakers forecast the volume of wine they expect to sell at a range of price points. These forecasts influence their purchase decisions for different varieties and qualities of grapes.

4.1.1 Winemakers forecast demand for their end products

The largest winemakers have devoted teams, processes and software for demand planning in key sales regions.

Winemakers consider the following factors in forecasting demand:

- *For winemakers that export into overseas markets:* changes in international bulk and bottled wine prices, foreign exchange rates, and geopolitical influences.

- *For winemakers that wholesale into the domestic market:* sales trends, competitor activity and customer decisions.

Most winemakers maintain long-term (three to five years) and short-term (12 months) demand forecasts for their individual product lines.

4.1.2 Winemakers forecast grape requirements

Winemakers use forecast end product demand as a basis to plan grape requirements. To meet forecast demand for grapes, winemakers create plans that specify the volume of grapes (by grade, variety and region) they require.

Winemakers seek to buy the grapes they require at prices that enable them to maximise their profits. When considering the lowest price they can pay for a particular batch of grapes, winemakers consider a range of factors including:

- *The level of competition for the grapes:* winemakers may pay higher prices if they believe growers would otherwise sell the grapes elsewhere (where growers have not pre-sold their grapes under an annual or multi-year supply agreement), or if growers are able to successfully negotiate or dispute the initial price offer.

- *The quality and condition of the grapes:* quality assessment processes can lead to price variations as discussed in chapter 3.

- *Other features of the supply arrangement:* for example, a winemaker purchasing grapes on a multi-year fixed price agreement may offer a conservative price to shield itself from the risk of adverse market changes. The various pricing mechanisms used by winemakers are discussed in section 4.3.

- *Previous prices and local pricing trends:* winemakers commonly refer to the annual Wine Australia National Vintage Report from previous years to predict prices for the upcoming harvest.\(^{156}\)

Winemakers have a number of options if they forecast excess demand:

- If the shortfall is identified well before harvest, they may approach existing or new growers to purchase additional volumes on multi-year or annual supply agreements.

- If the shortfall is identified immediately before or during harvest, they may attempt to purchase grapes in the spot market or purchase grapes, must or juice from other winemakers.

- If a shortfall is identified after harvest, they may purchase bulk wine from other winemakers.

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\(^{156}\) The Wine Australia *National Vintage report* describes the volumes crushed and prices paid by variety in each region in the previous harvest.
Winemakers may also use existing inventory of wine from previous years to alleviate a shortfall in production. Their ability to do this is limited by labelling restrictions that require at least 85 per cent of wine labelled with a certain year to be sourced from grapes harvested in that year.\textsuperscript{157}

Where winemakers forecast excess supply for a particular season, they may attempt to resell grapes, must or juice on the spot market, sell excess bulk wine to other winemakers or store excess production for subsequent years.

\subsection*{4.1.3 Winemakers do not generally consider transaction size when determining prices}

Winemakers do not appear to consider transaction size as a determinant of the price they will pay for a particular batch of grapes. As shown in figure 4.2 below, growers selling large volumes of grapes generally receive the same or similar prices as growers selling small volumes. This suggests that larger scale growers do not have better bargaining power than smaller scale growers.\textsuperscript{158}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Winemakers may also use existing inventory of wine from previous years to alleviate a shortfall in production. Their ability to do this is limited by labelling restrictions that require at least 85 per cent of wine labelled with a certain year to be sourced from grapes harvested in that year.\textsuperscript{157}
  \item Where winemakers forecast excess supply for a particular season, they may attempt to resell grapes, must or juice on the spot market, sell excess bulk wine to other winemakers or store excess production for subsequent years.
  \item Winemakers do not generally consider transaction size when determining prices
  \begin{itemize}
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  \end{itemize}
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{157} Wine Australia Regulations 2018 (Cth), reg. 27.
\textsuperscript{158} See chapter 5 for discussion of bargaining power imbalances between growers and winemakers.
Figure 4.2: Dispersion of warm climate grape prices by size of transaction, 2018 harvest

Source: ACCC analysis of industry-supplied data.159

159 The charts exclude transactions below $200 or above $800 per tonne, and above 4000 tonnes.
4.2 Large scale factors affect supply and demand

Australian grape prices are largely determined by conditions in international markets which drive demand, and seasonal factors in domestic markets which affect supply.

4.2.1 Global market conditions drive demand for Australian grapes

International supply and demand conditions largely determine the prices for Australian wine exports, and therefore have a strong impact on grape prices. In contrast, Australian wine consumption is fairly stable. Despite a steady increase in imports, domestic demand is relatively stable and is not subject to significant swings.

According to the International Organisation of Vine and Wine, Australian wine exports accounted for eight per cent of the global market by volume in 2017. The international wine trade is dominated by Spain, Italy and France, which together account for over 55 per cent of global market volumes. Significant volumes of wine are also exported by Chile, South Africa, Germany and the United States.

Harvest results in these countries affect the amount of wine available on the global market and, in turn, impact the prices that international wholesalers are willing to pay for Australian wine. The impact is particularly strong for commercial wine that is not defined by reference to its geographical origin, because this wine is easily substitutable for wine from other countries.

Direct changes in the level of export demand also influence Australian grape prices. For example, the global financial crisis in 2008 reduced worldwide demand for wine and resulted in a significant decline in wine export prices and grape prices (see figure 4.4 below).

Since 1997, the average Australian wine export price has been strongly negatively correlated with the exchange rate, with a weaker US dollar (and a relatively stronger Australian dollar) tending to coincide with lower export prices in Australian dollars (see figure 4.3).

161 ibid.
162 ibid.
Figure 4.3: Exchange rate USD to AUD compared to export price 1997–2018

Source: Anderson 2015 and various Wine Australia publications.

In turn, the wine export price is strongly correlated with average grape prices (see figures 4.4 and 4.5).

**Figure 4.4: Wine export prices compared to average grape prices 1985–2018**

![Graph showing correlation between wine export prices and average grape prices 1985–2018.](image)

Source: Anderson 2015 and various Wine Australia publications.\(^\text{164}\)

**Figure 4.5: Bulk wine export prices compared to average warm climate grape prices 2008–2018**

![Graph showing bulk wine export prices compared to average warm climate grape prices 2008–2018.](image)

Source: ACCC analysis of Wine Australia data.

These correlations support feedback from winemakers and growers that the export bulk wine price is the most significant factor influencing warm climate grape prices.

### 4.2.2 Domestic and seasonal factors influence the supply of grapes

The availability of grapes by volume, region, quality and variety strongly influences prices. Grape availability can be affected by a range of factors, including the prevalence of different varieties and the responsiveness of the industry to demand trends, weather and climate conditions.

Seasonal deviations from expected harvest yields can impact the level of market supply and the amount of inventory held by winemakers. This, in turn, influences grape prices.

\(^{164}\) Anderson, tables 15, 37, Wine Australia, Australian wine exports see rise in volume and value in 2014, Wine Australia, Australian wine exports jump 14 per cent to $2.1 billion, Wine Australia, 2017: A record-breaking year for Australian wine exports, Wine Australia, Figures show continuing strong international demand for fine Australian wine.
4.3 Pricing mechanisms in grape supply agreements

Under most grape supply agreements, the winemaker sets prices for each variety of grapes on a per tonne basis.

The set price in a given region for each grape variety may be the same, or it may vary.\(^{165}\) However, price variation is more common in cool climate regions.

The three main pricing mechanisms used in transactions between winemakers and growers are variable price, fixed price and spot price terms.

4.3.1 Variable price mechanism

The ACCC understands that variable price agreements are the most widespread pricing mechanism in warm climate regions. Under these agreements, the grower agrees in advance to supply a specified tonnage of grapes to the winemaker, at a price to be determined by the winemaker close to harvest, for one or more years.

The price is generally set by the winemaker. It is often defined in the agreement as a ‘fair market price’. However, it is not determined by reference to any specified source of information, and is generally taken to mean a price that the winemaker considers reflects the market value of the grapes. In this sense, the grower is a price taker. However, in some instances, growers can dispute the winemaker’s determination, as described in section 4.4.3.

Compared to growers on fixed price agreements, growers supplying under variable price agreements have less price certainty throughout the life of the agreement.

4.3.2 Fixed price mechanism

Under fixed price supply agreements, prices are determined upfront at the formation of the supply agreement. Compared to other pricing mechanisms, fixed price terms give growers and winemakers greater price certainty when entering into the agreement.

However, parties to multi-year fixed price agreements carry the risk that the agreed price will significantly differ from the market price, especially when market conditions are changing quickly. To alleviate this risk, at least one major winemaker uses agreements that apply a fixed price mechanism for a specified number of years and then revert to a variable price mechanism for the subsequent years of the agreement term.

4.3.3 Spot market price mechanism

The Code defines spot market agreements as those entered into less than 10 business days before harvest. Prices under spot market agreements are determined a short time before harvest, at the time the agreement is entered into.

Spot market growers are subject to the same price uncertainty faced by growers on variable price agreements. Spot market growers carry the risk of not finding a buyer for their grapes, but they are sometimes able to secure higher prices than those offered under annual or multi-year contracts, depending on market conditions.

4.4 Existing price notification practices vary significantly

There are various ways that winemakers notify growers of potential and actual prices, particularly under variable price agreements.

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\(^{165}\) ‘Price offered’ is distinct from the quality-adjusted price paid to each grower.
Price notification practices differ most between winemakers who are signatories to the Code and those who are not. For winemakers who are not signatories, price notification practices can also differ significantly from winemaker to winemaker, and region to region.

4.4.1 Price notification procedures outside the Code vary significantly

Major winemakers who are not signatories to the Code submitted that they use a number of practices including:

- notifying growers of final prices by 30 January each year
- holding meetings with growers in the period after harvest and providing feedback on market conditions and the potential impact on prices for the coming season
- releasing a price list three quarters of the way through the growing season
- not offering variable price agreements, and instead providing prices up front as part of a fixed price multi-year agreement.

4.4.2 Price notification procedures under the Code are more standardised

Winemakers who are signatories to the Code notify growers of prices using the procedure outlined in the Code. In addition, some signatories provide more detailed or earlier price information to growers than the Code requires.

The price notification procedure outlined in the Code only applies to agreements that require ‘a price offer or a negotiation as part of the calculation of the price’.

As discussed in sections 5.1 and 4.3.1, these types of agreements (variable price agreements) are widespread in warm climate regions. At least one signatory to the Code mostly uses multi-year fixed price agreements and therefore is not obligated to provide indicative prices for those agreements.

Indicative price notifications are not binding

For variable price agreements, the Code requires signatories to notify growers of an ‘Indicative Regional Price’ (commonly known as an ‘indicative price’), which is defined in the Code as:

“Indicative Regional Price” means, in relation to a variety of winegrapes, an indicative fair market price for that variety of winegrapes from that region for the next vintage which:

- is not winegrape grower or vineyard specific;
- is set by the winegrape purchaser acting reasonably;
- is not an offer capable of being accepted by a winegrape grower or binding on the winegrape purchaser; and
- is not a guarantee of the final price that will be offered to the winegrape grower.

Signatories must provide indicative prices to growers in the Hunter Valley, Riverina, Murray Valley and Riverland regions by 15 December each year. For growers in other regions, signatories must use their best reasonable endeavours to provide indicative prices by 15 January each year. If a grape supply agreement is entered after the relevant deadline, the signatory must provide an indicative price at the time the agreement is entered into.

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166 Winemakers’ Federation of Australia (WFA) and Wine Grape Growers Australia (WGGA), Australian Wine Industry Code of Conduct, 2014 (Code), cl. 2.4.1.
167 ibid, appendix 1.
168 ibid, cl. 2.4.1.
169 ibid.
Winemakers provide indicative prices directly to individual contracted growers through email, mail, phone or Grapeweb.\textsuperscript{170} Winemakers do not publish their indicative prices, and typically require growers to treat the prices confidentially. This makes it difficult for growers to gain an accurate understanding of market prices. However, despite the confidentiality requirements, Australian Vignerons and the Winemakers’ Federation of Australia (WFA) submitted that there is a tendency for pricing information to quickly become common knowledge.

Some winemakers have indicated that they also engage in informal conversations with individual growers throughout the growing season about prices.

Indicative prices are not a guarantee of the final price and are not binding.\textsuperscript{171} As such, they are generally not subject to formal negotiation, and cannot be disputed under the dispute resolution sections of the Code.\textsuperscript{172} The ACCC has found that final prices are usually similar to indicative prices, as detailed in section 4.5.4.

### Final price notifications occur close to harvest

Signatories to the Code must make a final price offer:

- as soon as practicable and, at the latest, before the anticipated harvest date for the grapes (if the signatory undertakes a pre-harvest vineyard inspection before making a final offer)
- at least 10 business days before the anticipated harvest date for the grapes (if the signatory does not undertake a pre-harvest inspection before making a final offer).\textsuperscript{173}

The ACCC is aware of one large Code signatory that commits to providing a final price offer to growers at least five business days before harvest is expected to commence. Other Code signatories have indicated that they provide price information within the deadlines outlined in the Code.

#### 4.4.3 The Code provides for a dispute resolution process for final prices

The Code contains a price dispute resolution procedure that growers can use to challenge a signatory’s final price, but not its indicative price. As a result, price disputes under the Code generally take place close to harvest, after the final price has been released. Growers have said they lack the time to resolve disputes during harvest, and this restricts the usefulness of the dispute resolution process.

Despite this, one winemaker provided an example of a dispute over the indicative price that involved use of the preliminary dispute resolution steps outlined in the Code. The dispute resulted in a higher final price being agreed upon by the parties.

The dispute resolution procedure under the Code is discussed in more detail in chapter 7.

#### 4.5 Industry has concerns about the utility of indicative pricing

The indicative price requirement was intended to assist growers in managing inputs prior to harvest and aid the search for alternative buyers.

However, it is commonly agreed within the industry that the indicative price requirement has been unpopular among many winemakers and growers. WFA submitted that the indicative price provision is a key obstacle preventing more winemakers from signing the Code. In 2014, the Code Management Committee (Code Committee) described the indicative price provisions as a ‘major disincentive’ to winemakers considering signing the Code.\textsuperscript{174}

\textsuperscript{170} Grapeweb is an online system used by winemakers and growers to communicate and organise grape production information.

\textsuperscript{171} Code, appendix 1.

\textsuperscript{172} ibid, pt. 3.

\textsuperscript{173} ibid, cl. 2.4.2.

This is consistent with feedback that some non-signatory winemakers and growers provided to the ACCC. Australian Vignerons questioned whether the benefits of indicative pricing outweigh the risks, noting that it is not a binding price offer, and Murray Valley Winegrowers (MVW) submitted that it does ‘more harm than good’. One winemaker submitted it would support removing the indicative price provisions from the Code.

Key concerns that have been raised about indicative pricing are that it:

- may have the effect of anchoring artificially low prices or facilitating price signalling
- occurs at an inappropriate time for both growers and winemakers
- deters some winemakers from signing the Code.

### 4.5.1 Some stakeholders suggested that indicative pricing encourages price signalling

Growers have expressed concern that indicative prices set a conservative benchmark that leads to lower final prices.  

In 2014, the Code Committee reported that grower representatives believed indicative price provisions had ‘encouraged lower across-the-board prices’. Similarly, CCW Co-Operative Limited submitted that the indicative price requirement is counterproductive for its negotiations with Accolade because it creates a lower starting point for negotiations.

Australian Vignerons submitted that indicative pricing sets a base or minimum price point that other buyers use as a reference. WFA submitted that indicative prices generally become a minimum price for the particular season. Winemakers acknowledged growers’ concerns about price leading in the Code Committee’s annual report in 2014.

WFA has expressed concern that by releasing indicative price information, signatories to the Code would be at risk of inadvertently engaging in anti-competitive concerted practices (as described in box 4.1).

The ACCC considers that indicative pricing increases the risk that final prices will be overly conservative. However, without more evidence, the confidential sharing of estimated price information between a winemaker and a grower is not likely to be an anti-competitive concerted practice within the meaning of subsection 45(1) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA). The current practice of winemakers confidentially providing indicative pricing to growers is for the purpose of assisting their negotiations, and does not involve engagement between multiple winemakers who could act in concert to manipulate prices.

We do not consider that this practice is likely to have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition because the information is provided directly to individual growers for the purpose of informing the grower of likely prices.

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177 ibid, p. 8.
Box 4.1: Anti-competitive concerted practices

From November 2017, subsection 45(1)(c) of the CCA provides that a person must not engage with one or more persons in a concerted practice that has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition.

The concept of a ‘concerted practice’ involves communication or cooperative behaviour that does not require all of the elements of an understanding but involves more than a person independently responding to market conditions.

A concerted practice will contravene section 45 of the CCA if it has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition. A business is at risk of engaging in an anti-competitive concerted practice if it replaces or reduces competitive, independent decision making by cooperating with its competitors regarding business decisions such as how it determines the price for its products.

4.5.2 Winemakers raised concerns that indicative pricing encourages sharing of confidential information

WFA submitted that growers generally share indicative prices with other growers and feed the information back to winemakers during price negotiations. WFA expressed concern that growers or grower representative groups may be engaging in anti-competitive concerted practices by sharing, or facilitating the sharing, of confidential indicative price information.

The ACCC has considered these concerns, and has concluded that the sharing of indicative price information by growers in this way is unlikely to be an anti-competitive concerted practice because it does not appear to have the purpose, and does not appear to have and is not likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition in a market.

The sharing of price information among individual growers is unlikely to have any substantial effect on competition for the following reasons:

- In contrast to a situation where growers have no pricing information, the sharing of information allows growers to gain some understanding of demand and the prices winemakers may be willing to pay for grapes. This assists, to a limited extent, to address information asymmetries that cause bargaining power imbalances between growers and winemakers. The sharing of price information between growers is more likely to be pro-competitive.

- The vast majority of these growers operate under multi-year agreements and have no option to exercise bargaining power by refusing to supply. Accordingly, growers cannot realistically act in a coordinated or cooperative manner by refusing to accept lower prices as they are contractually bound to supply regardless of the price they are paid.

For similar reasons, widespread sharing of price information by grape grower associations amongst members is also unlikely to substantially lessen competition. Rather, it is likely to increase competition to the extent it improves growers’ ability to negotiate with buyers and provides incentives for winemakers to respond competitively to rivals’ price offers.

4.5.3 The timing of indicative price notifications is problematic

The timing of the release of indicative prices is the result of a compromise between growers and winemakers during negotiation of the Code.178

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Grower representatives have suggested that indicative pricing should occur earlier in the year to better support grower decision making.\(^\text{179}\) For example:

- Australian Vignerons submitted that, in practice, the indicative price requirement does not allow growers enough time to adjust their inputs or search for alternative buyers. Australian Vignerons submitted that growers have committed almost all of their annual discretionary expenditure (except late irrigation, freight and harvest costs) by the time indicative prices are notified.

- MVW submitted that most costs, including labour, water, fertiliser and pest and disease prevention, are incurred before growers are notified of indicative prices. MVW submitted that the majority of growers’ spending for the season occurs from June to November.

- In 2010, the NSW Standing Committee on State Development recommended that the Wine Grapes Marketing Board (Reconstitution) Act 2003 be amended to require winemakers to publish indicative prices by 30 June (the middle of the pruning period) each year, with effective safeguards to ensure the system provides an accurate source of information to growers.\(^\text{180}\) This recommendation was not adopted.

One winemaker acknowledged that some growers find the timing too late to react with vineyard inputs or viticulture interventions.

However, at least one winemaker submitted that earlier price information would be more conservative and less accurate. A non-signatory to the Code said that even the current timeframe can limit a winemaker’s ability to account for agricultural risk and can send incorrect signals to the market. A signatory to the Code submitted that 15 December each year is already too early for winemakers to gauge relevant factors like actual yields and quality.

Similarly, WFA submitted that it is difficult for winemakers to know in December what their eventual production mix will be, how much wine they will sell, and at what prices. Therefore, it is difficult to provide an accurate picture of the price that will be offered at harvest.

There is a conflict between the interests of winemakers and growers in relation to the timing of the release of pricing information.

### 4.5.4 Final prices are often very similar to indicative prices

The ACCC obtained data on indicative and final prices offered to warm climate growers in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 in order to understand the relationship between indicative and final prices. It was difficult to obtain comprehensive data. Almost all of the records that we were able to analyse relate to the Riverland, and most of the transactions relate to 2015, 2017 and 2018, with very few transactions in 2016.

On the basis of this data, we found that final prices are likely to be higher than indicative prices (see figure 4.6). This is consistent with industry feedback.

The data indicates that final prices are sometimes lower than indicative prices. However, a reason why some final prices paid are lower than indicative prices could be that price penalties associated with quality assessments have been applied to particular batches of grapes. To the extent this explains lower final price outcomes, it supports the broad views of both winemakers and growers that indicative prices tend to reflect conservative estimates of non-quality adjusted final prices.


\(^\text{180}\) NSW Standing Committee on State Development, paras. 5.21-2, recommendations 3 and 4.
In addition, the ACCC found that indicative prices offered by different winemakers are typically similar to final prices for a given variety (figures 4.7 and 4.8).
4.5.5 Industry has not agreed on a settled approach to price transparency

Despite acknowledging the benefits of increased price transparency, reviews of the indicative price provision in the Code have found that it has resulted in unintended consequences. The Code Committee has undertaken a review of the indicative price provision several times. Recent Code Committee annual reports note that indicative pricing remains a contentious and complicated issue.\(^{181}\)

Price transparency measures outside of the Code have been used with varying levels of success. For several years in NSW the *Wine Grapes Marketing Board (Reconstitution) Act 2003* required winemakers to provide a schedule of indicative prices to the RWGMB by 30 January each year. The requirement

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was removed in 2007 with the support of RWGMB and local winemakers. The requirement had proved unworkable because winemakers provided very low prices that did not reflect real market conditions.182

4.6 **Grape pricing is not transparent and should be improved**

Insufficient price transparency in the warm climate regions is likely to distort the competitive process, impede efficient and responsive grape and wine production, and result in a misallocation of resources. The ACCC made two interim recommendations to improve price transparency in warm climate regions. As a result of further consultation and analysis, we have amended the recommendations, as outlined below.

4.6.1 **Price transparency is beneficial for the industry**

The ACCC considers that increased price transparency in the warm climate grape markets will lead to significant benefits, not only for growers, but for the entire supply chain.

**Price transparency can inform production decisions**

Price information helps markets operate efficiently by providing signals as to the highest-value allocation of resources. With more relevant and accurate price information, businesses can make better production, investment, risk management and contracting decisions. Without it, businesses are less able to make sound decisions and may forgo investments that would have benefitted themselves and the industry.

If businesses are better informed when making business decisions, the grape and wine industries can be more responsive to market trends and more resilient to cyclical downturns, resulting in improved welfare for growers, winemakers and consumers. The soundness of growers’ decisions becomes increasingly important when confronting difficulties relating to input prices, water scarcity and changes in climate.

For pricing information to be useful for making production decisions, it must be timely, forward-looking and relevant to particular regions and varieties. Growers have indicated that most of their production costs are incurred before December. Major cost events include pruning in July and fertilising, chemical application and irrigation starting in September. Market information is most useful for decision-making if it is available before major decision points, with continued updates during the growing season.

**Price transparency can encourage competition and promote efficiency**

The ACCC found that, together with barriers to switching, insufficient transparency over individual winemaker prices impedes competition between winemakers in the warm climate grape markets, and limits incentives to innovate and increase efficiency.

When growers can compare accurate and relevant pricing information from multiple winemakers, they can determine which winemaker is likely to provide the best price. They can use this information to negotiate with winemakers for better terms or decide to sell to a different winemaker. This ensures that winemakers compete effectively for grapes and rewards the most efficient winemakers with higher grape sales.

Increased efficiency is especially important in a period where economic and climate conditions are uncertain and where the Australian wine industry has looked towards higher quality and product differentiation to compete against lower cost countries. Effective competition in grape markets can lead to more competitive grape pricing, more efficient use of natural resources, and higher grape and wine quality, thereby benefitting consumers and the industry overall.

**Price transparency can help growers dispute current season prices**

The ACCC has found that warm climate growers on variable price terms face multiple difficulties to negotiating current season prices.

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182 NSW Standing Committee on State Development, para. 5.16.
There is little incentive within a supply agreement term for winemakers to set a competitive price or respond to their rivals’ prices with a more competitive price (see section 6.4).

Growers’ key source of price information is through word-of-mouth, rather than through a reliable and representative indication of prices in the market. Despite this, some growers have submitted that winemakers have, at times, revised prices based on word-of-mouth information provided by growers.

Growers usually rely on winemakers’ discretion to set a competitive price. Many winemakers commit to providing ‘fair market prices’. However, as there is no external measurable benchmark to refer to, growers do not have a transparent basis to determine whether their price is a ‘fair market price’ (see subsection 4.3.1).

Increased price transparency over individual winemaker prices can alleviate some of these difficulties and lead to fairer and more transparent outcomes. It can increase incentives for price competition and provide high quality information to support price negotiations or disputes.

4.6.2 There is a lack of price transparency in warm climate grape markets

Wine market information is not easily useable

Growers can access information about global trends published by wine brokers and trading platforms such as Ciatti and VINEX. This information generally relates to current conditions in wine markets, although a small amount of information about grape transactions has recently become available on VINEX.183

Information about current conditions in wine markets does not provide a direct basis for assessing current domestic grape prices because current grape prices depend on expected future wine market conditions. Future wine market conditions depend on a broad range of factors that include global wine inventory levels and harvest sizes, local regional grape and wine production trends, and movements in consumer trends.

Growers generally lack the resources and necessary visibility over sales channels to determine how these factors are likely to influence future wine prices, and in turn, how future wine prices are likely to affect the prices they receive for their grapes.

In contrast, winemakers are generally better positioned to independently assess how future market conditions relevant to their product mixes will affect their demand for grapes. Many winemakers regularly make this assessment through their demand planning processes (see section 4.1).

Growers do not necessarily have good visibility over how general market trends will affect the prices that an individual winemaker will offer. Although price dispersion is generally lower in the warm climate regions than in cool climate regions, there is a degree of price dispersion in warm climate regions, particularly for some varieties. Stakeholders submitted that in some cases, a winemakers’ unique product mix and sales channels may cause them to offer lower or higher prices than expected.

Some winemakers provide growers with information about how market conditions will affect their prices. However, growers have suggested that winemakers have an incentive to present information that supports lower prices, so there is a lack of trust in this information.

Some grower representative bodies assist with distributing and interpreting market information. The Inland Wine Regions Alliance has given presentations to its members as to how it perceives future grape prices will be affected by global and domestic market conditions. Other warm climate grower bodies have also indicated that they provide various types of market information to growers. However, the provision of information appears to occur in a relatively ad hoc way, rather than in a structured and regular format.

Major pricing information is aggregated and retrospective

Growers have access to the National Vintage Report and Price Dispersion Report, which are published annually by Wine Australia, usually in July or August. The reports are a major source of grape pricing data and are useful to assess the broader industry. However, the reports have shortcomings in terms of useability and usefulness for growers.

The reports aggregate pricing information, so growers cannot distinguish between individual winemakers on the basis of prices paid or tonnages acquired. As a result, growers have limited means of comparing the past performance of particular winemakers, as an indication of future performance.

The reports rely on data provided voluntarily by winemakers which is not audited, and this has caused some stakeholders to question its accuracy. In addition, the ACCC understands that not all winemakers provide information about price adjustments (such as quality bonuses) that occur after the data is provided, distorting the results. Further, there are issues with comparability because some of the prices include freight costs while others do not.

The response rate to the survey is generally high, but is subject to variation and fell by seven per cent (from covering an estimated 92 per cent to 85 per cent of all grapes crushed) between 2015 and 2018. In 2019 the estimated response rate was 88 per cent.  

The reports are published after the deadline for price disputes under the Code. This restricts the ability of growers to refer to the reports to ensure they receive a ‘fair market price’ (see subsection 5.4.2).

As the reports provide historical information, they do not directly inform growers as to how they should apportion spending for the upcoming season. More than half of the warm climate growers who responded to the ACCC grower survey indicated that they strongly disagree that they receive pricing information early enough to make informed decisions.

Growers have limited access to price information about individual winemakers

Winemakers generally require growers to keep price information (including indicative and final prices) confidential. This creates a barrier to growers assessing the market and negotiating a higher price.

Pricing information is often shared among growers by word-of-mouth, despite winemaker confidentiality requirements. However, word-of-mouth price information is not always accurate, reliable, comparable or representative. For example, winemakers may, for valid reasons, offer different prices to different growers or patches. These nuances may not be captured by the price information shared by word-of-mouth, and winemakers are likely to recognise this when assessing prices quoted by growers in price discussions for the current season.

4.6.3 We received mixed feedback on the price transparency recommendations

The ACCC made two interim recommendations to improve price transparency in the warm climate wine grape markets:

- Interim recommendation 4 was that winemakers be required to provide indicative prices to an independent body by 8 December each year for all warm climate grapes intended to be purchased in the subsequent harvest. This body would then make all pricing information simultaneously and publicly available on 15 December each year. Winemakers would also need to provide indicative prices to their own growers on this date.

- Interim recommendation 5 was that winemakers be required to provide final prices (both non-quality adjusted and a quality adjusted weighted average price) to an independent body, which will then make that information publicly available on 1 May each year.

The ACCC sought feedback on the recommendations and received mixed responses.

**We have removed interim recommendation 4, and recommend that indicative pricing be discontinued**

The ACCC consulted extensively on recommendation 4 following the publication of the Interim Report. Most winemakers and several growers were strongly opposed to the recommendation, and to indicative pricing generally. Some growers expressed support for indicative prices, or said that the ACCC’s recommendation is an improvement on current practices, but were unable to point to a material way that indicative pricing helps with their business decisions. Stakeholders raised concerns about indicative prices including:

- Indicative prices can be arbitrary and provide low value information due to uncertainty around grape prices.
- Indicative prices have a tendency to be more conservative whenever the grape market is in oversupply, and this increases the risk of conservative final prices which have been anchored to indicative prices.
- Indicative prices are non-binding and do not help growers negotiate final prices with winemakers who they have already committed to supply.

Recommendation 4 was designed to improve on the transparency and integrity of the indicative pricing scheme under the Code, by requiring simultaneous release and publication of the prices. The recommendation was designed to improve the pricing information communicated under the scheme, while addressing the concerns outlined in section 4.5.

Following consultations on recommendation 4, the ACCC considers there is very little evidence that the indicative pricing scheme provides, or can provide, significant tangible benefits to growers or the industry. There is not enough evidence to justify the risks and burdens associated with implementing a regulatory scheme for indicative pricing, even in an improved format, for the following reasons, which we have tested in detail with stakeholders since the publication of the Interim Report:

- Growers on multi-year supply agreements cannot swap winemakers for the current season based on indicative prices, because they have already committed to supply a particular winemaker.
- Winemakers are aware that the majority of growers cannot swap in that season, which limits their incentive to negotiate with growers based on indicative prices.
- Past final prices are more helpful for growers looking to enter into a new supply agreement than past indicative prices, because they are actual prices rather than non-binding estimates.
- Indicative prices are released too late to influence major growing decisions, but moving them earlier would make them less accurate, as discussed in section 4.5.3. One grower association submitted that access to usable market information is far more useful to growers than indicative prices released in December.

In light of this, rather than attempting to improve the indicative pricing scheme to address its deficiencies, as per interim recommendation 4, the ACCC considers that the best approach would be to discontinue the indicative pricing scheme altogether.

The ACCC has removed interim recommendation 4 from this Final Report. As such, we recommend that indicative pricing practices be removed from the Code and all grape supply agreements, to address the concerns about indicative pricing that interim recommendation 4 was designed to address.

The ACCC believes the best approach to improve price transparency is through alternative mechanisms. In sections 4.6.4 and 4.6.5 we describe:

- a new recommendation designed to increase the availability of market information to inform production decisions
- refinements to interim recommendation 5, which are designed to increase transparency over final prices in a way that will encourage switching and improve price competition.
Further, as per the Code, growers should be informed of the winemaker’s final non-quality adjusted price offer as soon as practicable before the grapes are harvested.\textsuperscript{185}

The ACCC notes that the removal of indicative pricing requirements under the Code will remove one of the key impediments to greater participation to the Code. Although this is not the ACCC’s rationale for recommending that indicative pricing be discontinued, it is likely to encourage more widespread adoption of the Code.

\textbf{4.6.4 Grower associations should publish information to assist growers with production, investment and risk management decisions}

Growers require information throughout the growing season to inform production decisions about grape growing inputs, as discussed in section 4.6.1. International trends significantly influence domestic grape and wine prices, as discussed in section 4.2.1. However, recognising this relationship is not enough to directly inform growers about likely grape prices. Analysis of a wide range of factors is required, as discussed in section 4.6.2.

The ACCC recommends that warm climate grape grower representative organisations deliver accessible, relevant and timely analysis of market trends to warm climate growers. The information should inform growers’ production and risk management decisions and help them adapt to changing market conditions.

Feedback in response to the Interim Report indicated that a wide range of market information is available to assist growers, but that it is difficult and time consuming for growers to collate and interpret this information.

The ACCC considers that groups that represent growers, including the Riverina Wine Grapes Marketing Board, Murray Valley Winegrowers, Riverland Wine and the Inland Wine Regions Alliance, are well placed to provide useful information in growers’ best interests. The grower groups should collaborate as much as possible by sharing expertise and resources, although the information provided should be region-specific. Wine Australia has indicated that it would be willing to provide guidance to grower groups on providing information in the most effective way. The ACCC also recommends that Wine Australia actively engage with the grower representative organisations to provide technical guidance and support, and, if necessary, develop alternative publications tailored for a grower representative organisation’s specific needs.

The grower groups should consider the factors they see as relevant factors that will affect the price of grapes in a particular season, and the weight to be placed on each of them. For example, they should consider early market indicators, such as the harvest sizes and level of wine inventory of competing wine producing countries, and peripheral market information including supply and demand trends for certain grape varieties in different geographic indications and likely short and medium term wine export prices.

The ACCC acknowledges that some grower representative bodies already provide this service to growers to an extent, and in this regard, the ACCC’s recommendation is to extend these activities to be more regular and widely distributed.

The information should be presented in a form that is easily accessible to growers and be directly relevant to assessing expected trends in grape prices for particular varieties in particular regions.

The information should be provided regularly and in a structured way at key decision points in the grape growing process, at least three or four times a year. It should be communicated directly to grower members and made prominently accessible to growers online and upon request.

We acknowledge that regional trends are not always applicable to every winemaker because of variations in product mixes. Separately, growers and winemakers should communicate with each other as much as necessary to understand how a particular winemaker’s prices may compare to predicted market trends for the particular variety and region. Market information provided by grower groups

\textsuperscript{185} Code, cl. 2.4.2.
would better equip growers to critically assess the objectivity and quality of the information given to them by winemakers in these conversations.

4.6.5 Wine Australia should publish transaction prices to inform grower switching and improve competition in wine grape markets

As discussed in section 4.6.3, growers require information about winemakers’ price offers over a period of time to inform their switching and contact renewal decisions, and to ensure they have a basis for challenging their grape price in the event that it is not a ‘fair market price’ in a particular season. Growers can also use this information to inform their selection of grape varieties and decisions to enter or exit the market.

The ACCC recommends that final wine grape prices be published

Recommendation 6 (interim recommendation 5) is designed to better inform growers about final prices.

The ACCC recommends that, for grapes purchased from warm climate regions, wine grape buyers be required to provide pricing information to Wine Australia. Wine Australia should aggregate and publish this information by winemaker, for each variety in each warm climate region, before the end of each financial year.

This recommendation applies to all grapes bought from warm climate regions.

The ACCC recommends that:

- Wine Australia publish information about the prices paid for wine grapes by each buyer. The ACCC considers that an appropriate level of detail would be to publish, for each buyer, the median and the middle 80 per cent range (that is, the 10th and 90th percentiles) of per-tonne prices, sorted by price, for each variety in each region. For the avoidance of doubt, this would mean reporting the three price points above which 10 per cent, 50 per cent and 90 per cent of the total weight of grapes was sold.

- The recommendation applies to all businesses that buy grapes from warm climate regions, regardless of their size. However, if may be appropriate for prices for grape purchases that account for a small proportion of total purchases (such as less than 5 per cent of a particular variety in a particular region) to be reported in aggregate. It may also be appropriate to exclude uncommon grape varieties.

- Winemakers should be identified in the pricing information. This is essential to enable growers to identify which winemakers offer the most competitive prices over time. Growers can then identify and contact these winemakers to understand their supply requirements and assess their overall competitiveness, noting that historical grape prices may not always be indicative of the future grape prices a winemaker will pay.

- Going forward, historical information (such as information from the previous four years) should be published alongside the information from the current year. This will allow growers to understand longer-term trends when deciding which winemaker to supply.

- Winemakers should be required to provide, and Wine Australia should publish as part of the report each year, revised data for the previous year, based on any changes to prices that occur after the data for the previous year was initially submitted to Wine Australia. These changes may include bonus payments that had not been accounted for, or adjustments to prices based on price or quality disputes.

We suggest that the reporting be as inclusive as possible of all types of transactions, to avoid distorting incentives to engage in particular transactions and to provide as complete a picture of the market as possible. The most useful and representative way to report on transactions conducted under fixed price contracts, spot market contracts, or as the result of grapes being produced in excess of contracted requirements should be considered by Wine Australia and the industry under a separate policy process.

The ACCC recommends that there be amendments to the Code and to all variable price supply agreements, to allow growers to lodge a price dispute up to three weeks after Wine Australia publishes
the price information. This will ensure that growers can assess the competitiveness of the price they received before deciding whether to lodge a dispute under their contract or the Code.

Growers and winemakers generally agreed that the publication date proposed in the Interim Report was too early, and several alternatives were proposed. Based on this feedback, we recommend final prices be published by Wine Australia by the end of each financial year.

We consider Wine Australia to be the most appropriate body to collect and publish the pricing information. This role is similar to Wine Australia’s current activity in conducting the National Vintage Survey and producing the National Vintage Report and Price Dispersion Report, and there is potential for this function to be streamlined into that process.

We recommend that Wine Australia be given legislative powers to compel winemakers to provide price information, and to allow this information to be audited. This will increase the participation rate and increase trust in the information provided.

**This recommendation will drive greater competition, efficiency and fairness**

Increased price transparency over final prices will increase transparency over historical prices of individual winemakers to encourage switching by growers, inform disputes over variable prices and encourage winemakers to make competitive price offers. This recommendation will improve competition for grapes and grower welfare and reward innovative and efficient practices by winemakers and growers. It will also give growers the necessary information and confidence to make sound and continued investments in the industry.

**We have considered stakeholder feedback on this recommendation**

Most growers and some winemakers supported interim recommendation 5 on the basis it would improve price transparency. However, most winemakers objected to this recommendation. Winemakers were particularly concerned that the recommendation could provide too much production cost information to domestic retailers and export customers, and diminish winemakers’ bargaining power in wholesale price negotiations.

We have closely considered this feedback, and consider the benefits of the scheme outweigh the risks. This is because:

- the majority of warm climate wine production is exported to markets in which Australian winemakers are largely price takers. In bulk export markets, where most warm climate grapes are sold, Australian winemakers’ production is too small to affect the market price. Therefore, winemakers’ costs factor minimally, if at all, into the price they receive from export customers.

- the major domestic retailers source and sell a large portfolio of private label wines, so they already have close visibility over supply chain prices. This recommendation is unlikely to provide winemakers with additional information that will significantly affect their bargaining position, particularly if only the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile prices are reported for each winemaker.

- although wine grapes are a significant winemaking input, winemaking costs include a diverse range of factors other than grape purchase prices and are dependent on scale of production. Moreover, wines are often blended, sometimes from inputs of different varieties, regions and vintages. We consider that these variables limit the ability of winemakers’ domestic and international customers to determine winemaking costs from grape costs alone.

In addition, several stakeholders suggested that annual reports by Wine Australia already provide sufficient information, that the recommendation could impose an unnecessary administrative burden, and that the ACCC did not provide sufficient details of how matters such as product differentiation will be addressed.

We consider that disaggregation by winemaker, which does not occur in the reports that Wine Australia already publishes, is necessary to allow growers to compare the performance of different winemakers.

We do not believe this recommendation will impose significant administrative burdens on winemakers. There is unlikely to be an additional reporting burden for the large number of winemakers who already voluntarily participate in Wine Australia’s National Vintage Survey, because the main difference
to current practice will be in the way that Wine Australia reports the information, rather than the information that winemakers are required to provide.

Finally, we have outlined details of how we would expect the scheme to work above, noting that some additional factors would be considered as part of the policy process. The ACCC expects this recommendation to deliver significant benefits to the industry, but we recognise that measures designed to increase price transparency can carry a risk of unintended consequences. To mitigate this risk, the ACCC will monitor the effects of the implementation of these recommendations.

### 4.6.6 Recommendations 5 and 6 apply only to the warm climate regions

Recommendations 5 and 6 only relate to grapes bought from the warm climate regions. Many stakeholders submitted that the ACCC’s recommendations should apply broadly across the whole industry. The ACCC would welcome and encourage application of these recommendations to grapes bought from cool climate regions.

This market study focussed on the warm climate regions because that is where we had the greatest concerns about competition and trade practices. The ACCC’s research, analysis and risk assessment on these recommendations related to the warm climate regions.

While it is possible that the recommendations would benefit cool climate regions as well, we do not have sufficient evidence to extend these recommendations to all cool climate regions on a compulsory basis. The diversity of cool climate regions could result in unintended consequences. For example, some cool climate regions are much smaller than others, and publishing price information relating to very few transactions could disclose actual transaction information. Some cool climate regions may have higher levels of price transparency than others, and may not need intervention. Some cool climate regions have better-resourced grower representative groups than others. Given the large number and diversity of cool climate regions, applying the recommendations to cool climate growers would impose a much greater burden on the industry to produce and publish the information.

In addition, price dispersion is less significant in warm climate regions than in cool climate regions because a range of differentiated (and therefore less interchangeable) grapes is commonly grown in cool climate regions. As a result, this kind of pricing information is likely to be less helpful to most cool climate growers for understanding price competitiveness without additional information about the comparability of the grapes.
5. Contracting practices

Key points
- Grape supply agreements between growers and winemakers vary widely.
- In warm climate regions multi-year variable price written supply agreements for a maximum tonnage are the most common type of supply agreement.
- Most growers prefer the certainty of multi-year supply agreements.
- A significant number of growers do not have written supply agreements, despite their desire for certainty.
- Due to imbalances in bargaining power, growers are often unable to effectively negotiate for the removal or amendment of suboptimal terms from supply agreements. Winemakers may rely on these suboptimal terms to the detriment of growers.
- The ACCC is assessing supply agreements and may investigate winemakers whose standard form contracts contain terms that appear to be unfair terms.

The ACCC’s analysis of contracting practices focuses on grower concerns about terms that have the potential to cause an imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties to the detriment of growers. While certain concerns were commonly expressed by growers, these issues do not apply to all winemakers uniformly.

This chapter discusses:
- the types of supply agreements used in the industry
- how growers trade with winemakers
- the allocation of risk between growers and winemakers in supply agreements
- bargaining power imbalances between growers and winemakers which increase the likelihood that growers accept supply agreements with suboptimal terms
- potentially unfair contract terms
- dispute resolution mechanisms in supply agreements and under the Code.

5.1 A broad range of supply agreements are used

The ACCC consulted with 13 winemakers and over 100 growers across the Riverina, Riverland and Murray Valley regions about their contracting practices and analysed 17 standard form supply agreements used by winemakers.

Multi-year variable price supply agreements are the main type of agreement used in warm climate regions. However, a wide variety of models exist as set out below.

A number of winemakers offer a variety of supply agreement models to growers. The existence of a range of models indicates that growers in warm climate regions have some degree of choice in how they deal with winemakers.

5.1.1 Annual or multi-year variable price supply agreements are most common

Annual or multi-year supply agreements with variable prices are most common for warm climate grapes. Under these supply agreements the grower commits to supply, and the winemaker commits to purchase, a specified tonnage of grapes of a particular variety well in advance of harvest.
Growers have a secure purchaser, but take on a high degree of price risk. The price that growers receive is not determined until close to harvest, though some of these supply agreements impose limits on the amount that the price can be varied each year. This is discussed in chapter 4.

5.1.2 Annual or multi-year fixed price agreements provide greater price certainty

Some winemakers offer supply agreements that specify a set tonnage at a fixed price. Under these agreements growers are not exposed to fluctuations in demand or price for the duration of the supply agreement, but are generally unable to negotiate an increase if the market price increases above the fixed price in the supply agreement.

5.1.3 Rolling supply agreements often require long notice periods to terminate

A number of winemakers offer multi-year variable price supply agreements on a rolling basis. These supply agreements require multiple years of notice for a grower or a winemaker to terminate after the initial term has expired. These agreements typically have an initial term of three to five years.

5.1.4 Spot market agreements are entered close to harvest

Growers may wait until close to harvest before entering an agreement. By doing so they can assess price offers once market signals such as harvest size, regional quality and winemaker requirements, are relatively clear.

These supply agreements are often oral or short written agreements that set out the basic transaction details, including the tonnage and price. Quality specifications are generally less prescriptive than under annual and multi-year supply agreements. Rather, the purchaser offers a price for the ripened grapes as inspected.

5.1.5 Oral supply agreements are highly variable

The prevalence of oral supply agreements varies between winemakers and regions.

The proportion of growers supplying under these arrangements varies from winemaker to winemaker, and such agreements may be long, medium or short-term.

Some winemakers have long-term, ‘handshake’ supply agreements with growers, informing them of price and quality specifications each year. However, many growers have described having significant uncertainty about the price and quality assessment parameters, noting that these may change from year to year.

Some winemakers use oral agreements but still have written guides for growers setting out quality specifications.

5.2 Supply agreement preferences vary among growers

Growers expressed varied views about the form of supply agreements they prefer to have with winemakers and whether they prefer to supply grapes to more than one winemaker.

Aided by improved demand, growers are increasingly choosing to deal with more than one winemaker to allow for diversification of risk. Risk diversification may be achieved by selling different varieties, or grapes from different patches of land, to different winemakers. Some growers also choose to have one or more supply agreements in place for some of their production, and sell some grapes on the spot market.

Nevertheless, a significant proportion of growers expressed concern about selling grapes to more than one winemaker because of fear that they would be viewed as disloyal. In particular, they expressed reluctance to remove some of their supply from their long-term winemaker because, if an oversupply
situation were to occur again, they believe they would be among the first growers to have their supply agreement terminated by the winemaker.

The majority of growers expressed a preference for multi-year supply agreements, rather than being exposed to demand risk under short-term agreements or spot market sales. This appears to stem from uncertainty experienced during the years when grapes were in oversupply. Growers who did not have multi-year supply agreements were more likely to have exited during periods of oversupply. Multi-year supply agreements also allow growers to spread risk across multiple years and can help growers obtain finance arrangements that would not be otherwise available.

A small, but increasing, number of growers prefer the flexibility of selling on the spot market, accepting offers from different winemakers each year close to harvest. At present, these growers appear to be receiving better prices and payment terms than those committed to supply under multi-year arrangements. However, these growers are exposed to demand risk, and some incurred substantial losses in years when the market was over-supplied. Most growers that the ACCC consulted in the Riverland and Murray Valley had multi-year variable price supply agreements, although some had also reserved patches of vines for spot market trading. A very small number of those growers had chosen to trade only in the spot market.

A small proportion of growers with oral supply agreements considered that such agreements provided greater flexibility. However, most growers expressed the view that oral supply agreements do not provide sufficient certainty. Where they have a choice, most growers would be unlikely to sell all their grapes under oral supply agreements. When growers enter into such supply agreements, the financial and agricultural risks to which they are generally exposed are exacerbated, as:

- the winemaker may dishonour the supply agreement by not purchasing the grapes
- quality specifications are unknown at the time of agreeing to supply, and the winemaker may consequently impose arbitrary quality specifications at the end of the season
- the winemaker may seek to impose conditions of trade that were not initially disclosed.

Growers in the Riverina expressed the most concern about a lack of good alternative options for selling their grapes, and not having written supply agreements in place with winemakers. This is unsurprising as oral supply agreements are more common in the Riverina than in other warm climate regions. This is likely attributable to a number of factors:

- No winemakers in the Riverina are signatories to the Code, which requires written supply agreements for grape trading. Consequently winemakers are under less pressure to formalise the terms of their supply arrangements.
- There is a real risk growers in the Riverina will not be able to supply a winemaker again if they decide to switch to supplying another winemaker. Accordingly, growers feel compelled to continue multi-year supply arrangements even if they are not satisfied with them. The resulting stagnancy may contribute to less pressure being applied to winemakers in the Riverina to formalise or improve trading terms.
- The ACCC found that most large and medium winemakers consider that it is important to have multi-year written supply agreements in place with growers to ensure they have sufficient security of grape supply. Winemakers need to ensure they can produce key product lines, and the high fixed costs of processing facilities necessitate processing certain minimum volumes for efficient use.

However, a number of winemakers told the ACCC that they tend not to offer written supply agreements. One winemaker said that it has offered written agreements in the past but growers indicated that they preferred the flexibility in who they sell to in order to ensure they were offered a fair market price.

The ACCC observed that growers outside the Riverina who expressed a preference for informal oral supply agreements were generally those that produced larger quantities of grapes and traded on the spot market.

While oral supply agreements are not always a matter of concern among growers, the ACCC considers that written agreements should be entered into for all types of grape supply arrangements. This ensures
that growers have increased transparency and certainty over their rights and obligations, including how and when price will be determined, quality specifications and payment terms.

The Code requires written supply agreements for trading grapes. Accordingly, the ACCC’s concerns regarding growers not having written supply agreements would largely be addressed by winemakers becoming signatories to the Code. This recommendation is discussed in detail in chapter 7.

5.3 Winemakers have significantly greater bargaining power than wine grape growers

The significant imbalance in bargaining power between winemakers and growers stems from a number of factors including the largely generic nature of warm climate grapes, the perishable nature of grapes, the size of growers compared to the size of major wineries, winemakers having better access than growers to market information, and ingrained practices arising from the period when grapes were oversupplied.

This significant imbalance in bargaining power results in growers being unable to negotiate better supply agreement terms and reduces their ability to dispute unfavourable decisions.

5.3.1 Winemakers benefit from information asymmetries

Winemakers are better able to estimate the price growers are likely to accept, in contrast to growers who are frequently unable to determine what constitutes a fair market price.

This results from winemakers having better access to market information than growers. In addition to having better access to information about market prices and likely demand, winemakers have information about how the season is proceeding for a large number of growers. In contrast, as winemakers generally do not make public price announcements and usually require growers to keep prices confidential, growers have a limited understanding of potential competing offers.

Growers could improve their knowledge of the market if they engaged in collective bargaining. However, collective bargaining has been rarely used in the wine grape industry (see section 6.5).

5.3.2 Growers rely more on winemakers than winemakers do on individual growers

Growers are significantly more dependent on their transactions with winemakers than winemakers are with individual growers.

The major buyers (large winemakers), process between 10 000 and 100 000 tonnes of grapes per season. In contrast, the ACCC understands the majority of growers produce less than 2000 tonnes per season. Grape growing businesses are mostly small operations, and many are family owned (see section 1.3).

Further, warm climate grapes are primarily acquired as a largely homogenous bulk commodity. There is generally little differentiation between individual growers’ grapes. Winemakers can acquire what they view as being the same product from many growers in a region.

As a result, a winemaker relies on an individual grower for only a small proportion of their requirements, and can substitute their grapes relatively easily. In contrast, a grower relies on a winemaker (or a small number of winemakers) to buy all of their grapes and cannot easily substitute buyers. This weakens growers’ bargaining power.

5.3.3 Grapes are highly perishable, reducing grower bargaining power

By harvest many growers know their winemaker’s final price offer, although this is often subject to quality assessments conducted at the winery (as outlined in section 5.4.3). Growers are often unwilling or unable to effectively dispute unfavourable quality assessments because quality assessment usually
occurs after harvest when grapes are highly perishable. This weakens growers’ bargaining position in comparison to winemakers.

5.3.4 Historical oversupply continues to impact grower bargaining behaviour

The recent prolonged period of oversupply of grapes further weakened the bargaining position of growers, reducing growers’ ability to negotiate better supply agreement terms or engage in effective dispute resolution.

Despite improved market conditions for most varieties in recent years and some grape varieties being in short supply, many growers are concerned that warm climate grapes could become oversupplied again, enabling winemakers to revert to more opportunistic behaviour.

Fear of being penalised in the future for seeking to negotiate terms or dispute quality assessments may mean that growers are not fully benefitting from the improved market conditions.

5.3.5 Supply agreements affect how risk is allocated

The supply agreements the ACCC examined varied markedly, both in relation to how price is determined and the types of terms included. However, some consistent themes became apparent in relation to risk allocation and liability. These are discussed below.

Winemakers tend to bear greater risk of consumer-side demand changes

Most supply arrangements provide growers with a secure buyer for grapes grown on defined patches of land for up to a maximum tonnage of grapes. Consultation with growers demonstrated that demand security is of primary importance when entering into supply agreements.

Multi-year supply agreements provide winemakers with security of supply, ensuring that they can fulfil forecast consumer demand for particular wine products. They also ensure that winemakers have sufficient throughput to use processing assets efficiently.

However, winemakers remain exposed to significant demand risk in their dealings with wholesale buyers. Winemakers have told the ACCC that, while they have ongoing trade relationships with domestic and international retailers, they have very little security regarding volumes and prices. Many winemakers provided examples of having product lines delisted at short notice by major domestic and international retailers. This indicates that winemakers are often at a bargaining power disadvantage during negotiations with their large retail customers.

When change in demand from wholesale buyers results in a winemaker’s forecasted demand for a product being incorrect, they are still obliged to purchase grapes under existing supply agreements. Accordingly, winemakers bear a significant amount of consumer demand risk.

At the same time, processed and bottled wine is a durable product that can be stored for a considerable period of time. Some processed bulk wine can also be blended into different wine products from those originally intended. This reduces demand risk for winemakers.

Growers largely bear grape price fluctuation risk

Under most supply agreements, price risk is largely borne by growers, with the price for each season being determined close to harvest. Price is discussed in detail in chapter 4.

Growers carry the agricultural production risk

Growers carry the risks involved with growing the grapes. Growers are responsible for ensuring vines receive water, nutrients and care as well as protection from potential disease and pests. The costs associated with this include purchasing water, fertilisers, agricultural chemicals (such as pesticides, herbicides and fungicides) and the cost of labour and machinery (such as for pruning and spraying). These costs are subject to change.
For instance, water costs have increased markedly in recent years. Since wine grapes are permanent plantings, wine grape growers have no choice but to bear these costs. Unlike producers of seasonal crops such as vegetables, wine grape growers do not have great flexibility to trade their water allocations instead of using them in a season when water prices are very high.

Because growers are price takers, there is no realistic mechanism to pass on the increasing costs of agricultural inputs to winemakers. Therefore, growers bear the risk of changes to these costs.

**Performance risk is mitigated in some circumstances**

Force majeure clauses in supply agreements release growers or winemakers from legal liability while they are prevented from fulfilling their contractual obligations by certain extreme circumstances beyond their control. Winemakers have told the ACCC that under these clauses, growers are not required to perform the contracts if they are unable to because of extreme weather or unavoidable disease events.

**Winemakers have discretion over harvest timing**

All supply agreements considered by the ACCC give winemakers the discretion to determine harvest schedules. This is discussed in detail in chapter 3.

Often, several varieties of grapes mature and are ready for harvest at the same time. It seems appropriate that winemakers determine harvest schedules unilaterally given they have limited capacity to accept delivery of grapes from many growers in a relatively short timeframe. However, the timing of harvest being at the discretion of the winemaker means growers carry a high degree of quality risk arising from a potentially delayed harvest. In addition, growers are restricted in their ability to harvest early to avoid forecast adverse weather events.

Winemakers carry some risk of buying grapes that are not of optimum quality, but have greater ability to use winemaking techniques to standardise or improve the quality of wines. While this carries some cost for the winemaker, the grower bears more quality risk in individual transactions.

**Significant financial risk is transferred to growers**

Under most supply agreements, final payment is made long after harvest, resulting in growers bearing significant financial risk. Winemakers commonly do not have to pay in full until nine to twelve months after taking delivery of the grapes. This is discussed in detail in section 5.4.4.
5.4 Possible unfair contract terms under the Australian Consumer Law

Box 5.1: Business to business unfair contract terms (UCT)

The business to business UCT protections were introduced to assist small businesses (such as farmers) that may have limited bargaining power, by empowering a court to declare terms in a standard form small business contract unfair and void.

To be a ‘small business contract’, at least one party to the contract must employ fewer than 20 persons and the upfront price payable under the contract must not exceed $300 000 or, if the contract has a duration of more than 12 months, $1 million.

A ‘standard form contract’ is one that has been prepared by one party to the contract and where the other has little to no opportunity to negotiate the terms.

The vast majority of supply agreements appear to be standard form, involving limited or no negotiation of terms.

The business to business UCT protections apply to standard form small business contracts entered into, amended or renewed on or after 12 November 2016.

A term is unfair if it:

- causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract and would cause detriment (financial or otherwise) to a party if it were to be relied upon
- is not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the party who would be advantaged by the term.

A court must consider the contract ‘as a whole’ when determining whether a term is unfair.

Where a term is found by a court to be unfair, it is void and unenforceable. The contract will continue to bind the parties if it is capable of operating without the unfair term.

The identification and removal of unfair terms increases the fairness of supply agreements.

The ACCC is assessing certain contract terms in the context of the UCT protections and may investigate winemakers who continue to have such terms in their standard form contracts.

Terms that the ACCC considers may be unfair fall into the following categories:

- Certain first right of refusal clauses.
- Terms that give winemakers broad rights to unilaterally vary terms of the agreement.
- Terms that provide for a lengthy period of time before growers receive final payment.
- Terms that give winemakers broad rights to terminate agreements.
- Terms that give winemakers broad scope to make unilateral and detrimental quality determinations, or reject grapes.

The ACCC recommends that winemakers review their standard form contracts and remove or amend any unfair terms. This recommendation applies to the contracts of any winemakers to which the UCT law applies. It is not dependant on a winemaker’s size or region.

5.4.1 First right of refusal clauses raise potential concerns

The ACCC has identified two types of first right of refusal clauses that may be unfair:

- Clauses that require growers to sell excess grapes to winemakers but do not require winemakers to match competitor offers.
- Clauses that require growers to enter into new supply agreements with winemakers but do not require winemakers to match competitor offers.

**First right to purchase excess grapes**

Most supply agreements nominate a maximum tonnage of grapes the winemaker is required to purchase. Growers can employ strategies to limit production to this maximum tonnage, such as thinning during flowering or reducing irrigation. However, there are factors outside growers’ control such as rainfall or temperature that also impact production volumes. This can result in excess tonnage.

The ACCC has observed clauses which give winemakers the option to purchase these excess grapes at a discount, and do not require winemakers to match competitor prices.

The winemaker has discretion in exercising the option; they are not obliged to take excess fruit, but have the opportunity to purchase excess fruit when grapes are in high demand.

Therefore, the grower does not have a guaranteed buyer for their excess grapes, and loses the opportunity to benefit from higher spot market offers if the winemaker chooses to purchase the grapes.

Conversely, the ACCC understands that there is a link between the quantity of grapes produced on a given plot of land and the quality of those grapes. Accordingly, winemakers may have a legitimate interest in limiting the quantity of grapes supplied by a grower in order to improve the likely quality of the grapes that they are obliged to buy.

The ACCC will engage in further analysis to determine whether or not such terms are likely to be unfair.

**First right to renew the supply agreements**

The ACCC has identified contract terms that prevent a grower from entering a new supply agreement with a competitor (including on better terms), until the contracting winemaker has determined it will not renew its supply agreement for a further term. Terms that seek to prevent a grower from entering into a new agreement with a different winemaker on better terms may be unfair.

5.4.2 **Winemakers can unilaterally vary supply agreement terms**

**Winemakers have a broad, unilateral ability to vary quality specifications**

While most supply agreements contain price grids which set out the quality specifications affecting price relatively clearly, most also give winemakers the broad unilateral ability to vary quality specifications. This can occur in a number of ways, including by winemakers:

- sending final price offers that change quality specifications. Most supply agreements viewed by the ACCC allow for the winemaker to set out final quality assessment parameters in final price offers, which can be different to what is stated in the supply agreements or associated materials such as grower manuals or guides

- amending the quality specifications set out in grower manuals.

Some winemakers have indicated that they need to be able to vary specifications to make changes in response to unanticipated amendments to regulatory requirements. However, the supply agreements viewed by the ACCC are not limited in this way, leaving potential variations at the discretion of the winemaker.

The ACCC is concerned that the ability to vary specifications could cause detriment to growers, because it creates uncertainty and cash flow issues for growers, and also because it distorts comparisons of winemakers’ offers before entering into supply agreements.

The ACCC considers that quality assessment parameters form a key aspect of conditions offered by winemakers in multi-year supply agreements. Changing these terms may result in a significant reduction in the value of the supply agreement to the grower.

The ACCC does not consider quality specifications should be able to be unilaterally varied to the detriment of the grower except for in limited circumstances, such as when there has been a change in
government regulations. Such circumstances should be stipulated in supply agreements and/or the ability to change quality specifications should require the grower’s agreement.

**Variable price terms in multi-year supply agreements give winemakers broad discretion to set prices**

Under a variable price supply agreement, the grower agrees in advance to supply a specified tonnage of grapes to the winemaker, at a price to be determined by the winemaker close to harvest.

As discussed in chapter 4, the major influences on warm climate grape prices are bulk wine export prices and local harvest conditions. Both of these factors are highly volatile and cannot be predicted by winemakers or growers with any certainty. Variable price supply agreements are a response to this uncertainty and allow winemakers to set a price that reflects prevailing market conditions.

The ACCC has observed a wide range of price mechanisms in variable price supply agreements and considers that some of these terms may be unfair contract terms.

The ACCC is concerned about variable price terms where:

- the winemaker’s discretion to set prices is not limited by reference to an external standard such as a ‘fair market price’, and/or
- growers do not have recourse to a dispute resolution process to challenge the winemaker’s determination.

There is a risk in such contracts that the winemaker’s pricing discretion could be used to the detriment of growers. For example, there is no restriction on a winemaker setting a price pay significantly below the average market price for grapes, and growers would have no way to challenge this price.

**Price can be varied by the winemaker until the final payment**

The ACCC has considered a contractual term which allows a winemaker to vary the final price for grapes up until the time of payment, which may be nine to twelve months after grapes are supplied, subject to a minimum price specified in the contract.

The ACCC considers that such terms may be unfair as it requires growers to carry the risk of price changes for a long period after winemakers have taken possession of the grapes.

**5.4.3 Winemakers have broad discretion regarding quality assessment and rejection**

Many growers have raised concerns that winemakers use quality assessment processes to unfairly downgrade, and therefore pay less for, grapes. Winemakers rejecting and downgrading grapes is discussed in detail in chapter 3 in the context of quality assessment.

While the ACCC accepts that winemakers require some ability to reject or downgrade grapes, we have identified a number of rejection and downgrade-related terms in supply agreements that may be unfair. These terms have the potential to cause imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties and to cause harm to growers because:

- winemakers have broad discretion to make quality assessment determinations or reject produce
- growers are typically not present at the winery during the quality assessment process
- growers often lack access to effective dispute resolution mechanisms when their produce is downgraded or rejected (see chapter 3 and chapter 7).

The ACCC has also viewed supply agreements that allow winemakers a significant period after delivery to reject grapes. For instance, one supply agreement provides for rejection within 30 days of title passing to the winemaker if the juice, must or wine is affected by a latent defect that was not reasonably identifiable on delivery. If this clause is exercised, the grower may be required to purchase its grapes for the price the winemaker paid for them. The right to reject is not limited to defined types of
latent defects, and the lengthy rejection period following delivery creates the potential for defects to be incorrectly attributed to the grower when the grower has had no control over the grapes for some time.

The ACCC also understands that most defects that would become apparent after delivery (such as smoke taint) can be tested for on or shortly after delivery.

### 5.4.4 Lengthy payment periods are common but may be unfair

The ACCC considers that lengthy payment periods, which are widely used in grape supply agreements, may be unfair contract terms.

The SA Wine Grapes Industry Act 1991 (WGI Act) allows the SA Minister for Agriculture, Food and Fisheries to set out timeframes for payment for SA grapes by winemakers. In 2004 the Minister set out the timeframes shown in figure 5.1. The same timeframes have since been inserted as minimum terms into the Code (see chapter 7), which has led some winemakers to adopt them outside of SA.

**Figure 5.1: Payment terms under the SA Wine Grapes Industry Act 1991**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For grapes delivered</th>
<th>First payment</th>
<th>Second payment</th>
<th>Third payment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1 April</td>
<td>⅓ by the end of the month</td>
<td>⅓ by 30 June</td>
<td>⅓ by 30 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>following the month of delivery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 April to 1 May</td>
<td>⅓ by 31 May</td>
<td>⅓ by 30 June</td>
<td>⅓ by 30 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After 1 May</td>
<td>⅔ by 30 June</td>
<td>⅓ by 30 September</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The WGI Act enables growers to obtain interest from winemakers for late payments. The WGI Act also makes it an offence for a winemaker to accept delivery of grapes without having made full payment for all grapes acquired from SA growers in the previous year.

These payment terms appear to have been intended to form the absolute minimum requirements for supply agreements in SA. However, winemakers appear to have generally adopted these payment terms as the industry standard.

Some winemakers have told the ACCC that the rationale for lengthy payment periods is that wine will not be sold for some time after delivery of grapes. However, growers argue that modern winemaking techniques mean many wines do not need to be aged for as long as they previously did. For example, many white wines are bottled and ready for consumption by the consumer within a few months of harvest.

Imbalance arises from such terms because the winemaker has the product without being required to make prompt payment, while growers are still required to pay invoices for agricultural inputs within 30 days. Most growers noted that they were financing their business through overdrafts. Accordingly, growers carry a high degree of financial risk with lengthy or uncertain payment terms well after title in the grapes has passed to the winemaker.

The ACCC is concerned about the widespread nature of lengthy payment periods across the wine industry. Many other agricultural commodities have supply chains that include extensive delays before products are sold, yet are subject to shorter payment terms between processors and farmers. For example, it can take two years for raw wool to be converted into finished consumer products, but farmers in that industry are commonly paid within seven days of the sale of their wool.

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187 Winemakers’ Federation of Australia (WFA) and Wine Grape Growers Australia (WGGA), Australian Wine Industry Code of Conduct, 2014 (Code), cl. 2.6.1.
Stakeholder feedback on payment terms was mixed

In the Interim Report, the ACCC recommended that long payment periods should be phased out of standard form contracts and an industry standard be introduced to require payment in full for grapes no later than 30 days after delivery.

Stakeholder feedback was divided on this recommendation.

Winemakers strongly objected to this recommendation. Their feedback was focussed on two points.

Firstly, several winemakers claimed that longer payment terms are necessary in the wine industry because:
- there are long production times for some wines
- winemakers face uncertainty regarding the sale of wines to exporters and retailers, and
- winemakers receive long payment terms from exporters (up to 120 days) and retailers (between 30 days and 90 days).

The ACCC is sceptical of this argument and understands that suppliers of winemakers’ non-grape inputs such as bottles, oak chips and cartons are typically paid on much shorter payment terms (between 30 days and 60 days). This suggests that growers’ current payment terms are more reflective of imbalanced bargaining power than the inherent nature of the wine industry. Further, growers also face long production times to produce grapes, especially from new vines, during which they incur significant costs.

Many industries face similar challenges and yet manage to pay their suppliers within considerably shorter timeframes. For example, large construction projects can take many years to complete and the revenue from such projects is often tied to completing significant project milestones. Despite this, payment terms in the construction industry are much shorter than the wine industry.\(^{190}\)

Secondly, winemakers argued that shortening payment terms would impose a significant cash flow burden on winemakers. Australian Grape and Wine Inc (AGWI) submitted that this could be lead to questions about some wine businesses’ long term viability.\(^{191}\) However, the ACCC found that the majority of warm climate growers already operate at a loss (see chapter 2) and that 35 per cent of growers have exited the market since 2008 (see chapter 1). The ACCC’s recommendation does not impose any additional cash-flow burden on the industry. Rather, it shifts the existing cash-flow burden from growers to winemakers.

For an economic perspective, in order to maximise social welfare, the entity that is most efficient in sourcing cash-flow funding should incur that expense. Many growers said they financed their operations via overdrafts, which currently incur interest at between 6 to 12 per cent. The ACCC understands that large winemakers would typically have greater financial assets and ability to service debt than the average grower, and would face significantly lower funding costs. Indeed, the ACCC received several submissions from winemakers to this effect.

The ACCC also supports the views of the Australian Small Business and Family Enterprise Ombudsman (ASBFEO) that shorter payment terms promote economic efficiency. In March 2019, ASBFEO released a report examining payment trends among large and multinational businesses.\(^{192}\) This report found that poor cash flow due to late payment limits small businesses’ ability to:
- harness growth acceleration opportunities
- improve supply chain efficiency
- invest in customer led preferences.\(^ {193}\)

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\(^{190}\) Australian Small Business and Family Enterprise Ombudsman (ASBFEO), Review of payment terms, times and practices, ASBFEO, Canberra, 2019, p. 17.

\(^{191}\) Australian Grape & Wine Incorporated (AGWI), Submission in response to the ACCC wine grape market study Interim Report, AGWI, Canberra, 2019, p. 17.

\(^{192}\) ASBFEO, p. 17.

\(^{193}\) ibid, p. 21.
The feedback from growers on the recommendation was mixed. Many growers indicated that earlier payment would be beneficial, especially during poor harvests. However, a number of growers considered that the existing WGI Act and Code payment terms aligned with their periods of most significant expenditure (pruning, budburst and harvesting) and enabled them to budget effectively across the year.

Some growers expressed a concern that grape prices may fall if 30 day payment terms were introduced. This view was also shared by some winemakers. However, the ACCC would expect that any reduction in the grape price may be offset by the reduction in growers' finance costs as a result of shorter payment terms.

There was also mixed feedback about whether this recommendation should apply to winemakers of all sizes. Some growers argued the recommendation should apply to all winemakers. However, some winemakers and industry associations submitted that this could have unintended consequences, such as imposing a burden on new entrants to the market who will not earn revenue from the sale of wine for a long period. This may result in small winemakers leaving the market for grapes, and therefore reduce the overall competition in the market.

On the other hand, some winemakers were critical of this recommendation only applying to large winemakers. They submitted that if large winemakers were the only ones obligated to provide 30 day payment terms, then growers would only supply large winemakers, rather than smaller winemakers.

The ACCC considers that these arguments overstate the potential consequences of introducing best practice payment terms for large winemakers. Small winemakers are more likely to grow their own grapes, are less likely to use standard form supply agreements and make up a very small part of the market for grapes (see chapter 1). Further, the ACCC understands that some small winemakers have already moved to shorter payment terms as a means of competing with large winemakers for grapes.

Some growers considered that the ACCC should recommend introducing a system of penalties to apply if winemakers failed to meet the 30 day payment terms. The ACCC considers that there is insufficient evidence to support such a recommendation at this stage. This may only become necessary if winemakers do not reduce the lengthy payment terms that currently exist in the industry.

Finally, some winemakers raised concerns that this recommendation would inhibit their ability to pay bonuses, as wine tastings are not normally undertaken until after the 30 day payment period. To be clear, this recommendation applies to contracted payment amounts and does not restrict a winemakers' ability to make bonus payments should they choose to do so.

**Winemakers should reduce payment terms**

The ACCC recommends that lengthy payment terms should be phased out of standard form supply agreements.

The ACCC considers that an argument can be made that the current industry standard payment terms when applied to grapes produced outside of SA are unfair contract terms. Payment terms consistent with the WGI Act that relate to grapes produced within SA are expressly permitted by a law of a State and so are exempt from the application of the UCT protections. When a court declares a term in a standard form small business contract unfair it is void. There are significant risks to winemakers should a court strike out long payment terms for being unfair. For example, a winemaker's supply agreement would only continue to bind its growers if the agreement was capable of operating without the unfair payment term. This risk applies to all winemakers that offer standard form supply agreements to which the UCT protections apply, regardless of size or region.

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194 *Competition and Consumer Act 2010* (Cth) sch. 2 (Australian Consumer Law), s. 26(1)(c).
195 Australian Consumer Law, s. 23(2).
The ACCC strongly recommends that all winemakers review their contracts and remove long payment terms. The ACCC will consider taking enforcement action against winemakers that do not remove long payment terms from contracts to which the UCT protections apply.

The ACCC is most concerned about potential unfairness from lengthy payment periods offered by large winemakers. The UCT protections prohibit unfair terms in standard form small business contracts. Contracts offered to growers by larger winemakers are more likely to be considered standard form contracts as they will generally have greater bargaining power than growers.\(^{196}\) This exposes lengthy payment terms in large winemakers’ contracts to a higher risk of being declared void by a court.

The ACCC considers a best practice standard of payment within 30 days of the final grape delivery should be adopted for all winemakers in Australia with total processing capacity across all wineries, including subsidiaries, of over 10,000 tonnes. This is consistent with the payment periods in the Australian Supplier Payment Code (see box 5.2). Approximately 1 per cent of winemakers fall within this category and yet they are responsible for producing 83 per cent of all wine in Australia (see figure 1.6).

The ACCC considers that short payment terms should be reflected in the Code. The ACCC acknowledges that it may be appropriate to enable some flexibility of payment terms in the Code, given that a variety of payment term lengths currently exist across the supply chain. However, the ACCC considers this flexibility should not extend to payment terms beyond 60 days.

The ACCC considers that a transition period of two years is appropriate to introduce best practice payment terms. However, winemakers should review their existing payment terms as soon as possible given the risk that their current payment terms may be unfair contract terms.

Based on the feedback received to date, it is unlikely that the industry will implement this recommendation voluntarily. AGWI, which administers the Code, said it was ‘deeply concerned’ by the recommendation.\(^{197}\) Accordingly, the ACCC will consider taking unfair contract term enforcement action against winemakers as a means of addressing its concerns about long payment terms.

The ACCC will also have regard to the payment period ultimately adopted in the Code when assessing whether or not to recommend to Government that a mandatory code be introduced.

Finally, the ACCC considers that the WGI Act has resulted in the industry adopting long payment periods to the detriment of growers and the advantage of winemakers. The ACCC encourages a review of the WGI Act, including a consideration of the removal of the provisions that permit the use of long payment terms.

\(^{196}\) Australian Consumer Law, s. 27(2)(a).

\(^{197}\) AGWI, p. 16.
Box 5.2: Best Practice Standards for Payments to Small Business—Australian Supplier Payment Code

The Australian Supplier Payment Code is a voluntary, industry-led initiative that enshrines the importance of prompt and on-time payment for small business suppliers through compliance with a set of best practice standards.\(^\text{198}\)

On 29 May 2017, the Business Council of Australia launched the Australian Supplier Payment Code in order to improve payment times across the economy by paying small businesses within 30 days of receipt of a correct invoice.\(^\text{199}\)

At the time, the Business Council of Australia stated that:

> Improving payment times will improve productivity and help ease the stress for small business owners. Healthy cash flows and working capital are crucial to the viability of a business and its ability to expand and create jobs.\(^\text{200}\)

Then Minister for Small Business, The Honourable Michael McCormack stated that ‘it is clear that most issues relating to payment times and practices occur between businesses’, and welcomed the Code as a ‘good first step by industry to acknowledge the seriousness of the problem and the need to improve.’\(^\text{201}\)

The Minister went on to explain that:

> The Government’s preference is to not add more regulation to address a problem unless it is absolutely necessary, .. [and] give industry the first opportunity to address the problem. However, the Government’s support is not unconditional and I will be carefully monitoring the effectiveness of the BCA’s Code and reserve the right to take stronger action should we see a lack of progress over time.\(^\text{202}\)

5.4.5 Some winemakers have broad, unilateral rights to terminate agreements

The ACCC considers that some of the termination clauses used in supply agreements may be unfair contract terms.

The ACCC has identified clauses that allow winemakers to terminate agreements with growers when grapes become surplus to their requirements for any reason, and at short or immediate notice.

If such a term were relied on, growers would likely suffer significant financial detriment. This would be exacerbated at times when it may be difficult for growers to find an alternative purchaser, such as in years when grapes were in low demand, or if the decision was made close to harvest.

Such clauses benefit only the winemaker, allowing them to push demand risk to growers. The supply agreements do not provide growers with rights that would allow them to terminate the agreement at their discretion. This negates what most growers consider to be their key priority under supply agreements: having a guaranteed buyer.

While winemakers have an interest in reducing risk, the ACCC considers that winemakers, in particular large winemakers, are in a better strategic position than growers to anticipate and manage demand risks.

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199 ibid.

200 ibid.

201 ibid.

202 ibid.
5.5 Dispute resolution processes are inadequate for addressing imbalances and detriment arising from supply agreements

Overall, the ACCC did not see examples of dispute resolution processes in written supply agreements that would adequately address imbalances and detriment caused by the potentially unfair terms identified in this chapter, as well as bargaining power imbalances.

Most supply agreements considered by the ACCC specify dispute resolution processes in relation to price and, to a limited extent, quality assessment, but not in relation to other matters. The majority of these supply agreements are offered by Code signatories, and wholly or largely reflect the dispute resolution procedures set out in the Code. The ACCC’s assessment of dispute resolution under the Code and recommendations regarding the Code are discussed in detail in chapter 7.

Growers contracted to winemakers which are not Code signatories consistently told the ACCC that either dispute resolution mechanisms were not available or that dispute resolution clauses were ineffective because their winemaker does not engage with dispute resolution processes.

5.5.1 Growers tend not to use dispute resolution outside of Code processes

- Most of the supply agreements between growers and non-signatories to the Code which the ACCC reviewed either give the winemaker the ability make final determinations on disputes or provide for mechanisms for determinations by potentially expensive external service providers. Growers may also escalate disputes through litigation, although the ACCC notes that litigation does not provide for timely dispute resolution and the cost of litigation would be prohibitive to many growers.

- Growers have said that winemakers who are not signatories to the Code do not actively engage in dispute resolution processes. Several growers provided examples of processes stalling where the winemaker would not alter their position or consider the grower’s case.

- Grower representative groups have raised particular concern regarding supply agreements between growers and winemakers who are not signatories to the Code which refer to the dispute resolution under the Code. They submitted that such terms have limited effect as the support provided by the Code committee (such as assistance in appointing independent experts) are not available to non-signatories.

5.5.2 Bolstering the Code would improve dispute resolution across the industry

Despite its shortcomings, the ACCC considers that the Code is currently the most effective avenue for individual growers to resolve disputes. It has provided some growers with avenues for successfully disputing prices in the past. It is also an established entry point to raising disputes, with a support network that can be readily accessed by growers if they wish. However, the Code should be bolstered by increasing the robustness and accessibility of timely dispute resolution processes, addressing concerns about the independence and cost of experts, and increasing the number of signatories.

The ACCC’s recommendations on how the Code could be bolstered to provide more effective dispute resolution for all growers are discussed in chapter 7.
6. **Competition for wine grapes**

**Key points**

- A cyclical downturn in the industry since 2006 has resulted in limited competition between winemakers for grapes.
- While there are many winemakers in the warm climate regions, there is a high level of concentration in grape acquisition markets, particularly in the Riverina and Riverland.
- Competition for grapes is substantially affected by transport distances and costs.
- Winemakers compete for grapes on a range of price and non-price terms. However, we have observed limited price competition, and a greater but varying degree of non-price competition, in the warm climate regions.
- Price competition is being restricted by a lack of price transparency. Growers lack reliable price information to inform their switching decisions.
- Growers face high barriers to switching, including because of terms in supply agreements. This restricts growers from taking advantage of superior offers in the market.
- Very few growers have used collective bargaining groups to negotiate supply agreements with winemakers. However, collective bargaining should not be disregarded as a way to reduce bargaining power imbalances.
- A highly concentrated domestic retail market and import competition means winemakers are constrained from increasing wholesale prices of wine. This in turn constrains the prices that winemakers can offer growers.

To assess the extent of competition between buyers of grapes the ACCC analysed the following information:

- Where growers are located relative to who they sell to.
- The costs of transporting grapes and factors that limit the extent to which they can be transported, such as degradation of quality.
- How winemakers compete for supply of grapes, including price and non-price factors.
- How the wine grape oversupply and price downturn described in chapter 1 continues to influence the nature of competition in the market.
- The price information available to and relied upon by growers when choosing who to supply.
- The various factors impeding growers switching between different buyers.
- The potential for collective bargaining to be a useful mechanism to reduce bargaining power imbalances.
- Competition between winemakers for supply into export bulk wine markets and to domestic retailers.

6.1 **The market for wine grapes**

A market includes goods and services that are substitutable for, or otherwise competitive with, the goods or services being considered. Substitution involves switching from one product or service to another in response to a change in relative price or quality.

As discussed in the overview of the market study, the ACCC has focussed its analysis on competition for wine grapes. This is the first major stage of the wine supply chain and involves buyers (usually...
winemakers) competing to acquire grapes from growers to process into wines. This takes place within various geographic regions, with the following analysis focusing on warm climate regions.

The ACCC received feedback from some stakeholders that the Interim Report did not sufficiently consider the impact of retail and export markets on the relationship between winemakers and growers. This market study has not focussed on markets for wine. However, the ACCC has considered the effects that these markets have on the competition for grapes (see section 6.6).

6.1.1 The ACCC has considered a separate product market for warm climate grapes

The ACCC has considered various possible substitutes for warm climate grapes as a winemaking input. We have found that:

- there is minimal substitutability between warm climate and cool climate grapes
- there is a low degree of substitution of must or bulk wine for grapes
- it has not been necessary to define separate markets for each warm climate grape variety because we have not found competition concerns specific to a variety.

Warm climate grapes are generally not substitutes for cool climate grapes

As discussed in chapter 2, wine from cool climate regions often has premium branding associations. The ACCC heard from growers that even where wine from warm climate regions is of a comparable quality, it will not attract the same price premium. This indicates a distinct market for cool climate grapes.

Warm climate grapes commonly trade at significantly lower prices than cool climate grapes (see figure 2.3). Consequently, it is unlikely that a winemaker would buy cool climate grapes in place of warm climate grapes except where the prices are comparable. However, only a small percentage of cool climate grapes are sold at a similar price to warm climate grapes.

There is limited substitution between grapes, must and bulk wine as winemaking inputs

Although grapes, must and bulk wine are possible inputs into the winemaking process, there is only a limited degree of substitution between them. Compared to wine grapes, the use of bulk wines does not allow the winemaker to take advantage of its processing capacity. As a result, bulk wines are commonly sourced as a secondary input, for example, if a winemaker fails to secure sufficient suitable grapes to fulfil their requirements.

Alternatively, winemakers may source bulk wine if they have insufficient capacity to process the volumes required to meet demand, or if they need volumes of a certain quality for blending.

Winemakers prefer not to source must because it is susceptible to degradation during transport.

There is limited substitution between grape varieties

Industry engagement did not reveal concerns from growers or winemakers that are specific to certain grape varieties. Therefore, we have not found it necessary to consider whether there are separate markets for each variety in order to examine concerns relating to the wine grape market.

However, we recognise that grape varieties are often not substitutable for one another. Furthermore, winemakers consider that red and white varieties are only interchangeable in very limited circumstances.

Growers told the ACCC that it can cost up to $40 000 per hectare and take at least three years to switch varieties and establish a crop. Consequently, growers are unable to respond rapidly to changes in the relative prices of grape varieties by switching the ones they produce.
6.1.2 Competition is influenced by the distance between growers and wineries

Competition for the purchase of grapes primarily occurs within or close to a given growing region because of:

- grape perishability
- transportation costs relative to the value of the grapes
- wine labelling restrictions
- biosecurity regulations, such as those relating to phylloxera.

**Grapes are highly perishable**

Grapes begin to degrade hours after harvest, and even more quickly if exposed to heat and sunlight. High temperatures can accelerate the onset of fermentation, which is highly undesirable outside of controlled winery conditions.

Perishability is a key consideration when transporting grapes over long distances. White wines commonly have a lighter and more sensitive flavour profile than red wines, so winemakers are more concerned about the potential of white grapes to degrade. As a result, red varieties can be transported over greater distances than white ones. A major winemaker stated they are typically willing to transport red varieties a maximum of 400 km, as compared to 200 km for white varieties.

**Transport costs limit the distances that grapes travel**

Where the grower and the winery are situated in the same region, winemakers generally require the grower to bear all costs of transporting the grapes to the winery. Where the grower and the winery are situated in different regions, winemakers generally only require the grower to bear some of the transport costs. However, overall transport costs are typically higher the further the grower is located from the winemaker. As such, winemakers with wineries located further from the grower need to offer higher prices to be competitive with winemakers that are closer.

Winemakers are generally willing to transport higher value grapes or varieties that are locally unavailable over longer distances. Figure 6.1 illustrates estimated transport costs relative to the average Chardonnay and Shiraz prices in 2018.

**Figure 6.1: Estimated freight costs per tonne by climate, variety and distance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transport distance</th>
<th>Estimated freight cost per tonne</th>
<th>Freight cost as a percentage of the 2018 warm climate average grape prices:205</th>
<th>Freight cost as a percentage of the 2018 cool climate average grape prices:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chardonnay ($335 per tonne)</td>
<td>Shiraz ($481 per tonne)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 km</td>
<td>$49</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 km</td>
<td>$70</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400 km</td>
<td>$98</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800 km</td>
<td>$178</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ACCC analysis of data from winemakers and Wine Australia.

Transport costs typically represent a high proportion of the grape price in warm climate regions. One major winemaker with a winery located in the Murray Valley primarily sourced warm climate grapes

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205 Average prices of grapes are sourced from ACCC analysis of Wine Australia data representing 77 per cent of production in 2018.
from the Murray Valley and Riverland regions where transport distances were 200 km or less. This winemaker stated its average transport distance for cool climate grapes was between 200 and 400 km.

**Labelling restrictions restrict grape substitution**

Winemakers may face some barriers to substitution between grapes from otherwise largely interchangeable warm climate regions, depending on the geographical indication intended to be attached to the final product.

The *Wine Australia Regulations 2018* require that, if the description and presentation of wine uses a certain registered geographical indication, 85 per cent of the wine volume be produced from grapes grown in the region defined by that indication.\(^{206}\)

This requirement restricts substitution with grapes sourced from outside the region where the winemaker is seeking to use the branding attributed to that region. This effect is most pronounced for substitution between cool climate and warm climate grapes because of the difference in recognition as premium wine regions (see section 6.1.1).

To illustrate, a winemaker seeking to produce wines labelled as from the Barossa Valley is restricted to producing only 15 per cent of the volume using Murray Valley grapes. In contrast, a winemaker seeking to produce wines labelled as from South Eastern Australia, which includes the Riverland, Murray Valley and Riverina, is able to use grapes from these regions interchangeably.

**There are restrictions on transporting grapes from phylloxera zones**

Phylloxera is a pest that attacks the roots of grapevines. It is currently known to be present in several defined quarantine zones in VIC and NSW.

State legislation and the National Phylloxera Management Protocol (the Protocol) place restrictions on the movement of ‘risk vectors’ across state borders, quarantine zones and phylloxera exclusion zones. Risk vectors include vines, grapes, must and juice.

Winemakers widely require contracted growers to comply with the Protocol, and at least two winemakers have the discretion to reject grapes from vineyards whose region is declared to be a phylloxera infested zone.

As a result, growers in phylloxera infested zones face both legal and contractual restrictions on transporting grapes and derived products out of the region. This means that grapes grown within such regions are essentially required to be processed in that region.

This imposes a clear barrier on substitution between grapes outside and inside phylloxera infested zones which could affect the geographic dimension of the market. These restrictions do not currently apply to any of the warm climate regions.

**There is limited competition between warm climate regions**

The distance between the Riverland and the Murray Valley is approximately 160 km, while the distance between the Riverina and the Murray Valley is approximately 400 km. The distance between the Riverland and the Riverina is greater still, around 600 km. As such, there is likely to be minimal competition for grapes between Riverina winemakers and those in the other two warm climate regions. However, we expect there is a small amount of competition between winemakers with wineries located in the Riverland and Murray Valley.

This is supported by analysis of 2018 grape purchasing data. Figure 6.2 illustrates the percentage of warm climate grapes sourced from each warm climate region by several major winemakers with wineries located in no more than one warm climate region.\(^{207}\)

\(^{206}\) *Wine Australia Regulations 2018* (Cth), reg. 26.

\(^{207}\) We have excluded winemakers with wineries in more than one warm climate region and winemakers which use contract processors to process grapes purchased from the warm climate regions.
Figure 6.2: Percentage of warm climate grapes bought by selected large winemakers with a winery in a warm climate region in 2018

Source: ACCC analysis of data from winemakers and Wine Australia.

Figure 6.2 indicates that winemakers purchase the vast majority of grapes from regions where they have a winery. This is particularly true for grapes purchased by Riverina winemakers, with almost all grapes coming from their own region. Large winemakers with a winery in the Murray Valley were more likely than those with a winery in the Riverina to source grapes from another region (the Riverland). However, similar to the Riverina, most grapes bought by Murray Valley winemakers came from the local region (the Murray Valley).

This is supported by the results of the ACCC Wine Grape Grower Survey where:
- all surveyed Riverina growers supplied to wineries within the Riverina
- around nine per cent of surveyed Murray Valley growers supplied winemakers whose closest wineries were located in the Riverland region, or closer to the Riverland region than to the Murray Valley region.

As a result, the ACCC considers the geographic markets for warm climate grapes to be predominantly defined as the regions in which they are grown, with a minor degree of overlap between the Riverland and Murray Valley markets.

6.2 Market concentration varies significantly between regions

Market concentration is a measure of the number of firms in a market and the distribution of market share among those firms. Generally, higher market concentration results in a lower degree of competition and a greater likelihood of the largest firms having market power. However, if there are effective constraints on market power, such as the threat of new entry or expansion by rivals, then even firms in highly concentrated markets may have little market power.

The following subsections examine the level of market concentration in each of the three warm climate regions by maximum processing capacity. While maximum processing capacity does not directly translate to the volume of grapes purchased in a year, it is a broad indicator of expected winemaking shares over the medium to long term.

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208 Owing to a shortage of publishable data, this figure does not include Riverland winemakers.
6.2.1 Market concentration in the warm climate regions

There is a high concentration of processing capacity in the Riverina, with one to two dominant winemakers (see figure 6.3).

Figure 6.3: Winemakers with the largest processing capacities in the Riverina

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Winemaker</th>
<th>Capacity (tonnes pa)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Winemaker A</td>
<td>250 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winemaker B</td>
<td>100 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winemaker C</td>
<td>48 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winemaker D</td>
<td>40 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winemaker E</td>
<td>38 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winemaker F</td>
<td>21 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winemaker G</td>
<td>12 500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Various publicly available information, including Winetitles Media and the Australian Financial Review.

The ACCC has found that processing capacities do not necessarily reflect the shares of grapes purchased in the Riverina because of varying levels of vertical integration into grape production by winemakers.

Compared to the other warm climate regions, there is a lower degree of market concentration and a more balanced distribution of processing capacity in the Murray Valley (see figure 6.4). Despite this, the ACCC still considers the Murray Valley market to be highly concentrated.

Figure 6.4: Winemakers with the largest processing capacities in the Murray Valley

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Winemaker</th>
<th>Capacity (tonnes pa)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Winemaker G</td>
<td>150 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winemaker H</td>
<td>110 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winemaker I</td>
<td>80 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winemaker J</td>
<td>60 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winemaker K</td>
<td>52 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winemaker L</td>
<td>45 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Winetitles Media.

There is a particularly high concentration of processing capacity in the Riverland, with one winemaker having around half of the regional processing capacity (see figure 6.5).

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209 The winemakers listed in figures 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 are restricted to those operating the 20 largest wineries in Australia, of which 16 are located in the warm climate regions.


211 Winetitles Media, The largest wine processing facilities.
Figure 6.5: Winemakers with the largest processing capacities in the Riverland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Winemaker</th>
<th>Capacity (tonnes pa)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Winemaker M</td>
<td>230 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winemaker N</td>
<td>100 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winemaker O</td>
<td>90 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winemaker P</td>
<td>25 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Various publicly available information, including Winetitles Media and The Advertiser.

The high degree of market concentration is likely to have led to reduced competition in each of the three warm climate regions, due to a limited number of buyers competing to acquire grapes from growers.

6.3 Winemakers compete for grapes in a variety of ways

There are price and non-price dimensions to the offers made to growers by winemakers. Many winemakers compete more vigorously on non-price terms than on price.

6.3.1 Winemakers compete for grapes on price and payment terms

Winemakers compete on a range of price and payment terms, including the price offered, price certainty, payment timeframes and certainty of payment.

Winemakers compete on price and price certainty

Growers have told the ACCC that certain winemakers are known for having historically higher or lower prices compared to their competitors. We understand that the reputation of a winemaker to offer high or low prices significantly influences growers’ decisions of which winemaker to supply.

In addition to expected prices, price competition also exists in the context of price certainty. As noted in chapter 4, supply agreements are often based on a ‘fair market price’ which is subject to the winemaker’s discretion and communicated to growers close to harvest. This means growers are often unaware of the price they will receive when they enter into a supply agreement.

One winemaker submitted that it would approach uncontracted growers early in the season and offer upfront fixed prices to attract growers. In doing so, this winemaker takes on price risk normally borne by growers in order to secure supply.

Growers prefer certainty of payment

Some growers have complained about non-payment, late payments, and a lack of effective recourse to seek compensation for late payments. As a result, certainty of payment is likely to be a factor in price competition for grapes.

Some winemakers offer shorter payment terms

As discussed in chapter 5, supply agreement terms relating to when growers will be paid vary widely. This suggests that payment terms may be a means of a winemaker differentiating themselves from competitors.

Many winemakers offer payment terms which align with the minimum requirements of the Code (see chapter 7). However, some non-signatory winemakers offer shorter or longer payment timeframes.

6.3.2 Winemakers compete for grapes on non-price terms

Winemakers also compete on a range of non-price terms. In doing so, they can create competitive advantages without relying on committing to higher prices.

Winemakers offer varying supply agreement durations

Some winemakers compete by offering growers a range of supply agreements to choose from. Growers have indicated they place significant value on being able to secure a buyer for their grapes by entering long-term contracts. The agreements and terms used in the industry are discussed in detail in chapter 5.

Winemakers generally offer multi-year supply agreements of at least three years, and many supplement these with annual or other short term contracts.

Winemakers seek to secure all vineyard output

The majority of growers produce multiple varieties of grapes. Depending on changing consumer trends, the demand for some varieties may fluctuate and the grower may struggle to find a buyer for these varieties in certain seasons. These growers may find a winemaker that is willing to purchase multiple varieties to be more attractive as a buyer.

Winemakers differentiate themselves by processing capacity

Winemakers and growers agree that timing of harvest is one of the most important factors in determining the quality and volume of grapes that can be harvested. The importance of timing of harvest is considered in detail in chapter 3.

Winemakers with excess processing capacity or multiple wineries have greater flexibility in scheduling harvest and delivery. This translates to greater certainty for growers that their grapes will be harvested at close to the optimal time.

The ACCC understands that winemakers promote their processing capacities to recruit growers.

Winemakers provide viticultural expertise to growers

Some winemakers referred to their level of engagement and strength of relationship with growers as a means of competing for supply. Many winemakers attribute their ability to retain growers to the close relationships they have developed. Engagement with growers may include:

- regular site visits
- viticultural advice
- updates on their product portfolio and demand requirements.

Winemakers offer some degree of supply agreement flexibility

Winemakers may compete for grapes by offering variations to standard form agreements in some circumstances. While most winemakers reported varying their terms for certain growers, the ACCC understands that there is a correlation between the degree of relative bargaining power held by the grower and the likelihood of variation to the supply agreement.

For example, in the ACCC’s grower survey over 60 per cent of warm climate growers reported that their supply agreements were offered on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis as compared to around 40 per cent of cool climate growers.

Furthermore, a winemaker’s size can influence whether the winemaker will offer variations to their supply agreements. One of the largest winemakers reported that approximately 10 per cent of their supply agreements were varied to some extent. In contrast, a smaller but still major winemaker, demonstrated a wide degree of variation including substantial differences in pricing, delivery and quality assessment terms. This winemaker stated that it was part of its purchasing strategy to offer terms that best appealed to growers of different regions.
6.3.3 Winemakers vertically integrate to reduce risk and secure supply

Winemakers may vertically integrate by acquiring their own vineyards. By doing so they secure access to grapes with particular attributes, reduce the risk of insufficient supply and gain closer control over quality. Winemakers can also maintain a level of viticultural expertise to inform their winemaking business. The extent of vertical integration into grape growing by large winemakers is extremely varied. This will impact on competition for grapes as the more a winemaker grows themselves, the less they need to buy from independent growers.

6.4 Competition for grapes is impeded by multiple factors

In addition to market concentration (as discussed above), factors that appear to be affecting the degree of competition between winemakers include the recent prolonged cyclical downturn, lack of price transparency and growers facing significant barriers to switching winemakers.

6.4.1 A prolonged cyclical downturn has reduced competitive behaviour

As discussed in chapter 1, the Australian wine industry is emerging from a prolonged cyclical downturn driven by a decade of grape oversupply, and unfavourable exchange rates and international market conditions. The ongoing and prolonged nature of this event makes it difficult for the ACCC to form precise views as to the underlying extent of competition in the warm climate wine grape markets.

The continuing effects of the oversupply period mean winemakers face low incentives to compete for warm climate grapes. Growers in the Riverland and Murray Valley told the ACCC that they value securing a long-term buyer more highly than receiving a better price. This has caused significant inertia in growers responding to improved market conditions. We have not observed large numbers of growers seeking shorter term supply agreements to use the threat of switching as a tool to negotiate higher prices.

6.4.2 Lack of transparency stifles price competition

As discussed in chapter 4, there is a lack of price transparency in grape markets. This lack of price transparency significantly impedes competition for grapes. Growers are less able to make informed switching decisions if they do not know what prices specific winemakers are willing to pay for their grapes. The lack of price information available to growers means that winemakers face reduced pressure to offer higher prices, and this may reduce competition for grapes.

6.4.3 Growers face barriers to switching winemaker

The extent of effective competition for grapes is influenced by whether growers can credibly threaten to switch winemaker. If growers are able to switch with relative ease and frequency, winemakers will need to offer competitive prices and terms in order to maintain their share of grape supply.

Many growers have raised various concerns with the ACCC about the difficulties of switching winemaker, including:
- high market concentration of winemakers (as discussed above)
- multi-year agreement terms
- roll over clauses with long termination notice periods
- fear of retribution
- exclusivity clauses and restrictions on growers dealing with excess tonnages
- inadequate information about market prices.
Growers may be locked into multi-year supply agreements

As detailed in chapter 5, supply agreements in warm climate regions are generally multi-year agreements with three to five year terms.

Multi-year supply agreements are a direct barrier to switching because growers have fewer opportunities to change winemaker in response to a better offer. This limits the depth of competition for growers’ grapes that occurs each year.

Even if most growers are already contractually committed in a given year, winemaker’s price offers may be competitively constrained if:

- a substantial segment of growers are out of contract each year and are free to switch
- the winemaker does not price discriminate between growers who are free to switch and growers who are not.

It is our understanding that winemakers do not commonly price discriminate between growers in a given warm climate region, except on colour and other quality factors.

The ACCC received feedback from some stakeholders that they had interpreted this finding to mean that the ACCC was critical of long-term contracts. To be clear, the ACCC is not concerned about businesses entering long-term supply agreements and acknowledges they can benefit both growers and winemakers. For example, multi-year supply agreements provide growers with a higher degree of certainty and ensure winemakers can secure fruit from valued growers (see chapter 5). Rather, the ACCC is simply observing that long-term contracts are a barrier to more frequent switching by growers.

Roll over clauses are often accompanied by long termination notice periods

Roll over clauses remove the need for the parties to a supply agreement to renegotiate the agreement on its expiry. When accompanied by long termination notice periods, they can be a significant barrier to switching, and directly reduce the pressure for winemakers to provide competitive offers.

The following are examples from two of the largest winemakers’ supply agreements:

- The supply agreement is extended by the original term and requires 30 days’ notice to terminate.
- The supply agreement is extended by one year and requires a deed varying the contract to be signed by both parties in order to terminate the contract.

The above examples restrict the grower and winemaker from switching to other buyers and suppliers respectively.

Fear of retribution

During consultation, the ACCC commonly heard that growers are reluctant to switch winemakers because of concerns they would face adverse treatment in future.

The threat of losing a potential buyer is especially persuasive for growers in the highly concentrated warm climate regions. Only small a percentage of respondents to the grower survey in warm climate regions agreed they could choose to sell to different buyers from year to year without suffering adverse treatment.

The ACCC finds this culture particularly concerning, as fear of losing a potential buyer for future harvests can be a significant deterrent to switching. This undermines competition between grape buyers.

6.5 Collective bargaining may result in public benefits

The *Competition and Consumer Act 2010* (Cth) (CCA) generally requires businesses to act independently of their competitors when making decisions about pricing, who they do business with, and the terms and conditions of doing business. Competitors who act collectively in these areas are at risk of breaching the competition provisions of the CCA.
6.5.1 The ACCC can grant legal protection for parties to collectively bargain in certain circumstances

The CCA allows for the ACCC to grant legal protection for parties to engage in practices like voluntary collective bargaining, or collective boycotts, if there are public benefits that would outweigh the public detriments. Currently, there are two ways that businesses can obtain an exemption from the competition provisions of the CCA for collective arrangements: authorisation or notification (see box 6.1). The ACCC is currently developing a class exemption for collective bargaining which will provide a ‘safe harbour’, allowing eligible businesses, including farmers, to form collective bargaining groups without risk of breaching the specified provisions of the CCA. Once a class exemption is in place, businesses that fall within the criteria of the class exemption won’t need to separately lodge a notification or authorisation, and will be able to rely on the exemption without delay or additional cost.

Box 6.1: Collective bargaining authorisations and notifications

Authorisation and notification are public processes. Applications are placed on the ACCC’s website with any public submissions that are received.

There are some differences between the authorisation and notification processes.

Notification is often a simpler, quicker process than authorisation, coming into effect after just 14 days where the ACCC doesn’t object, but it can only be used where members of the collective bargaining group (CBG) reasonably expect the value of their transactions with the target business will be less than $5 million per annum per member (for primary producers).

Authorisation can take longer to come into effect than notification, but an advantage is that it does not have a transaction threshold.

Once the proposed collective bargaining class exemption comes into effect later in 2019, it is intended that businesses would not need to seek ACCC approval to collectively bargain provided each business in the group had less than $10 million aggregated turnover in the previous year. The class exemption would operate alongside the existing authorisation and notification processes, which could still be used by a business that falls outside the class exemption to seek legal protection on a case-by-case basis.

6.5.2 The public benefits of a collective bargaining arrangement must outweigh the detriments

Most major winemakers offer standard form supply agreements. While some winemakers allow for minor variations, the majority of growers are unable to significantly influence contract terms. As explained in chapter 5, this flows from the imbalance of bargaining power between winemakers and growers.

Collective bargaining can enable growers to mitigate the impact of bargaining power imbalances, allowing them to negotiate more balanced terms. It has been used successfully by some farmers in a number of agricultural industries.

Collective bargaining could involve a number of growers joining together to negotiate with a winemaker on prices or supply arrangements, or to facilitate the efficient sequencing of the delivery of grapes to a winemaker.

In order for collective bargaining to qualify for legal protection via an authorisation or notification, there must be likely public benefits that would outweigh the likely public detriments.

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213 The term ‘public benefit’ is not defined in the CCA, but the ACCC has generally given it a broad meaning. As noted by the Australian Competition Tribunal, public benefits are ‘anything of value to the community generally, any contribution to the aims of society including as one of its principle elements...the achievement of economic goals of efficiency and progress.’

214 The limit for most other types of businesses is $3 million.
The terms ‘public benefit’ and ‘public detriment’ are not defined in the CCA and they are interpreted broadly. The public benefit and detriment must result from the CBG rather than other effects that would occur in any event.\textsuperscript{215}

Public benefits can include:

- reducing transaction costs through sharing the time and expense of negotiation
- creating opportunities for growers to have more effective input into contracts to negotiate supply agreement terms that better reflect growers’ needs
- improving the information available to growers, including about key supply agreement terms
- creating new marketing opportunities by combining volume.

Collective bargaining can also create mutually beneficial outcomes for both the group and winemakers, by guaranteeing a substantial volume of supply or providing access to a unique product.

On the other hand, public detriments may arise as a result of:

- increasing the potential for coordination between CBG members beyond what is necessary to improve the efficiency of contracting
- providing for negotiated supply agreements that have the effect of shielding inefficient members and distorting investment decisions.

Increasing the bargaining power of the group is not in itself a public benefit if it simply results in the transfer of benefit from the target business to the group. However, improvements in bargaining power can generate public benefits if it would be likely to result in contracts that enable more of the gains from trade to be realised.

For example, a growers’ CBG might be able to negotiate higher grape prices than are possible without collective bargaining. If higher prices to growers enabled them to make investments to improve the quality of their grapes, this may provide benefits to both growers and winemakers, and be considered a public benefit.

\textbf{6.5.3 Collective bargaining has rarely been used by growers}

Collective bargaining has rarely been used in the wine grape industry.

One example of a CBG is Rivawine Collaboration Pty Ltd (Rivawine), which represents 11 growers in the Riverland region.\textsuperscript{216} While Rivawine is responsible for significantly less volume than CCW, the large Riverland grower co-operative, it is not tied to a specific purchaser.

In its notification to the ACCC in November 2018, Rivawine raised the possibility of consolidating production for contract processing as a public benefit arising from the collective bargaining arrangement. It was claimed that consolidating production would ‘improve the management of harvest intake through greater flexibility of harvest across a large group’. In its decision to allow the notification to stand, the ACCC considered that Rivawine could allow its growers to have better input into supply agreement negotiations and may enable its growers to be better informed of relevant market conditions.

\textbf{6.5.4 Collective bargaining has broad potential in the grapes industry}

The ACCC recognises the challenges for growers in using collective bargaining in the wine grape industry. Winemakers lack incentives to negotiate with a CBG where there are sufficient alternative suppliers in a particular region who are not part of the CBG. Despite this, collective bargaining should not be disregarded as there are many potential benefits, as noted in subsection 6.5.2.

\textsuperscript{215} ACCC, Small business collective bargaining notification and authorisation guidelines, ACCC, Canberra, 2018, p. 6.

6.5.5 **Collective boycotts may be a less viable option due to the perishability of grapes**

A collective boycott is a mechanism that can be included as part of a CBG authorisation or notification, and can be used to encourage a party to enter negotiations with a CBG. It involves CBG participants agreeing not to supply a party whom the group is negotiating with, until the group is satisfied with the offer received.

Historically, there have been very few applications for authorisation for collective boycotts, and some of these have been denied authorisation by the ACCC, or by the Australian Competition Tribunal overturning the ACCC’s decision to grant authorisation. This has been due to concerns about the harm that some boycotts can do to those in the relevant industry. Despite this, the ACCC remains open to authorising collective bargaining arrangements that include the possibility of boycotting a processor if negotiations don’t succeed. A collective boycott can be a useful negotiating tool to bring the target business to the table or restart stalled negotiations. The effectiveness and appropriateness of a collective boycott will depend on the particular circumstances.

However, for collective boycott conduct to be an effective negotiation tool for growers, it must be possible for the group to credibly threaten to withhold grapes if their requirements are not met. This presents a challenge for growers, given that grapes will perish if not delivered to a winery at a specific time, the use of exclusive agreements and the possibility of the industry returning to an oversupply situation.

6.6 **Winemakers are constrained at the wholesale level**

Major Australian winemakers have two primary options for the wholesaling of their wine: they can sell into the export market or to domestic retailers. In each of these markets, Australian winemakers are largely price takers.

6.6.1 **Bulk wine is predominantly sold into competitive export markets**

Exported wines can vary significantly in terms of price, variety, region, quality and flavour profile. Figure 6.6 shows the value of wines exported in 2018 by price segment. The majority of bulk wine exports is captured in the lowest price segment, namely $2.49 per litre and under. The average price of bulk wine exports was $1.17 per litre in 2018.\(^{217}\) This reflects the fact that the majority of bulk wine exports consist of commercial wines.

These wines are often commoditised and highly substitutable with commercial wine produced in other winemaking countries, many of which export far greater volumes than Australia. As a result, Australian winemakers are unable to significantly influence bulk wine export prices, which are instead primarily determined by international market conditions and foreign exchange rates (see chapter 4). Australian wholesalers are price takers in bulk wine export markets, unable to significantly influence the prices they receive.

The ACCC has found that the export market has been the main constraint on grape prices over the past 20 years. The primary determinant of warm climate grape prices are supply and demand conditions in export markets (see section 4.2), as demonstrated by the close correlation between grape prices and export wine prices.

Figure 6.6: Exports by price segment 2018 (AUD million FOB)\textsuperscript{218}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Price segment</th>
<th>Moving annual total (December 2018)</th>
<th>Value Change</th>
<th>Growth rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$2.49 and under</td>
<td>$556 million</td>
<td>$44 million</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2.50 to $4.99</td>
<td>$828 million</td>
<td>-$1.4 million</td>
<td>-0.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5.00 to $7.49</td>
<td>$376 million</td>
<td>$44 million</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$7.50 to $9.99</td>
<td>$166 million</td>
<td>$16 million</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10 to $14.99</td>
<td>$234 million</td>
<td>$33 million</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15 to $19.99</td>
<td>$77 million</td>
<td>$0.2 million</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20 to $29.99</td>
<td>$218 million</td>
<td>$86 million</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30 to $49.99</td>
<td>$99 million</td>
<td>$5.1 million</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50 to $99.99</td>
<td>$187 million</td>
<td>$23 million</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100 to $199.99</td>
<td>$33 million</td>
<td>$16 million</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$200 and above</td>
<td>$48 million</td>
<td>-$3.9 million</td>
<td>-7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total value</strong></td>
<td><strong>$2821 million</strong></td>
<td><strong>$262 million</strong></td>
<td><strong>10%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Wine Australia.

6.6.2 Winemakers wholesale into highly concentrated domestic retail markets

While most bulk wine is exported, some winemakers sell all or part of their production in the domestic wholesale market. Domestic wholesale prices for wine are constrained by competition between winemakers, imports, and the bargaining power of major supermarkets.

While warm climate grape markets are highly concentrated, the domestic wholesale wine market is far less concentrated. This is because the geographic dimension of the domestic wholesale market is effectively nationwide, whereas the geographic dimensions of the warm climate grape markets are generally the region of the winemaker’s winery.

In contrast to the domestic wholesale wine market, the domestic retail wine market is highly concentrated. The largest four retailers comprise around 80 per cent of the market\textsuperscript{219}, and the two major players, Woolworths (BWS, Cellarmasters, Dan Murphy’s and Langton’s) and Coles (First Choice Liquor, Liquorland and Vintage Cellars), accounted for over 60 per cent of industry revenue in 2017–18.

Additionally, retailers can import wine, which is another source of competition for Australian winemakers. As stated in chapter 1, New Zealand Sauvignon Blanc has been the highest selling white wine in Australia since 2009. Actual or potential competition from imported goods constrains the prices that can be achieved by domestic winemakers to some extent, as retailers have the ability to substitute local with imported products if domestic prices are not competitive.

The degree to which retailers can switch between local and imported products depends on the extent to which consumers consider imports to be a substitute for Australian products, and may be impacted by customer preferences for particular brands or local produce. Imports have risen in recent years, from 86.2 million litres in 2012–13 to 96.7 million litres in 2016–17\textsuperscript{220}.

This high level of retail market concentration has been accompanied by the two major retailers as well as Aldi developing private label wines. The retailers contract wine production, predominantly to large winemakers, and focus on producing low to middle priced wine. These wines compete directly with

\textsuperscript{218} Note: FOB refers to ‘free on board’.
the winemakers’ equivalent wines. Woolworths has more than 200 private label wines and Coles more than 75.221

Australian Grape and Wine Inc have submitted that there are few must-have brands that retailers need for their businesses, and that there is enormous competition for retail shelf space between Australian winemakers, private label retailer brands and international wine brands. Similarly, winemakers have told the ACCC that, in their dealings with large retailers, they are generally:

- price takers
- limited in their ability to pass on cost increases to retailers and, in their experience, attempts to do so have resulted in their products being destocked
- forced to accept other terms and conditions, including granting exclusivity over certain labels to the retailer
- facing increasing competition due to the retailers giving increased prominence and promotion to their private label wines and imported wines.

### 6.6.3 Winemakers have limited ability to pass on higher costs

Being largely price takers in the export and domestic retail markets means that winemakers cannot simply pass higher grape prices and other costs along the supply chain. Winemakers are constrained as to the prices they can afford to pay for grapes which, at times, can lead to downward pressure on grape prices.

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7. Australian Wine Industry Code of Conduct

Key points

- The voluntary *Australian Wine Industry Code of Conduct* (Code) sets out minimum standards for supply agreements, and procedures for the resolution of disputes over price and quality assessments conducted in the vineyard.

- The Code has not been widely adopted by winemakers. Signatories to the Code account for less than half of all wine grapes purchased from both warm and cool climate regions. Since 2014, there have been only four new signatories. There have been no new signatories following release of the ACCC’s Interim Report, although at least one large winemaker has expressed a willingness to become a signatory.

- Coverage of the Code varies significantly between regions. For instance, none of the major winemakers from the Riverina are signatories to the Code.

- Requirements around indicative pricing are the main reason given by non-signatories in refusing to sign the Code. Winemakers have also expressed concerns about third party dispute resolution and the minimum requirements for grape supply agreements under the Code.

- There was a significant increase in the number of disputes raised with the Code Management Committee (Code Committee) during the 2017 and 2018 harvests. This may indicate that the Code’s dispute resolution procedures are gaining traction with growers.

- The dispute resolution mechanisms set out in the Code are providing a net benefit to the industry. However, these mechanisms can be improved and expanded to cover a greater range of disputes, particularly non-price contractual disputes and quality assessments at the winery.

- If winemakers continue to refrain from signing the Code, a mandatory code may be required to ensure most growers have the benefit of the Code’s additional protections.

The ACCC considers it is beneficial to have an industry-led code of conduct to govern contractual relations between grape growers and winemakers. However, growers, grower representatives, winemakers and the Code Committee have all expressed concerns over shortcomings of the current Code as an effective regulatory instrument in the wine industry.

The ACCC’s analysis of the current Code centres on criticisms raised by industry stakeholders regarding the lack of signatories to the Code, concerns about indicative pricing notifications and the efficacy of dispute resolution mechanisms under the Code.

Despite the fact that some growers and winemakers have been able to successfully resolve disputes under the Code, the ACCC’s overall view is that the current Code is not working as intended to balance the interests of growers and winemakers. The ACCC considers that the Code has the potential to provide greater benefits to the industry if certain amendments are adopted and there is a significant increase in uptake by winemakers.

This chapter discusses:

- the contractual framework provided by the Code
- dispute resolution mechanisms under the Code
- the effectiveness of the Code as an industry-led regulatory instrument
- recommendations to improve access to, and outcomes from, dispute resolution under the Code.
7.1 There are three models for industry codes in Australia

Industry codes of conduct set out minimum standards of commercial conduct for industry participants. Broadly speaking, industry codes come in three forms:

- Non-prescribed voluntary industry codes—these are codes developed and administered by industry participants. They are only enforceable to the extent that the industry includes an enforcement mechanism in the code.
- Prescribed voluntary codes—these are voluntary codes that industry participants have the option of signing up to, with signatories subject to some limited enforcement action by the ACCC and liable to compensate affected parties for any harm suffered a result of a breach of the code. The Food & Grocery Code is an example of a prescribed voluntary code.\(^{222}\)
- Mandatory codes—these codes are binding on all industry participants and are subject to enforcement by the ACCC. The ACCC can take action against parties that breach a mandatory code, including in the form of financial penalties or infringement notices. The Horticulture Code of Conduct is an example of a mandatory code.\(^{223}\)

The Horticulture Code of Conduct does not apply to produce sold directly to processors such as winemakers. However, it does apply to produce sold through non-processors such as brokers. Brokers are used rarely by growers in warm climate regions. Consequently our market study focusses on the Code.

Industry codes can help to address specific market failures that cannot be addressed by individual industry participants.

7.2 The Code is intended to balance the interests of growers and winemakers

The Code was established in December 2008 by the Wine Industry Relations Committee (WIRC) as a joint committee of the then Winemakers’ Federation of Australia (WFA) and Wine Grape Growers Association (WGGA). The WGGA became Australian Vignerons in 2016. In February 2019, Australian Vignerons and the WFA merged to become Australian Grape and Wine Inc (AGWI). Consequently AGWI has inherited responsibility for administering the Code.

The Code is a non-prescribed voluntary industry code.\(^{224}\) Wine grape purchasers have the option of becoming signatories to the Code. There are no joining fees or ongoing annual costs associated with signing the Code.

A list of current signatories is published on the Code website.\(^{225}\)

Under the Code, three-yearly reviews are required to be conducted by the Code Committee. In their submission to our Interim Report, AGWI stated it agreed with the ACCC’s recommendation that the Code be strengthened and indicated it would conduct a comprehensive review of the Code.\(^{226}\)

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226 Australian Grape & Wine Incorporated (AGWI), Submission in response to the ACCC wine grape market study interim report, AGWI, Canberra, 2019, p. 19.
7.2.1 The Code is administered by the Code Committee

The Code Committee is responsible for administering the Code. Its functions include:

- monitoring and assessing the operation of the Code
- publishing an annual report on the Code’s performance
- recommending amendments to the Code
- promoting further adoption of the Code among industry participants
- facilitating the resolution of disputes between growers and signatories to the Code
- making determinations regarding complaints about breaches of the Code.\(^\text{227}\)

The number of members sitting on the Code Committee has varied slightly since 2011, when the Code Committee replaced the Code Administration Committee. Currently, the Code Committee is comprised of an Independent Chair, and six members representing a variety of industry participants.

The Code Committee is supported by a Code Secretariat. The Code Committee may delegate any of its powers and duties under the Code to the Code Secretariat, which is funded by AGWI.\(^\text{228}\) Since 2009, The Accord Group has acted as the Code Secretariat.

7.2.2 AGWI’s organisational structure is skewed towards winemakers

The Board of AGWI is responsible for appointing members to the Code Committee and approving recommendations from the Code Committee to amend the Code.\(^\text{229}\) Decisions by the Board of AGWI require approval from 80 per cent of those voting on the motion.\(^\text{230}\)

AGWI’s Board consists of 16 Directors and the President. Each of AGWI’s four Membership Committees appoints four Directors to the Board of AGWI. The following committees are responsible for appointing members to the Board:

- the Small Winemakers’ Membership Committee
- the Medium Winemakers’ Membership Committee
- the Large Winemakers’ Membership Committee
- the Vigneron’s Membership Committee.

Grower representation with regard to the Code should be improved

Given the organisational structure of AGWI, which has three membership committees for winemakers and only one membership committee representing growers\(^\text{231}\), the composition of the Code Committee may become skewed in favour of winemakers. This has the potential to undermine the Code’s effectiveness and reduce grower confidence.

In the Interim Report, the ACCC recommended that the Code be amended to guarantee equal representation of growers (including grower representative bodies) and winemakers on the Code Committee. The ACCC considered that equal grower and winemaker representation would be likely to:

- lead to increased interaction between grower representatives and winemakers to improve the dispute resolution procedures under the Code
- allow grower representatives to increase grower awareness of the Code and promote access to Code processes

\(^{227}\) Code, pts. 1, 3–5.
\(^{228}\) ibid, cl. 5.1.3.
\(^{229}\) ibid, cls 5.1.2, 5.1.6.
\(^{231}\) The Vigneron’s Membership Committee.
lead to balanced administration of the Code, including having increased consideration of grower interests when amendments to the Code are considered

increase grower confidence in the Code.

The ACCC also recommended that AGWI appoint a sub-committee equally representing growers and winemakers to decide on proposed amendments to the Code.

AGWI has confirmed that it will implement both of these recommendations. AGWI will shortly establish a new Code Committee reporting to a board sub-committee; both of which will have equal grower and winemaker representation.

The ACCC welcomes this development and encourages the new Code Committee to ensure the ACCC’s recommendations regarding quality assessments, pricing, payment periods and dispute resolution are also addressed in the Code.

7.2.3 The Code regulates a number of industry practices

The Code sets out minimum standards for supply agreements and provides for dispute resolution mechanisms between growers and purchasers. Under the Code, agreements must be in writing and specify:

- the term of the agreement
- the pricing method used between the parties
- any terms relating to price adjustments
- any quality standards
- when title in the grapes passes to the winemaker
- any terms relating to force majeure
- any restrictions on the assignment and sale of vineyards
- dispute resolution mechanisms consistent with those set out in the Code.

Where the agreement does not set a fixed or base price for the grapes, purchasers buying grapes from the warm climate and Hunter Valley regions must communicate an indicative price by 15 December each year, before making a final price offer closer to harvest. A detailed discussion of indicative pricing under the Code is in chapter 4, including our recommendation to amend the Code to remove indicative pricing.

The Code also sets out minimum payment terms for supply agreements. Broadly consistent with SA legislation, the Code requires growers be paid one third of the purchase price at the end of the month following the month of delivery, one third at the end of June each year, and the balance at the end of September each year. Parties may also agree to different payment terms than those set out in the Code. A detailed discussion of payment periods is in chapter 5, including our recommendation to amend the Code to include best practice 30 day payment terms for large winemakers.

Dispute resolution processes under the Code are intended to assist growers and winemakers to resolve certain types of disputes, impartially and in a timely and cost effective manner, while maintaining harmonious commercial relations.

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233 ibid.
234 Code, pts. 2-3.
235 ibid, cl. 2.6.1.
236 ibid, pts. 1, 3.
7.2.4 The Code creates contractual obligations

Signatories to the Code agree to be bound by its provisions in their commercial dealings with growers.\(^{237}\)

Clause 2.1.1 provides that each supply agreement must contain a statement that it is governed by the Code and that, in the event of any inconsistency between the Code and the agreement, the Code will prevail. The ACCC considers that the inclusion of a statement complying with clause 2.1.1 in the parties’ supply agreement is likely to give the provisions of the Code contractual force. In these circumstances, a breach of the Code could also constitute a breach of contract.

Separately from any action for breach of contract, the Code Committee is responsible for determining whether alleged breaches of the Code are substantiated. Part 4 of the Code sets out the procedures for dealing with a complaint that a signatory has breached the Code. If the Code Committee determines that a breach has occurred, it may instruct the signatory of the steps required to remedy the breach, or remove the winemaker from the list of signatories to the Code.\(^{238}\)

7.3 The Code has had some positive impact but could be improved

During the ACCC’s consultation with growers, some acknowledged that they had benefitted from using the Code’s price dispute mechanisms to obtain a better price than that initially offered by their winemaker. However, industry participants have also reported a number of shortcomings. These include:

- the low number of signatories undermines the effectiveness of the Code for the whole industry
- dispute resolution processes are limited to disputes over price and quality assessments in the vineyard
- dispute resolution processes are perceived as costly
- there is a lack of industry experts available to be appointed to determine disputes and many growers question the impartiality of these experts
- while indicative pricing and price offer mechanisms provide some process for negotiating price, the timing of release limits their efficacy as a negotiation tool
- minimum requirements under the Code have served to further entrench lengthy payment terms across the industry.

Indicative pricing and payment terms are discussed further in chapters 4 and 5 respectively. The remainder of this chapter considers other concerns with the Code and recommends measures to improve its effectiveness.

7.3.1 There is a need for accessible dispute resolution in the wine industry

Access to effective and efficient dispute resolution is important for a well-functioning market. For dispute resolution mechanisms to be effective, they should be fair to all parties, simple to follow, and seek to achieve an outcome in a cost effective and timely manner. Effective dispute resolution can reduce imbalances in bargaining power, improve transparency and lead to fairer contract terms.

The Code provides limited access to dispute resolution procedures for certain types of disputes. As outlined in chapter 5, most growers dealing with non-signatories to the Code do not have access to effective dispute resolution procedures.

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\(^{237}\) ibid, pt. 1.
\(^{238}\) ibid, cl. 4.1.10.
7.3.2 The Code provides dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve price and quality disputes in the vineyard

The Code provides mechanisms for disputing final price offers from winemakers and quality assessments conducted by winemakers in the vineyard. These processes are virtually identical, the only difference being that the timeframes for the resolution of quality assessment disputes are significantly shorter. The processes are summarised in figure 7.1.

The Code’s processes encourage parties to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution. Disputes that cannot be resolved in the first instance may require the appointment of an independent expert, under the processes set out under the Code. While the qualifications to be an independent expert are not specified in the Code, the Code website states the independent expert must be either a qualified winemaker or viticulturist with a minimum five years’ experience in assessing and grading wine grapes, as well as having significant commercial experience in this area and in contracting arrangements.²³⁹

Independent experts make a determination by applying the Code, the terms of the parties’ agreement and, where necessary, the independent expert’s own procedures. Their decision is final and binding on the parties, except in the case of a manifest error or proven misconduct.²⁴⁰

The Code Committee has taken a strict view on the enforcement of time limits under the Code. The Secretariat will not assist parties if a dispute is raised out of time, unless both parties agree to waive the time limits under the Code.²⁴¹

²⁴⁰ Code, pt. 3.
Figure 7.1: Processes for the resolution of price disputes and quality assessments conducted in the vineyard under the Code

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pricing disputes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The grower issues a Notice of Dispute (the Notice) to the purchaser and forwards a summary of the dispute to the Code Committee.</td>
<td>Within seven business days of receiving a final price offer from the purchaser.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The purchaser must respond to the Notice in writing and inform the Code Committee that it has responded to the Notice.</td>
<td>Within seven business days of receiving the Notice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The parties are given time to negotiate a resolution to the dispute. During this time, the Secretariat may contact the parties to facilitate a resolution to the dispute.</td>
<td>The relevant period for negotiation is:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ 60 business days from the date the Notice was issued, if the Notice was issued before 30 April.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ 14 business days from the date the Notice was issued, if the Notice was issued after 30 April.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the parties fail to resolve the dispute, they may jointly appoint an independent expert to determine the dispute.</td>
<td>The parties have seven business days from the expiry of the relevant period to appoint an expert.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the parties cannot agree on the appointment of an expert, either party can apply to the Code Committee to appoint an expert on their behalf.</td>
<td>A party must apply to the Code Secretariat within 14 business days of the expiry of the relevant period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The independent expert considers the matter and delivers their determination.</td>
<td>The expert has 14 business days from the date of their appointment to deliver a determination. If the matter requires extensive research or investigation, this is extended to ‘a reasonable timeframe’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vineyard quality assessment disputes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The grower issues a Notice to the purchaser and forwards a summary of the dispute to the Code Committee.</td>
<td>As soon as practicable after being notified of the downgrade or rejection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The purchaser must respond to the Notice in writing and inform the Code Committee of this.</td>
<td>Within 48 hours from the time the Notice was issued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The parties have a short period for negotiation. During this time, the Code Secretariat may contact the parties to facilitate a resolution to the dispute.</td>
<td>The parties have 72 hours from the time the Notice was issued to negotiate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the parties cannot resolve the dispute, they may jointly appoint an independent expert.</td>
<td>The parties have 96 hours from the time the Notice was issued to jointly appoint an expert.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the parties cannot agree on the appointment of an expert, either party can apply to the Code Committee to appoint an expert on their behalf.</td>
<td>Such application must be made within 120 hours of the time the Notice was issued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The independent expert delivers their determination.</td>
<td>The expert has 48 hours from the time of their appointment to make a determination. If the matter requires extensive research or investigation, this is extended to ‘a reasonable timeframe’.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Code.242

7.3.3 Use of the Code’s dispute resolution mechanisms has increased

From 2009 to 2018, the Code Secretariat received 99 requests from growers seeking assistance with dispute resolution under the Code (figure 7.2). Of these enquiries, 85 requests fell within the Code’s dispute resolution provisions. Four of these matters related to quality assessments in the vineyard, while

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242 Code, cls. 3.1–2.
81 related to pricing disputes. The vast majority of these pricing disputes related to prices offered by three signatories to the Code for the 2017 and 2018 harvests.\textsuperscript{243}

The ACCC understands the increase in growers seeking to access dispute resolution under the Code has largely been driven by grower representative groups. These groups have increased efforts to educate growers about the processes under the Code. They are also advocating that growers use these processes to pursue price increases in the context of improved demand for grapes.

The Code Committee’s annual reports and the ACCC’s consultation with industry indicate that disputes are usually resolved before an independent expert is appointed to determine the dispute. Independent experts were only appointed in four of the complaints received by the Secretariat.

Disputes are resolved on a confidential basis.\textsuperscript{244} However, submissions received by the ACCC have indicated that in resolving disputes, winemakers have offered price increases, waived the need for compliance with certain quality specifications, or released growers from supply agreements.

\textbf{Figure 7.2: Complaints received by the Code Committee, 2009 to 2018}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Enquiries</th>
<th>No jurisdiction</th>
<th>Disputes outside Code</th>
<th>Disputes within Code</th>
<th>Price disputes</th>
<th>Vineyard assessment disputes</th>
<th>Informally settled</th>
<th>Expert appointed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009–10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010–11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011–12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012–13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013–14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014–15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015–16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016–17</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017–18</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Code Committee, Annual Reports 2009 to 2018.

\textbf{7.3.4 Dispute resolution procedures under the Code should be expanded}

Clause 3.3 of the Code does not seem to adequately assist the parties to resolve disputes arising out of quality assessments conducted at the weighbridge. Further, the ACCC considers it would be beneficial for the Code to provide a mechanism to assist the parties to resolve other kinds of contractual disputes. This mechanism should apply to all winemakers regardless of size.

\textbf{The Code does not provide a process for the resolution of quality assessment disputes at the winery}

In almost all standard form contracts reviewed by the ACCC, the purchaser has the right to perform additional quality assessments at the winery where it may downgrade or reject grapes.


including upon delivery at the weighbridge. Chapter 3 contains a detailed discussion about quality assessment processes.

If a purchaser seeks to impose financial penalties or reject the grapes at the weighbridge, clause 3.3 of the Code provides that the purchaser should notify the grower of that decision ‘as soon as practicable’. The Code states that growers should be given an opportunity, where practical, to inspect the grapes. It encourages growers to try and reach agreement with the purchaser on the nature and extent of the downgrade and any resulting price adjustment. This is intended to allow the continued processing of the grapes, or rejection of the grapes.\(^{245}\)

The Code states disputes over quality assessments at the weighbridge need to be resolved quickly, ideally within 12 hours of the delivery of the grapes. However, the Code does not provide a mechanism for independent assessment or arbitration of the dispute. The Code specifically states:

> For the avoidance of any doubt but without limiting the other obligations set out in this clause, the Code does not require an independent expert to resolve disputes over downgrades and rejections at the weighbridge.\(^{246}\)

The ACCC recognises the need to ensure grapes are processed efficiently during busy harvest schedules by avoiding drawn-out disputes at the winery. However, the ACCC has concerns about winemakers having broad or ultimate discretion under contracts to make unilateral quality assessment determinations, without providing any recourse to growers (see chapters 3 and 5). The issue is particularly problematic where growers have little visibility, and potentially limited understanding, over how quality assessments are conducted.

In the Interim Report, the ACCC recommended that the Code should be amended to provide a structured process for reviewing adverse quality assessments at the winery.

Growers and their associations were generally supportive of this recommendation, and winemakers did not express disagreement with this proposal.

The ACCC maintains that the dispute resolution mechanisms under the Code should be expanded to provide a structured process for the resolution of disputes over quality assessment decisions made at the winery (including at the weighbridge).

This process should include the use and retention of digital images to inform dispute resolution, particularly for issues such as disease and the presence of matter other than grapes. The beef industry has had some success using digital images as a mechanism for dispute resolution in situations where objective measurement and statistically appropriate sampling is not viable.

The ACCC also sought feedback on the feasibility of taking, holding and testing retention samples if a winemaker downgrades or rejects a delivery of grapes and the likely costs of having these samples tested by an independent third party. Stakeholder responses were generally positive on this point, including a joint submission from the Australian Wine Research Institute and AGWI stating it would be financially feasible to take, hold and test such samples.

The ACCC considers the Code should be amended to require that winemakers hold a random retention sample for each delivery in respect of which they decide to downgrade or reject the grapes. The ACCC understands that most winemakers already collect samples from grape deliveries, and that the introduction of this requirement would not be unduly burdensome.

The Code should also provide a process for growers to elect to have the retention sample tested by an independent third party to determine whether the grapes met the relevant quality standards. The Code Committee, in consultation with industry participants, should develop procedures for the holding and testing of retention samples and managing disputes.

\(^{245}\) Code, cl. 3.3.

\(^{246}\) ibid.
Expansion of dispute resolution procedures to include contractual disputes

Since 2009, the Code Secretariat has received a number of requests from growers seeking assistance with disputes that fell outside the Code’s procedures (see figure 7.2 above). These enquiries generally related to contractual disputes between the parties, indicating that there is demand for structured dispute resolution processes beyond the subject matter currently covered by the Code. Growers expressed a strong desire for more comprehensive dispute resolution processes during the consultation process.

In the Interim Report, the ACCC recommended that the Code should be amended to provide a structured process for resolving contractual disputes, as well as other types of disputes that may arise out of supply agreements.

Growers and their associations were generally supportive of this recommendation, while winemakers largely did not express a view.

The ACCC maintains that the Code should be amended to provide broader dispute resolution processes for non-price contractual disputes and quality assessments at the winery. For example, a structured process to allow growers to challenge termination notices or negotiate an early exit from a supply agreement should be considered.

The ACCC sought industry feedback on an appropriate dispute resolution model to ensure disputes are resolved fairly, efficiently and without imposing significant costs on the parties. Stakeholders did not provide any feedback on specific models. The ACCC expects this will form part of the upcoming Code review.

7.3.5 Independent experts are rarely used to resolve disputes

Most disputes raised under the Code have been resolved by mutual agreement between the parties, without resorting to the appointment of an independent expert. Winemakers have expressed that both growers and winemakers are generally not inclined to involve third parties, such as experts, in their disputes. They state that winemakers and growers prefer to negotiate mutually satisfactory outcomes rather than engage a third party whose determination may favour one of the parties.

That said, the potential that an unresolved dispute can be dealt with by a third party whose decision is binding on both parties undoubtedly provides an incentive for parties in dispute to reach an agreement.

A number of growers and grower representative bodies have indicated that growers are not confident that experts can act impartially, as most of them also work with winemakers and are likely to be reliant on continued engagement by winemakers for ongoing income.

Some grower representative bodies have also highlighted that there are few or no independent experts in their region to resolve disputes, which could cause delays and increase costs in the resolution of the dispute. However, Murray Valley Winegrowers indicated in their submission that there were a sufficient number of qualified experts in their region.

The Code requires that parties bear the costs of appointing an independent expert equally. This is likely to impose a more significant burden on growers and discourage them from pursuing more formal dispute resolution. Growers generally do not have a clear understanding of the costs of appointing an independent expert, including the number of hours of work the expert would need to undertake to deliver a determination. Further, because of concerns about the impartiality of experts, growers consider that they would also need to engage lawyers. The potentially high costs of engaging industry experts and lawyers disincentivise growers from progressing to the formal stages of the Code’s dispute resolution procedures.

Issues around the unknown costs of dispute resolution are compounded by the lack of transparency over market prices and quality assessment processes. There is significant potential for growers to incur costs, without any real understanding of the merits of their dispute and consequent likelihood of success.

247 ibid, cls. 3.1.6, 3.2.6.
Unless the Code Committee is able to identify a larger pool of independent experts with an appropriate degree of geographical coverage, and consider ways to reduce the costs of engaging experts to resolve disputes, it is likely the independent expert provisions will continue to go unused.

In the Interim Report, the ACCC sought feedback on strategies to reduce the costs associated with appointing an independent expert and increase the availability of qualified experts in all winemaking regions to resolve disputes. Stakeholders did not provide any relevant feedback and the ACCC encourages the upcoming Code review to consider such strategies.

### 7.3.6 Timeframes for the resolution of disputes should be improved

Some growers have raised concerns about the timeframes for dispute resolution under the Code. For price disputes, growers are concerned that their busy workload during harvest prevents them from disputing prices until after harvest, when they no longer have control over their produce. The Code Committee partially addressed these issues in December 2014 by extending the time available for parties to negotiate a resolution to the dispute to 60 days, if the complainant issues a Notice before 30 April.248

Nevertheless, the Code requires price disputes to be resolved before regional average price data is available. This data is currently published by Wine Australia around August each year. It is not until after this data is published that growers have a better understanding of the merits of their price dispute. Chapter 4 contains a detailed discussion of the lack of price transparency in the industry and the consequences of this.

While the Code’s focus on facilitating the informal resolution of disputes has likely assisted in preserving commercial relationships between growers and winemakers, it does not adequately address the bargaining power imbalances between the parties. Because of the perishable nature of grapes, growers bear significant agricultural risks up until the time the purchaser accepts their grapes. Any delays to harvest or delivery of the grapes may result in significant financial losses for the grower, placing them in a weak bargaining position. Therefore, growers cannot risk delaying harvest to negotiate a better price.

Australian Vignerons’ submission to the ACCC’s Issues Paper stated that the Code should aim to ensure that any issues relating to grape intake are settled prior to harvest. This is so that any disputes can be managed in a timely fashion, and to ensure that growers do not incur excessive costs.249

The ACCC recommends that the Code review consider whether the processes and timeframes for dispute resolution under the Code are fit for purpose.

### 7.3.7 Some growers do not use dispute resolution mechanisms for fear of retribution

Growers expressed concern to the ACCC that they risk damaging their relationship with the purchaser of their grapes if they raise a dispute. Grower representative bodies have indicated that growers are afraid that if they lodge dispute resolution notices they will be branded ‘troubleshooters’, and that their contracts may not be renewed in the future.

The Code Committee has noted that reports of intimidation of growers, whether real or perceived, are likely to lead to the dispute resolution provisions not being utilised.250 The Code Committee has acknowledged that it must take an educative role and promote dispute resolution under the Code.251

The majority of respondents to the ACCC’s grower survey indicated that they believed that engaging in dispute resolution procedures could harm their future business dealings with purchasers (figure 7.3).

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251 ibid.
As noted in 7.3.3, there was an increase in the number of disputes in 2017 and 2018. This may indicate that growers are more willing to raise disputes with purchasers. However, the vast majority of these disputes related to only three winemakers, so this may not reflect an industry-wide change.

Other information received by the ACCC indicates that signatories to the Code are developing practices to better handle disputes falling under the Code. For instance, Accolade has indicated that disputes are handled by its Chief Viticulturist so that growers can continue to deal with their local viticulturist and not be concerned about damaging their working relationships. This also allows Accolade to obtain a better overall picture of the common causes of disputes. This may indicate a growing acceptance in the industry that disputes are part of the ordinary course of business.

It is likely that fears of retribution are currently more prevalent in light of the last cyclical downturn in the industry. As demand for grapes increases, growers are likely to become less concerned about potential retaliatory action from winemakers, and start to feel that they have sufficient bargaining power to negotiate and raise disputes concerning contracts. Indeed, the recent and marked increase in disputes under the Code indicates that this shift may already be occurring.

The ACCC considers that the Code Committee should continue to advocate for adherence to the Code and provide education on the Code to growers and winemakers. This will help promote access to, and the effectiveness of, the Code’s dispute resolution processes.

### 7.3.8 The low number of signatories undermines the efficacy of the Code

Of Australia’s approximately 2500 winemakers, 43 have signed up to the Code, including six of Australia’s 20 largest winemakers (by grape intake).\(^{252}\) While these winemakers represent a significant proportion of the total market for the purchase of grapes, they ultimately represent less than half of all grapes purchased in Australia. Since 2014, there have been only four new signatories to the Code.

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The low number of signatories undermines grower confidence in dealings with winemakers and has the potential to exacerbate bargaining power imbalances between growers and winemakers because:

- growers do not have consistent and ready access to structured dispute resolution
- winemakers may announce indicative prices or final prices later than the timeframes provided by the Code, further reducing price transparency and certainty
- winemakers may enter into contracts on terms less favourable than the minimum terms set out in the Code
- winemakers may continue trading with growers, on a long-term basis, without written contracts.

In its 2012–13 annual report, the Code Committee reported on the reasons given by non-signatories for electing not to sign the Code. Winemakers have expressed:

- concerns over having to comply with indicative pricing requirements
- concerns over adhering to minimum requirements for payment terms
- that they are not comfortable with third party dispute resolution
- that they do not have or want written contracts
- that other winemakers in their region are not signatories
- that being a signatory is unnecessary because they are already complying with what they consider to be the Code’s key requirements.  

These concerns generally reflect those raised with the ACCC in the course of this market study. In addition to the above, some non-signatories to the Code have expressed concern that becoming a signatory would constrain their capacity to negotiate commercially appropriate agreements with specific growers on a case-by-case basis. One winemaker also indicated concern that the Code imposes significant obligations on winemakers in their dealings with growers without providing a commercial benefit.

**Coverage of the Code varies across the warm climate growing regions**

Data received by the ACCC indicates that the quantity of grapes purchased by signatories to the Code from independent growers varies significantly between the three warm climate regions. These differences are set out in figure 7.4 below.

**Figure 7.4: Grapes purchased from independent growers by signatories in warm climate regions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total grapes purchased from region (tonnes)</th>
<th>Percentage of grapes purchased by signatories (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Riverland</td>
<td>355 078</td>
<td>around 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murray Valley</td>
<td>242 276</td>
<td>around 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverina</td>
<td>201 296</td>
<td>&lt; 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Wine Australia and data supplied by industry.  

Signatories to the Code purchase significant quantities of grapes from growers in the Riverland and Murray Valley regions. In contrast, in the Riverina region, signatories to the Code purchase a negligible quantity of grapes from third party growers. It is likely that the problems associated with low numbers of signatories to the Code are felt most acutely by growers in the Riverina region.

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254 The total amount of grapes purchased is based on figures disclosed in Wine Australia, *National vintage report 2018*, Wine Australia, Adelaide, 2018. The percentage of grapes purchased by signatories to the Code is based on data provided to the ACCC by winemakers.
More winemakers should sign up to the Code

The ACCC considers that an industry code is an appropriate mechanism for addressing many of the market failures identified in this report, including by:

- improving minimum standards for payment periods
- improving and expanding dispute resolution mechanisms
- improving access to dispute resolution mechanisms.

The ACCC considers that a voluntary code will not effectively address issues in the wine grape market without more winemakers becoming signatories. Unless more winemakers sign on, many industry issues are likely to remain unaddressed. For example, without winemakers in the Riverina region signing the Code, the ACCC considers that many growers are likely to continue trading without written contracts and will not have meaningful access to dispute resolution mechanisms.

In the Interim Report, the ACCC recommended that all winemakers in Australia with crushing capacities above 10 000 tonnes sign the Code. The ACCC examined the proposed threshold as part of its industry consultations on the Interim Report.

Several growers and their associations queried the proposed threshold of 10 000 tonnes, with some suggesting it be lower or there be none. They argued it was important for all winemakers to follow basic business practices such as having written contracts, and that any threshold would encourage winemakers to re-structure their businesses to avoid the application of the Code.

AGWI also did not agree with having a threshold and were critical of splitting the sector based on winemakers’ size. While winemakers generally did not comment on this proposal, most stated they were in agreement with AGWI’s submission.

The ACCC has had regard to the lack of industry support for the proposed threshold and recommends that all winemakers that purchase grapes from growers should sign the Code.

At the same time, the ACCC acknowledges that there are differences in the nature of a large winemakers’ business compared to small winemakers and considers these should be reflected in the Code. For example, the ACCC accept that its 30 day best practice payment terms recommendation may not be suitable for small winemakers (see chapter 5).

In their submission, AGWI stated it intends to take action to encourage more signatories, and at least one large winemaker has indicated they will consider signing the Code. The ACCC welcomes these developments but notes that there were no new signatories to the Code following release of the ACCC’s Interim Report.

After signing up to the Code, the ACCC encourages winemakers to offer to amend existing supply agreements to ensure that they comply with the Code’s requirements.

7.4 ACCC recommends the Code remains voluntary at this stage

In the Interim Report, the ACCC sought feedback on its position of not recommending a mandatory code of conduct. Stakeholder feedback was polarised between growers and winemakers.

A number of growers and their associations argued that winemakers would not engage with the Code unless it was made mandatory. These included growers and grower associations from both warm and cool climate regions. These submissions pointed to the low levels of engagement with the Code to date to argue that a mandatory code was necessary to drive industry change.

255 AGWI, Submission in response to the ACCC wine grape market study interim report, p. 20.
256 ibid, pp. 19–20.
None of the winemakers, either signatory or non-signatory, supported a mandatory code. These submissions generally took the position that there was no demonstrable need for a mandatory code.

The ACCC will review the progress of the industry in adopting the ACCC’s final recommendations 12 to 18 months after the release of the Final Report. After this review the ACCC may recommend to Government that a mandatory code be introduced if:

- more winemakers do not sign up to the Code
- the upcoming Code review does not address matters raised in this report regarding quality assessments (see chapter 3), pricing (see chapter 4), payment terms (see chapter 5) and dispute resolution. A full list of the ACCC’s recommended changes to the Code is at appendix A.

At a minimum, the ACCC expects that all large winemakers will sign the Code. Large winemakers make up approximately one per cent of all winemakers (see figure 1.6). At the same time, large winemakers have a disproportionate impact on the market as they are responsible for producing 83 per cent of all wine in Australia (see figure 1.6). Large winemakers are generally highly sophisticated businesses and are well placed to adapt to the requirements imposed by the Code.

The ACCC expects that within 12 months from the date of this report:

- the administrative changes set out in section 7.2.2 would be implemented
- significant progress would be made towards implementing a modified Code.

The ACCC is hopeful that winemakers and growers will take the opportunity to implement effective self-regulation through the upcoming Code review. However, based on the feedback received to date, it is unlikely that the industry will adopt all of the ACCC’s recommendations voluntarily. This increases the likelihood that the ACCC will recommend introducing a mandatory code in due course.
Appendix A—Recommended changes to the Australian Wine Industry Code of Conduct

The ACCC’s recommended changes to the Code are summarised in the following table.

Figure A.1: Recommended changes to the Australian Wine Industry Code of Conduct

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Recommended change</th>
<th>Winemakers affected</th>
<th>Related recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 – Quality assessments</td>
<td>3.4.3</td>
<td>Require winemakers to use well-documented and objective testing and sampling techniques for quality assessments in the vineyard and at the winery where they are available.</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.4.5</td>
<td>Amend the Code to reflect updated industry guidance on quality assessment standards to clearly reflect current best practice.</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2.2</td>
<td>Require supply agreements to outline the testing and sampling methods that winemakers use to assess grape quality.</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 – Pricing</td>
<td>4.6.3</td>
<td>Remove the requirement for winemakers to provide Indicative Regional Prices.</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.6.5</td>
<td>Allow price disputes by growers up to three weeks after Wine Australia publishes final price information pursuant to Recommendation 6.</td>
<td>Buyers of warm climate grapes</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 – Contracting practices</td>
<td>5.4.4</td>
<td>Require best practice 30 day payment terms for large winemakers.</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 – Code of Conduct</td>
<td>7.2.2</td>
<td>Guarantee equal representation of growers (including grower representative bodies) and winemakers on the Code Committee.</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.3.4</td>
<td>Introduce a structured process for reviewing adverse quality assessment decisions made at the winery, including use of retention samples and images.</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.3.4</td>
<td>Introduce a structured process for resolution of contractual disputes and other disputes that may arise out of supply agreements.</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.3.5</td>
<td>Consider strategies to reduce the costs associated with appointing an independent expert and increase the availability of qualified experts in all winemaking regions.</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.3.6</td>
<td>Consider changes to the processes and timeframes for dispute resolution under the Code.</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>